The question was put on the amendment and lost-5 ayes-6 noes.

Mr. Mason. I make no motion, but throw out for the consideration of the convention, whether a person in the second branch ought not to be qualified as to property?

The question was then put on the clause, and lost-5 ayes-6 noes.

It was moved to strike out the clause, to be ineligible to any state office.

Mr. Madison. Congress heretofore depended on state interests-we are now going to pursue the same plan.

Mr. Wilson. Congress has been ill managed, because particular states controlled the union. In this convention, if a proposal is made promising independency to the general government, before we have done with it, it is so modified and changed as to amount to nothing. In the present case, the states may say, although I appoint you for six years, yet if you are against the state, your table will be unprovided. Is this the way you are to erect an independent government?

Mr. Butler. This second branch I consider as the aristocratic part of our government; and they must be controlled by the states, or they will be too independent.

Mr. Pinkney. The states and general government must stand together. On this plan have I acted throughout the whole of this business. I am therefore for expunging the clause. Suppose a member of this house was qualified to be a state judge, must the state be prevented from making the appointment?

Question put for striking out-8 ayes-3 noes.

The 5th resolve, that each house have the right of originating bills, was taken into consideration, and agreed to.

Adjourned till to-morrow morning.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 27th, 1787.

Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. The 6th resolve was postponed, in order to take into consideration the 7th and 8th resolves. The first clause of the 7th was proposed for consideration, which respected the suffrage of each state in the first branch of the legislature.

[Mr. Martin, the attorney general from Maryland, spoke on this subject upwards of three hours. As his arguments were too diffuse, and in many instances desultory, it was not possible to trace him through the whole, or to methodize his ideas into a systematic or argumentative arrangement. I shall therefore only note such points as I conceive merit most particular notice.]

The question is important, (said Mr. Martin,) and I have already expressed my sentiments on the subject. My opinion is, that the general government ought to protect and secure the state governments-others, however, are of a different sentiment, and reverse the principle.

The present reported system is a perfect medley of Confederated and national government, without example and without precedent. Many who wish the general government to protect the state governments, are anxious to have the line of jurisdiction well drawn and defined, so that they may not clash. This suggests the necessity of having this line well detailed-possibly this may be done. If we do this, the people will be convinced that we meant well to the state governments; and should there be any defects, they will trust a future convention with the power of making further amendments.

A general government may operate on individuals in cases of general concern, and still be federal. This distinction is with the states, as states, represented by the people of those states. States will take care of their in

ternal police and local concerns. The general government has no interest, but the protection of the whole. Every other government must fail. We are proceeding in forming this government as if there were no state governments at all. The states must approve, or you will have none at all. I have never heard of a confederacy having two legislative branches. Even the celebrated Mr. Adams, who talks so much of checks and balances, does not suppose it necessary in a confederacy. Public and domestic debts are our great distress. The treaty between Virginia and Maryland about the navigation of the Chesapeake and Potomac, is no infraction of the confederacy. The corner-stone of a federal government is equality of votes. States may surrender this right; but if they do, their liberties are lost. If I err on this point, it is the error of the head, not of the heart.

The first principle of government is founded on the natural rights of individuals, and in perfect equality. Locke, Vattel, Lord Somers, and Dr. Priestly, all confirm this principle. This principle of equality, when applied to individuals, is lost in some degree, when he becomes a member of a society, to which it is transferred; and this society, by the name of state or kingdom, is, with respect to others, again on a perfect footing of equality-a right to govern themselves as they please. Nor can any other state, of right, deprive them of this equality. If such a state confederates, it is intended for the good of the whole; and if it again confederate, those rights must be well guarded. Nor can any state dėmand a surrender of any of those rights; if it can, equality is already destroyed. We must treat as free states with each other, upon the same terms of equality that men originally formed themselves into societies. Vattel, Rutherford and Locke, are united in support of the position, that states, as to each other, are in a state of nature,

Thus, says Mr. Martin, have I travelled with the most respectable authorities in support of principles, all tending to prove the equality of independent states. This is equally applicable to the smallest as well as the largest states, on the true principles of reciprocity and political freedom.

Unequal confederacies can never produce good effects. Apply this to the Virginia plan. Out of the number 90, Virginia has 16 votes, Massachusetts 14, Pennsylvania 12-in all 42. Add to this a state having four votes, and it gives a majority in the general legislature. Consequently a combination of these states will govern the remaining nine or ten states. Where is the safety and independency of those states? Pursue this subject farther. The executive is to be appointed by the legislature, and becomes the executive in consequence of this undue influence. And hence flows the appointment of all your officers, civil, military and judicial. The executive is also to have a negative on all laws. Suppose the possibility of a combination often states-he negatives a law-it is totally lost, because those states cannot form two thirds of the legislature. I am willing to give up private interest for the public good-but I must be satisfied first, that it is the public interest-and who can decide this point? A majority only of the union.

The Lacedemonians insisted, in the amphictionic council to exclude some of the smaller states from a right to vote, in order that they might tyrannize over them. If the plan now on the table be adopted three states in the union have the controul, and they may make use of their power when they please.

If there exists no separate interests, there is no danger of an equality of votes; and if there be danger, the smaller states cannot yield. If the foundation of the existing confederation is well laid, powers may be added-You may safely add a third story to a house where the foun

dation is good. Read then the votes and proceedings of congress on forming the confederation-Virginia only was opposed to the principle of equality-The smaller states yielded rights, not the large states-They gave up their claim to the unappropriated lands with the tenderness of the mother recorded by Solomon-they sacrificed affection to the preservation of others.-New-Jersey and Maryland rendered more essential services during the war than many of the larger states. The partial representation in congress is not the cause of its weakness, but the want of power. I would not trust a government organized upon the reported plan, for all the slaves of Carolina or the horses and oxen of Massachusetts. Price says, that laws made by one man or a set of men, and not by common consent, is slavery-And it is so when applied to states, if you give them an unequal representation. What are called human feelings in this instance are only the feelings of ambition and the lust of power. Adjourned till to-morrow morning.

THURSDAY, JUNE 28th, 1787.

Met pursuant to adjournment.

Mr. Martin in continuation.

On federal grounds, it is said, that a minority will govern a majority-but on the Virginia plan a minority would tax a majority. In a federal government, a majority of states must and ought to tax. In the local government of states, counties may be unequal-still numbers, not property, govern. What is the government now forming, over states or persons? As to the latter, their rights cannot be the object of a general government These are already secured by their guardians, the state governments. The general government is therefore intended only to protect and guard the rights of the states as states.