(a) The Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment does not apply to the period before a defendant is indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused. Although delay prior to arrest or indictment may give rise to a due process claim under the Fifth Amendment or to a claim under any applicable statute of limitations, no Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial arises until charges are pending. Similarly, any undue delay after the Government, acting in good faith, formally dismisses charges must be scrutinized under the Due Process Clause, not the Speedy Trial Clause. Once charges are dismissed, the speedy trial guarantee-which is designed primarily to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges-is no longer applicable. Following dismissal of charges, any restraint on liberty, disruption of employment, strain on financial resources, and exposure to public obloquy, stress and anxiety is no greater than it is upon anyone openly subject to a criminal investigation. Pp. 6-9.

(b) The Court of Appeals erred in holding, in essence, that criminal charges were pending against respondent during the entire period between his military arrest and his later indictment on civilian charges. Although respondent was subjected to stress and other adverse consequences flowing from the initial military charges and the continuing investigation after they were dismissed, he was not under arrest, not in custody, and not subject to any "criminal prosecution" until the civilian indictment was returned. He was legally and constitutionally in the same posture as though no charges had been made; he was free to go about his affairs, to practice his profession, and to continue with his life. Pp. 9-10.

632 F. 2d 258 and 635 F. 2d 1115, reversed and remanded.

BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 11. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 12.

Alan I. Horowitz argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Jensen, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, John Fichter DePue, and Brian M. Murtagh.

Ralph S. Spritzer argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Bernard L. Segal and Michael J. Malley.

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to decide whether the time between dismissal of military charges and a subsequent indictment on civilian criminal charges should be considered in determining whether the delay in bringing respondent to trial for the murder of his wife and two children violated his rights under the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment.

I

The facts in this case are not in issue; a jury heard and saw all the witnesses and saw the tangible evidence. The only point raised here by petitioner involves a legal issue under the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Accordingly, only a brief summary of the facts is called for. In the early morning of February 17, 1970, respondent's pregnant wife and his two daughters, aged 2 and 5, were brutally murdered in their home on the Fort Bragg, N. C., military reservation. At the time, MacDonald, a physician, was a captain in the Army Medical Corps stationed at Fort Bragg. When the military police arrived at the scene following a call from MacDonald, they found the three victims dead and MacDonald unconscious from multiple stab wounds, most of them superficial, but one a life-threatening chest wound which caused a lung to collapse.

At the time and in subsequent interviews, MacDonald told of a bizarre and ritualistic murder. He stated that he was asleep on the couch when he was awakened by his wife's screams. He said he saw a woman with blond hair wearing a floppy hat, white boots, and a short skirt carrying a lighted

candle and chanting "acid is groovy; kill the pigs." He claimed that three men standing near the couch attacked him, tearing his pajama top, stabbing him, and clubbing him into unconsciousness. When he awoke, he found his wife and two daughters dead. After trying to revive them and covering his wife's body with his pajama top, MacDonald called the military police. He lost consciousness again before the police arrived.

Physical evidence at the scene contradicted MacDonald's account and gave rise to the suspicion that MacDonald himself may have committed the crime. On April 6, 1970, the Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) advised MacDonald that he was a suspect in the case and confined him to quarters. The Army formally charged MacDonald with the three murders on May 1, 1970. In accordance with Article

'A woman generally within this description was apparently seen by the military police as they rushed to answer respondent's call. During the course of this case, considerable suspicion has been focused upon Helena Stoeckley. Stoeckley was 19 at the time and a heavy user of heroin, opium, mescaline, LSD, marihuana, and other drugs; within days after the crime she began telling people that she was involved in the murder or that she at least had accompanied the murderers and watched them commit the crimes. She also wore mourning dress and displayed a funeral wreath on the day of the victims' funeral. The investigation confirmed that she had been seen returning to her apartment at 4:30 on the morning following the killings in the company of men also generally fitting the descriptions given by MacDonald. Stoeckley testified at trial that she had no memory of the night in question because she was "stoned" that night. She did, however, admit that at the time of the crime she owned and frequently wore a blond wig and a pair of white boots and that she destroyed them within a few days after the crime because they might connect her with the episode.

"Threads from MacDonald's pajama top, supposedly torn in the living room, were found in the master bedroom, some under his wife's body, and in the children's bedroom, but not in the living room. There were 48 puncture holes in the top, yet MacDonald had far fewer wounds. The police were able to identify the bloodstains of each victim, and their location did not support MacDonald's story. Blood matching the type of MacDonald's children was found on MacDonald's glasses and pajama top. Fragments of surgical gloves were found near the bodies of the victims; the gloves from which those fragments came were found under a sink in the house.

32 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U. S. C. § 832, the Commanding General of MacDonald's unit appointed an officer to investigate the charges. After hearing a total of 56 witnesses, the investigating officer submitted a report recommending that the charges and specifications against MacDonald be dismissed. The Commanding General dismissed the military charges on October 23, 1970. On December 5, 1970, the Army granted MacDonald's request for an honorable discharge based on hardship.3

At the request of the Justice Department, however, the CID continued its investigation. In June 1972, the CID forwarded a 13-volume report to the Justice Department recommending further investigation. Additional reports were submitted during November 1972 and August 1973. Following evaluation of those reports, in August 1974, the Justice Department presented the matter to a grand jury. On January 24, 1975, the grand jury returned an indictment charging MacDonald with the three murders.

Prior to his trial in Federal District Court,' MacDonald moved to dismiss the indictment, in part on the grounds that the delay in bringing him to trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The District Court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals allowed an interiocutory appeal and reversed, holding that the delay between the June 1972 submission of the CID report to the Justice Department and the August 1974 convening of the grand jury violated MacDonald's constitutional right to a speedy trial. MacDonald v. United States, 531 F. 2d 196 (CA4 1976). We granted certiorari and reversed, holding that a criminal defendant could not appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss on Speedy Trial Clause grounds until after the trial had been completed. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U. S. 850 (1978).

'MacDonald's discharge barred any further military proceedings against him. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 (1955).

'The District Court had jurisdiction because the crimes were committed on military property. 18 U. S. C. §§ 7(3), 1111.

MacDonald was then tried and convicted on two counts of second-degree murder and one count of first-degree murder. He was sentenced to three consecutive terms of life imprisonment. On appeal, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit again held that the indictment violated MacDonald's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and dismissed the indictment. 632 F.2d 258 (1980). The court denied rehearing en banc by an evenly divided vote. 635 F. 2d 1115 (1980). We granted certiorari, 451 U. S. 1016 (1981), and we reverse."

5

II

The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. . . ." A literal reading of the Amendment suggests that this right attaches only when a formal criminal charge is instituted and a criminal prosecution begins.

In United States v. Marion, 404 U. S. 307, 313 (1971), we held that the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment does not apply to the period before a defendant is indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused:

"On its face, the protection of the Amendment is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who have been ‘accused' in the course of that prosecution. These provisions would seem to afford no protection to those not yet accused,

'In addition to the Speedy Trial Clause issue, MacDonald raised a number of issues involving the conduct of the trial and rulings of the trial judge. He also claimed that the delay in bringing him to trial resulted in a denial of his Fifth Amendment due process rights. The Court of Appeals declined to reach those issues. Accordingly, we do not decide those issues, instead leaving them for the Court of Appeals on remand.

"Our analysis of the speedy trial claim is not to be influenced by consideration of the evidentiary basis of the jury verdict. The jury that heard all of the witnesses and saw the evidence unanimously decided that respondent murdered his wife and children. Respondent does not challenge the jury verdict itself.