STEVENS, J., dissenting 456 U. S. Nation's waters from gradual but possibly irreversible contamination is no less clear than the command to protect the snail darter." To assume that Congress has placed a greater value on the protection of vanishing forms of animal life than on the protection of our water resources is to ignore the text, the legislative history, and the previously consistent interpretation of this statute.16 15 It is true that in TVA v. Hill there was no room for compromise between the federal project and the statutory objective to preserve an endangered species; either the snail field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative agency." Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S., at 317. In EPA v. National Crushed Stone Assn., 449 U. S. 64, the Court read the "plain language of the statute," id., at 73, to require private firms "either to conform to BPT standards or to cease production." Id., at 76. ""Congress' intent in enacting the Amendments was clearly to establish an all-encompassing program of water pollution regulation. Every point source discharge is prohibited unless covered by a permit, which directly subjects the discharger to the administrative apparatus established by Congress to achieve its goals." Milwaukee v. Illinois, supra, at 318 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). 15 The Senate Report emphasized that "if the timetables established throughout the Act are to be met, the threat of sanction must be real, and enforcement provisions must be swift and direct." S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 65 (1971). 16 "The establishment of such a self-consciously comprehensive program by Congress, which certainly did not exist when Illinois v. Milwaukee[, 406 U. S. 91,] was decided, strongly suggests that there is no room for courts to attempt to improve on that program with federal common law." Milwaukee v. Illinois, supra, at 319. Today's holding that a federal court has inherent power to grant exemptions from the statutory permit requirement presents a dramatic contrast with the holding in Milwaukee v. Illinois: "Federal courts lack authority to impose more stringent effluent limitations under federal common law than those imposed by the agency charged by Congress with administering this comprehensive scheme." 451 U. S., at 320. 305 STEVENS, J., dissenting darter or the completion of the Tellico Dam had to be sacrificed. In the FWPCA, the Court tells us, the congressional objective is to protect the integrity of the Nation's waters, not to protect the integrity of the permit process. Ante, at 314. Therefore, the Court continues, ante, at 315, a federal court may compromise the process chosen by Congress to protect our waters as long as the court is content that the waters are not actually being harmed by the particular discharge of pollutants. On analysis, however, this reasoning does not distinguish the two cases. Courts are in no better position to decide whether the permit process is necessary to achieve the objectives of the FWPCA than they are to decide whether the destruction of the snail darter is an acceptable cost of completing the Tellico Dam. Congress has made both decisions, and there is nothing in the respective statutes or legislative histories to suggest that Congress invited the federal courts to second-guess the former decision any more than the latter. A disregard of the respective roles of the three branches of government also tarnishes the Court's other principal argument in favor of expansive equitable discretion in this area." The Court points out that Congress intended to halt water pollution gradually, not immediately, and that "the scheme as a whole contemplates the exercise of discretion and balancing of equities." Ante, at 316. In the Court's words, Congress enacted a "scheme of phased compliance." Ibid. Equitable discretion in enforcing the statute, the Court states, is therefore consistent with the statutory scheme. The Court's sophistry is premised on a gross misunderstanding of the statutory scheme. Naturally, in 1972 Congress did not expect dischargers to end pollution immediately. Rather, it entrusted to expert administrative 18 17 See also n. 5, supra. "The Committee believes that the no-discharge declaration in Section 13 of the 1899 Refuse Act is useful as an enforcement tool. Therefore, this STEVENS, J., dissenting 456 U. S. agencies the task of establishing timetables by which dischargers could reach that ultimate goal. These timetables are determined by the agencies and included in the NPDES permits; the conditions in the permits constitute the terms by which compliance with the statute is measured." Quite obviously, then, the requirement that each discharger subject itself to the permit process is crucial to the operation of the "scheme of phased compliance." By requiring each discharger to obtain a permit before continuing its discharges of pollutants, Congress demonstrated an intolerance for delay in compliance with the statute. It is also obvious that the "exercise of discretion and balancing of equities" were tasks delegated by Congress to expert agencies, not to federal courts, yet the Court simply ignores the difference. IV The decision in TVA v. Hill did not depend on any peculiar or unique statutory language. Nor did it rest on any special interest in snail darters. The decision reflected a profound section [§ 301] declares the discharge of pollutants unlawful. The Committee believes it is important to clarify this point: No one has the right to pollute. "But the Committee recognizes the impracticality of any effort to halt all pollution immediately. Therefore, this section provides an exception if the discharge meets the requirements of this section, Section 402, and others listed in the bill." S. Rep. No. 92-414, supra, at 43. ""An NPDES permit serves to transform generally applicable effluent limitations and other standards-including those based on water qualityinto the obligations (including a timetable for compliance) of the individual discharger, and the Amendments provide for direct administrative and judicial enforcement of permits. With few exceptions, for enforcement purposes a discharger in compliance with the terms and conditions of an NPDES permit is deemed to be in compliance with those sections of the Amendments on which the permit conditions are based. In short, the permit defines, and facilitates compliance with, and enforcement of, a preponderance of a discharger's obligations under the Amendments." EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S., at 205 (citations omitted). 305 STEVENS, J., dissenting respect for the law and the proper allocation of lawmaking responsibilities in our Government.20 There we refused to sit as a committee of review. Today the Court authorizes freethinking federal judges to do just that. Instead of requiring adherence to carefully integrated statutory procedures that assign to nonjudicial decisionmakers the responsibilities for evaluating potential harm to our water supply as well as potential harm to our national security, the Court unnecessarily and casually substitutes the chancellor's clumsy foot for the rule of law. I respectfully dissent. 20 "Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of veto. The lines ascribed to Sir Thomas More by Robert Bolt are not without relevance here: ""The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal, not what's right. And I'll stick to what's legal. . . . I'm not God. The currents and eddies of right and wrong, which you find such plain-sailing, I can't navigate, I'm no voyager. But in the thickets of the law, oh there I'm a forester. . What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil? . . . And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you-where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? . . . This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast-Man's laws, not God's-and if you cut them down... d'you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? . . . Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake.' R. Bolt, A Man for All Seasons, Act I, p. 147 (Three Plays, Heinemann ed. 1967). "We agree with the Court of Appeals that in our constitutional system the commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with 'common sense and the public weal.' Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches." TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194-195. SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION CO. v. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 81-622. Argued March 31, 1982-Decided April 27, 1982 Respondent, as consignor, shipped goods by rail to a third party under uniform straight bills of lading prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). Each bill provided that the consignor was liable for freight charges unless it signed a statement in the bill that "[t]he carrier shall not make delivery of this shipment without payment of freight and all other lawful charges." Respondent failed to execute this "nonrecourse" clause in the bills of lading. Petitioner, a common carrier by rail, delivered the first shipment to the consignee without collecting the freight charges in advance and without investigating the consignee's credit standing. Petitioner delivered the other shipments only after receiving checks from the consignee, but the checks were dishonored by the consignee's bank for insufficient funds. After unsuccessfully attempting to collect the unpaid freight charges from the consignee, petitioner requested that respondent pay the charges and, when payment was not made, filed suit against respondent in Federal District Court. The court ruled that although petitioner had established a prima facie case for the recovery of the freight charges, respondent had established a valid equitable defense by showing that petitioner had failed to comply with the ICC's credit regulations. These regulations, promulgated pursuant to § 3(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, did not allow for delivery of freight on credit for more than five days. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: Petitioner's violation of the credit regulations does not bar its collection of lawful freight charges from respondent. Pp. 342-352. (a) Petitioner established a prima facie case of respondent's liability for the freight charges by proving that respondent failed to sign the nonrecourse clause in the bills of lading. The bill of lading is the basic transportation contract between the shipper-consignor and the carrier, and, unless the bill provides to the contrary, the consignor remains primarily liable for the freight charges. Thus, by failing to execute the nonrecourse provision, respondent continued to be primarily liable. Pp. 342-344. (b) Petitioner's violation of the credit regulations did not provide respondent with an equitable affirmative defense to petitioner's prima facie |