for the Democratic nomination; or (b) Hart really did win the New Hampshire primary. In fact, I accept both of these non-media-based interpretations of Hart's early success as valid, at least in part. Nonetheless, I think that Hart's phenomenal surge in the national polls needs to be understood in terms of "mediality" as well as "reality." "Mediality" is reality, but reality filtered through the prism that is the press. "Mediality" reflects not merely events or conditions, but events and conditions as the press reports them, and, of course, as political leaders help to define and interpret them. Hart's case, as "mediality," is instructive, but it is also unusual. Our year-long record in 1994 shows at least as many cases in which "mediality" did not carry much electoral impact. But Hart's case does suggest what "mediality" can do during the early campaign. On February 25 (just prior to the primary in New Hampshire), seven percent of the Democrats preferred Hart for the nomination. On March 2, that finure was 34 percent; on March 6, 33 percent wanted l'art as the nominee. In fact, at one point during this period the polls indicated that un to three million Democrats per day were switching to Hart, the greatest preference shift ever in the history of nolling for the nomination. Again, nobody can prove that the news media caused this shift. I've already offered two other interpretations that emphasize "reality," not "mediality." Still, looking at the figure on the next name a figure that graphs Hart's share of the newshole on network news and his support in the one would have to be somewhat naive as to believe that Gary Hart Hart's Share of the Newshole on Network News and His Support in the Polls (First nine weeks of 1984) Robinson 4 in early March reflected only "reality." FIGURE ONE The correlation between Hart's share of the network newshole and Hart's standing in the polls is extraordinarily strong. Note, too, that support - If one needs a single case history suggesting that the news media broadcast journalism have an independent effect on the nominations process, Gary Hart's campaign in 1984 is about as good a case history anybody is likely to find. - How the News Media Influence the Process The Media Analysis Project has analyzed content and performance of the news media for the last two presidential elections. Focusing mainly on network journalism, we find three patterns of performance that are likely to produce "mediality" instead of "reality," and, therefore, to produce a mediabased effect on the nominations process. President One ought not be deterministic about these things however. Reagan transcended all of this in 1984. And Walter Mondale, the early frontrunner and choice of the party leadership, eventually did win his nomination. But, over time, these three practices will continue to produce real consequences in nominations politics, as they have since the early seventies. "Surprise Journalism" All the news media, but particularly broadcast journalism, have a marked tendency to shift attention dramatically to anyone who does surprisingly well The figures on Hart show that pattern in 1984, but not quite so clearly as figures for John Anderson in 1980. I have included data from our research in January, February, and March of 1990, looking at the attention given Anderson on CBS and in UPI. Unlike Hart, Anderson won no primary, no caucus. But he was the surprise candidate, especially when he came in second in the Vermont and Massachusetts primaries. Note that the Anderson "surprise" in 1980 produced nearly four times as much coverage in March as in February on CBS about three times as much in UPI. FIGURE TWO "Surprise journalism" followed Anderson in 1980 as it followed Hart in '84, and Jimmy Carter, as well, back in 1976. Four things need to be said about "surprise journalism." First, the news media acknowledge that they practice it "surprise journalism" being nothing more than the commitment by the press to cover what is new. Second, "surprise journalism" is much easier to defend than that which it replaced the journalism of "moral victory," the sort of reporting during the early 1970s in which Ceorge McGovern might actually be labelled as a "moral victor" by the media, even when McGovern lost the primary at issue. Third, "surprise journalism" need not always produce popular support for the candidate who increases his or her share of the newshole. Jesse Jackson could not trade his increasingly great exposure for increased support nearly as efficiently as Hart or Anderson. Fourth, despite Jackson's case, under most circumstances the "beneficiary" of "surprise journalism" will profit from the increased exposure, quickly and broadly. Even if the candidate doesn't win, "surprise journalism" matters. |