tion the distinction was quite the reverse; those who opposed the system, were there considered and styled the federal party, those who advocated it, the antifederal.

Viewing it as a national, not a federal government, as calculated and designed not to protect and preserve, but to abolish and annihilate the state governments, it was opposed for the following reasons, it was said, that this continent was much too extensive for one national government, which should have sufficient power and energy to pervade and hold in obedience and subjection all its parts, consistent with the enjoyment and preservation of liberty; that the genius and habits of the people of America, were opposed to such a government-That during their connexion with Great Britain, they had been accustomed to have all their concerns transacted within a narrow circle, their colonial district; they had been accustomed to have their seats of government near them, to which they might have access, without much inconvenience, when their business should require it-That at this time we find if a county is rather large the people complain of the inconvenience, and clamor for a division of their county, or for a removal of the place where their courts are held, so as to render it more central and convenient

That in those states, the territory of which is extensive, as soon as the population increases remote from the seat of government, the inhabitants are urgent for a removal of the seat of their government, or to be erected into a new state-As a proof of this, the inhabitants of the western parts of Virginia and North-Carolina, of Vermont and the province of Maine, were instances, even the inhabitants of the western parts of Pennsylvania, who it is said, already seriously look forward to the time when they shall either be erected into a new state, or have their seat of government removed to the Susquehanna.-If the inhabitants of the different states consider it as a grievance to attend a country court or the

seat of their own government, when a little inconvenient, can it be supposed they would ever submit to have a national government established, the seat of which would be more than a thousand miles removed from some of them? It was insisted that governments of a republican nature, are those best calculated to preserve the freedom and happiness of the citizen-That governments of this kind, are only calculated for a territory but smull in its extent; that the only method by which an extensive continent like America could be connected and united together consistent with the principles of freedom, must be by having a number of strong and energetic state governments for securing and protecting the rights of individuals forming those governments, and for regulating all their concerns; and a strong energetic federal government over those states for the protection and preservation, and for regulating the common concerns of the state. It was further insisted, that even if it was possible to effect a total abolition of the state governments at this time, and to establish one general government over the people of America, it could not long subsist, but in a little time would again be broken into a variety of governments of a smaller extent, similar in some manner to the present situation of this continent; the principal difference in all probability would be that the governments, so established, being affected by some violent convulsion, might not be formed on principles so favorable to liberty as those of our present state governments-That this ought to be an important consideration to such of the states who had excellent governments, which was the case with Maryland and most others, whatever it might be to persons who disapproving of their particular state government would be willing to hazard every thing to overturn and destroy it. These reasons, sir, influenced me to vote against two branches in the legislature, and against every part of the system which was repugnant to the principles of a federal go

vernment-Nor was there a single argument urged, or reason assigned, which to my mind was satisfactory, to prove that a good government on federal principles was unattainable, the whole of their arguments only proving, what none of us controverted, that our federal government as originally formed, was defective and wanted amendment-However, a majority of the convention hastily and inconsiderately, without condescending to make a fair trial, in their great wisdom, decided that a kind of government which a Montesquieu and a Price have declared the best calculated of any to preserve internal liberty, and to enjoy external strength and security, and the only one by which a large continent can be connected and united, consistent with the principles of liberty was totally impracticable, and they acted accordingly.

of

With respect to that part of the second section of the first article, which relates to the apportionment of representation and direct taxation, there were considerable objections made to it, besides the great objection of inequality-It was urged, that no principle could justify taking slaves into computation in apportioning the number of representatives a state should have in the governmentThat it involved the absurdity of increasing the power a state in making laws for free men in proportion as that state violated the rights of freedom-That it might be proper to take slaves into consideration, when taxes were to be apportioned, because it had a tendency to discourage slavery; but to take them into account in giving representation tended to encourage the slave trade, and to make it the interest of the states to continue that infamous traffic-That slaves could not be taken into account as men, or citizens, because they were not admitted to the rights of citizens, in the states which adopted or continued slavery-If they were to be taken into account as property, it was asked, what peculiar circumstance should render this property (of all others the most odious in its nature) en

titled to the high privilege of conferring consequence and power in the government to its possessors, rather than any other property: and why slaves should, as property,' be taken into account rather than horses, cattle, mules, or any other species; and it was observed by an honorable member from Massachusetts, that he considered it as dishonorable and humiliating to enter into compact with the slaves of the southern states, as it would with the horses and mules of the eastern. It was also objected, that the numbers of representatives appointed by this section to be sent by the particular states to compose the first legislature, were not precisely agreeable to the rule of representation adopted by this system, and that the numbers in this section are artfully lessened for the large states, while the smaller states have their full proportion in order to prevent the undue influence which the large states will have in the government from being too apparent; and I think, Mr. Speaker, that this objection is well founded. I have taken some pains to obtain information of the number of freemen and slaves in the different states, and I have reason to believe, that if the estimate was now taken, which is directed, and one delegate to be sent for every thirty thousand inhabitants, that Virginia would have at least twelve delegates, Massachusetts eleven, and Pennsylvania ten, instead of the number stated in this section; whereas the other states, I believe, would not have more than the number there allowed them, nor would Georgia, most probably at present, send more than two-If I am right, Mr. Speaker, upon the enumeration being made, and the representation being apportioned according to the rule prescribed, the whole number of delegates would be seventy-one, thirty-six of which would be a quorum to do business; the delegates of Virginia, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, would amount to thirty-three of that quorum-Those three states will, therefore, have much more than equal power and influence in making the laws

and regulations, which are to affect this continent, and will have a moral certainty of preventing any laws or regulations which they disapprove, althongh they might be thought ever so necessary by a great majority of the states-It was further objected, that even if the states who had most inhabitants ought to have a greater number of delegates, yet the number of delegates ought not to be in exact proportion to the number of inhabitants, because the influence and power of those states whose delegates are numerous, will be greater when compared to the influence and power of the other states, than the proportion which the numbers of their delegates bear to each other; as for instance, though Delaware has one delegate, and Virginia but ten, yet Virginia has more than ten times as much power and influence in the government as Dela ware; to prove this, it was observed that Virginia would have a much greater chance to carry any measure than any number of states whose delegates were altogether ten (suppose the states of Delaware, Connecticut, RhodeIsland, and New-Hampshire) since the ten delegates from Virginia in every thing that related to the interest of that state would act in union, and move one solid and compact body, whereas the delegates of these four states, though collectively equal in number to those from Virginia, coming from different states having different interests, will be less likely to harmonize and move in concert. As a further proof, it was said, that Virginia, as the system is now reported, by uniting with her the delegates of four other states, can carry a question against the sense and interest of the eight states by sixty-four different combina tions; the four states voting with Virginia, being every time so far different as not to be composed of the same four; whereas the state of Delaware can only, by uniting four other states with her, carry a measure against the sense of eight states by two different combinations-a mathematical proof that the state of Virginia has thirty-two times