PROCLAMATIONS, MESSAGES, AND GENERAL MILITARY ORDERS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

Cabinet Conference on Provisioning Fort Sumter.

(Sent to each member of the Cabinet.)

March 15, 1861.

My dear Sir: Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it? Please give me your opinion in writing on this question.

Your obedient servant,

A. Lincoln.

In response to this note William H. Seward, Secretary of State, renders a negative answer in a long opinion, the substance of which is summed up in the concluding paragraph:

"I may be asked whether I would in no case, and at no time, advise force-whether I propose to give up everything? I reply, no. I would not initiate war to regain a useless and unnecessary position on the soil of the seceding States. I would not provoke war in any way now. I would resort to force to protect the collection of the revenue, because this is a necessary as well as a legitimate minor object. Even then it should be only a naval force that I would employ for that neces

sary purpose, while I would defer military action on land until a case should arise when we would hold the defense. In that case we should have the spirit of the country and the approval of mankind on our side. In the other, we should imperil peace and union, because we had not the courage to practise prudence and moderation at the cost of temporary misapprehension. If this counsel seems to be impassive and even unpatriotic, I console myself by the reflection that it is such as Chatham gave to his country under circumstances not widely different."

Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, renders an affirmative answer, which he bases upon the statements of military authorities, that, if the attempt to provision included an attempt to reënforce, the possibility of success amounted to a reasonable degree of probability. The Secretary adds:

"The probable political effects of the measure allow room for much fair difference of opinion; and I have not reached my own conclusion without serious difficulty.

"If the attempt will so inflame civil war as to involve an immediate necessity for the enlistment of armies and the expenditure of millions, I cannot advise it in the existing circumstances of the country and in the present condition of the national finances.

"But it seems to me highly improbable that the attempt, especially if accompanied or immediately followed by a proclamation setting forth a liberal and generous yet firm policy toward the disaffected States, in harmony with the principles of the inaugural address, will produce such consequences; while it cannot be doubted that in maintaining a port belonging to the United States and in supporting the officers and men engaged in the regular course of service in its defense, the Federal Government exercises a clear right and, under all ordinary circumstances, performs a plain duty."

Simon Cameron, Secretary of War, returns a negative answer to the query. He recites opinions of military authorities pro and con as to the feasibility of the project, but with the preponderance of opinion in the negative. He says that all the officers within Fort Sumter, together with Generals Scott and Totten, have

expressed the opinion, that it would be impossible to succor Fort Sumter substantially, if at all, without capturing, by means of a large expedition of ships of war and troops (at least twenty-five thousand men), all the opposing batteries of South Carolina. A month before the relief would have been practicable, now Fort Moultrie is re-armed and strengthened in every way; many new hand batteries have been constructed, the principal channel has been obstructed; in short the difficulty of reënforcement has been increased ten, even twenty fold. In favor of the proposition he mentions the project of Gustavus V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the navy, formerly connected with the Coast Survey and familiar with Charleston harbor. "Mr. Fox," he says, "has proposed to make the attempt to supply the fort by aid of cutters of light draught and large dimensions, but he does not suppose, or propose, or profess to believe that provisions for more than one or two months could be furnished at a time." Now Sumter could not now contend against these formidable adversaries if filled with provisions and men. That fortress was intended to repel an invading foe. The range of her guns is too limited to reach the city of Charleston. No practicable benefit would result to country or government by accepting such a proposal.

Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, returns a negative answer. He says that the wisdom of the enterprise in this military aspect has been questioned by experts. In a political view the relief of the fort was inexpedient. The public mind has concluded that the fort is to be evacuated and is becoming reconciled to this prospect. To provision Fort Sumter would be to precipitate war, and he is not prepared to advise a plan that would provoke hostilities in event of success, and to incur untold disaster in event of failure.

Caleb B. Smith, Secretary of the Interior, gives an opinion similar to that of Welles. He says: "If the evacuation of Fort Sumter could be regarded as an acknowledgment by the government of its inability to enforce the laws, I should without hesitation advise that it should be held without regard to the sacrifices which its retention might impose. I do not believe, however, that the abandonment of the fort would imply such an acknowledgment on the part of the government. There

are other means by which the power and the honor of the government may be vindicated, and which would, in my judgment, be much more effective to compel the people of South Carolina to render obedience to the laws, and which would at the same time avoid the sacîifice of life which must result from a conflict under the walls of the fort."

Montgomery Blair, Postmaster-General, renders an opinion strongly affirmative. He says:

"The evacuation of Fort Sumter, when it is known that it can be provisioned and manned, will convince the rebels that the administration lacks firmness, and will, therefore, tend more than any event that has happened to embolden them; and so far from tending to prevent collision, will insure it unless all the other forts are evacuated, and all attempts are given up to maintain the authority of the United States.

"Mr. Buchanan's policy has, I think, rendered collision almost inevitable, and a continuance of that policy will not only bring it about, but will go far to produce a permanent division of the Union.

"This is manifestly the public judgment, which is much more to be relied on than that of any individual. I believe Fort Sumter may be provisioned and relieved by Captain Fox with little risk; and General Scott's opinion, that with its war complement [of 650 men] there is no force in South Carolina which can take it, renders it almost certain that it will not then be attempted. This would completely demoralize the rebellion. The impotent rage of the rebels, and the outburst of patriotic feeling which would follow this achievement, would initiate a reactionary movement throughout the South which would speedily overwhelm the traitors. No expense or care should, therefore, be spared to achieve this success.

"The appreciation of our stocks will pay for the most lavish outlay to make it one.

"Nor will the result be materially different to the nation if the attempt fails, and its gallant leader and followers are lost. It will in any event vindicate the hardy courage of the North, and the determination of the people and their President to maintain the authority of the government; and this is all that is wanting, in my judgment, to restore it."