tries' responsibility for the problem and its ability to contribute to the costs entailed to resolve it.

By these criteria the facts clearly validate the reasonableness of requiring a significant contribution by the industry.

In recent years, there has been a change in the ownership of U.S. coal mines. Over 40 percent of our Nation's coal is now produced by companies owned or controlled by the giants of the oil and metals industries. The three largest coal companies (Peabody Coal, Consolidation Coal, and Island Creek Coal) are now owned by Kennecott Copper Co., Continental Oil Co., and Occidential Petroleum Co., respectively. Other major U.S. corporations owning large coal interests include Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, Standard Oil (Ohio), Humble Oil & Refining Co. (affiliated with Standard Oil of New Jersey), Gulf Oil, United States Steel, Jones & McLaughlin Steel, and Bethlehem Steel. One of the major defense and space contractors, General Dynamics, prides itself on being one of the Nation's 10 largest coal producers.

Over the past 10 years, during which the corporate ownership of the coal industry has been radically changed, the methods of production have also been dramatically changed, yielding as previously noted, vastly increasing profits, from $56 million in 1959 to $130 million in

1965.

During the past 16 years, according to Secretary of the Interior Hickel, the coal industry has spent $195 million on commercial research and development. Though exact figures were not available, he estimated that less than $15 million was spent by the industry on health and safety research.

It is no wonder that the Department of the Interior concluded that

While the coal mining industry has made giant strides in its ability to extract the natural resource coal from the depths of the earth, it has lagged behind other industries in protecting its most valuable resource-the miner.

Yet, during the 16 years that the industry has invested $195 million on commercial research, the Government has given the industry subsidies amounting to $168 million of the taxpayers' funds for production research and development.

The health and safety hazards imposed upon workers in this industry are directly attributable to developments in the technology of mining coal. For example, the dreadfully high incidence of black lung is an immediate consequence of the coal dust created by the increased production rates which this industry has achieved in recent years. Despite this obvious fact, however, a fatalistic attitude regarding the inevitability of coal mining hazards appears to have permeated the industry and to have anesthetized it from the shocking reality: men are maimed and killed in mine accidents, or their lives are slowly ground out in the struggle with black lung, because the industry has not been willing to spend the funds necessary to protect the workers from such fates.

We know that 309 U.S. miners lost their lives in the mines in 1968. We know that 100,000 U.S. miners are afflicted with pneumoconiosis. But we also know that in this age of space exploration the incidence

of this disease can be completely prevented by implementing existing technology and undertaking the research necessary to reduce the level of respirable dust.

The problem lies not in the lack of technical competence, but in the lack of will to invest in health and safety. While we have been willing to spend money on developing techniques to increase production, we have not been willing to spend money to apply and improve even known techniques for reducing the hazards of mining.

It is only proper that this industry, which has not met its health and safety problems, but which has enjoyed substantial financial benefits through the commercial research paid for by the U.S. taxpayers, should now be required to share in the costs of research necessary to protect the health and safety of the miners.

RESEARCH

The bill directs the Secretary and the Surgeon General to conduct comprehensive studies, experiments, and demonstrations in their respective areas of expertise in the field of coal mine health and safety. Special efforts are to be made to find improved methods for the recovery of persons from a mine after an accident, to solve the problem of underground-to-surface communications, to find improved and safer sources of power to haul men and coal underground, and to illuminate active working places. In addition, section 201 (b) requires research in connection with hazards from trolley wires and trolley feeder wires, signal wires, the splicing and use of trailing cables, and in connection with improvements in vulcanizing of electric conductors, improvement in roof control measures, methane drainage in advance of mining, where such drainage relates to safety, improved methods of measuring methane and oxygen concentrations and the use of improved underground power equipment.

The Surgeon General and the Secretary will conduct an accelerated program to reduce dust concentrations underground. This section also would direct the Surgeon General to conduct research and studies on the health conditions of nonminers working with or around coal products in areas outside coal mines.

The committee intends the Secretary and Surgeon General to initiate studies with the goal of eliminating all health and safety hazards in mining. The committee expects that the Secretary and the Surgeon General will look to scientific and engineering knowledge, not just in the mining industry, but in all fields offering promise of new methods to protect health and safety.

ADMINISTRATION

Prior to the Farmington disaster of last November 20, there was a notably unimpressive record by the Department of the Interior and its Bureau of Mines in respect to improving the health and safety of miners.

Many of the deficiencies of the 1952 Act were known years ago, yet little effort has, in the past, been made by the Bureau or the Department to correct them. Similarly, the advisory code has not been revised since 1953, despite significant changes in coal mining since then.

In the 17 years since the enactment of the Federal Coal Mine Safety Act, as amended, health and safety has been the stepchild of the

Bureau. The primary interest of the Bureau during this period has been mineral production, including coal. In some cases, the people involved in the direction of health and safety have been lethargic and more industry production oriented than miner health and safety oriented. Considering the accidental death and injury record of this industry, it is astounding to note the Bureau's budget for this period has been approximately $10 million for all mine health and safety annually until this fiscal year, as compared to the Bureau's total annual budget of approximately $80 million.

As in the case of this legislation, the catalyst for action to change the Bureau's complacent attitude was the Farmington disaster. That fateful event has caused the Bureau to undertake a number of changes, considered drastic by many in the industry, but quite elementary considering the health and safety record of the industry. Some evidence of this improved attitude can be found in the fact that since January 1 through August 30, 1969, there have been 914 spot inspections, as compared to 808 in all of 1968. In addition, there have been 1,262 closing orders issued during this period, as compared to 612 such orders in 1968. Despite this evidence the committee is still concerned that not enough attention is given by the officials of the Department to insuring that the health and safety functions of the Bureau will be buttressed. The expanded authority and responsibility found in this bill demands that these functions be substantially expanded and improved. The committee intends to exercise its legislative review responsibilities respecting this program in the future with great care. The committee intends to do whatever it can to assure that greater efforts will be made to bring redirection to those in the Bureau who are more production oriented than health and safety oriented. The committee's bill, as effective as it may be, will never achieve adequate health and safety for the miner unless the Department acquires new perspective and focus concerning the importance of the miner and unless there is strong and vigorous administration by the Department.

Section-by-Section Analysis

The following analysis discusses all the provisions of the bill.

Section 1

This section cites the act as the "Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969."

Section 2. Findings and purpose

This section makes certain congressional findings relative to the need for, and desirability of, legislation to improve the health and safety of the Nation's coal miners. It emphasizes the fact that the operators of coal mines, with the assistance of the miners, have the primary responsibility to remove the causes of accidents and occupational disease. It declares that the purpose of the act is to establish immediately comprehensive interim mandatory health and safety standards, to require that improved standards be developed, to require compliance by the operators and the miners, to aid the States in developing State health and safety programs, and to improve present research and training programs in this field.

Section 3. Mines subject to act

This section establishes that all coal mines the operations or products of which affect commerce are subject to this act, and each operator and every miner of such mine must comply with its provisions. It applies to surface, as well as underground coal mines which affect commerce, including those coal mines which provide coal to the United States under contract or other agreement and to coal mines located on Federal lands.

Section 4. Definitions

This section defines various terms used in the act.

The definition of an "operator" is designed to be as broad as possible to include any individual, organization, or agency, whether owner, lessee or otherwise, that operates, controls, or supervises a coal mine, either directly or indirectly. It does not, however, include persons whose primary responsibility is to run the mine or supervise employees such as a superintendent or foreman unless such person meets the statutory definition of operator. These are the agents of the operator.

The definition of an "imminent danger" is broadened from that in the 1952 act in recognition of the need to be concerned with any condition or practice, naturally or otherwise caused, which may lead to sudden death or injury before the danger can be abated. It is not limited to just disastrous type accidents, as in the past, but all accidents which could be fatal or nonfatal to one or more persons before abatement of the condition or practice can be achieved.

The definition of an "accident" includes, but is not limited to, such