is, “Shall they be made free or be sold to new masters?" I perceive no objection to Congress deciding in advance that they shall be free. To the high honor of Kentucky, as I am informed, she has been the owner of some slaves by escheat, and she sold none, but liberated all. I hope the same is true of some other States. Indeed, I do not believe it would be physically possible for the General Government to return persons so circumstanced to actual slavery. I believe there would be physical resistance to it which could neither be turned aside by argument nor driven away by force. In this view I have no objection to this feature of the bill. Another matter involved in these two sections and running through other parts of the act will be noticed hereafter.

I perceive no objection to the third and fourth

sections.

So far as I wish to notice the fifth and sixth sections, they may be considered together. That the enforcement of these sections would do no injustice to the persons embraced within them is clear. That those who make a causeless war should be compelled to pay the cost of it is too obviously just to be called in question. To give governmental protection to the property of persons who have abandoned it, and gone on a crusade to overthrow that same government, is absurd, if considered in the mere light of justice. The severest justice may not always be the best policy. The principle of seizing and appropriating the property of the persons embraced within these sections is certainly not very objectionable; but a justly discriminating application of it would be very difficult, and to a great extent impossible. And would it not be wise

to place a power of remission somewhere, so that these persons may know they have something to lose by persisting, and something to save by desisting? I am not sure whether such power of remission is or is not within section thirteen.

Without any special act of Congress, I think our military commanders, when, in military phrase, "they are within the enemy's country, should, in an orderly manner, seize and use whatever of real or personal property may be necessary or convenient for their commands; at the same time preserving in some way the evidence of what they do.

What I have said in regard to slaves while commenting on the first and second sections, is applicable to the ninth, with the difference that no provision is made in the whole act for determining whether a particular individual slave does or does not fall within the classes defined in that section. He is to be free upon certain conditions; but whether those conditions do or do not pertain to him, no mode of ascertaining is provided. This could be easily supplied.

To the tenth section I make no objection. The oath therein required seems to be proper, and the remainder of the section is substantially identical with a law already existing.

The eleventh section simply assumes to confer discretionary powers upon the Executive. Without this law I have no hesitation to go as far in the direction indicated as I may at any time deem expedient. And I am ready to say now, I think it is proper for our military commanders to employ as laborers as many persons of African descent as can be used to advantage.

The twelfth and thirteenth sections are some

thing better than unobjectionable; and the fourteenth is entirely proper if all other parts of the act shall stand.

That to which I chiefly object pervades most parts of the act, but more distinctly appears in the first, second, seventh, and eighth sections. It is the sum of those provisions which results in the divesting of title forever.

For the causes of treason and the ingredients of treason not amounting to the full crime, it declares forfeiture extending beyond the lives of the guilty parties; whereas the Constitution of the United States declares that "no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted." True, there seems to be no formal attainder in this case; still I think the greater punishment cannot be constitutionally inflicted in a different form for the same offense.

With great respect I am constrained to say I think this feature of the act is unconstitutional. It would not be difficult to modify it.

I may remark that this provision of the Constitution, put in language borrowed from Great Britain, applies only in this country, as I understand, to real or landed estate.

Again, this act, by proceedings in rem, forfeits property for the ingredients of treason, without a conviction of the supposed criminal or a personal hearing given him in any proceeding. That we may not touch property lying within our reach because we cannot give personal notice to an owner who is absent endeavoring to destroy the government is certainly not very satisfactory. Still, the owner may not be thus engaged; and I think a reasonable time should

be provided for such parties to appear and have personal hearings. Similar provisions are not uncommon in connection with proceedings in

rem.

For the reasons stated I return the bill to the House in which it originated.

Order Authorizing Employment of "Contrabands."

JULY 22, 1862.

First. Ordered that military commanders within the States of Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas, in an orderly manner seize and use any property, real or personal, which may be necessary or convenient for their several commands, for supplies, or for other military purposes; and that while property may be destroyed for proper military objects, none shall be destroyed in wantonness or malice.

Second. That military and naval commanders shall employ as laborers, within and from said States, so many persons of African descent as can be advantageously used for military or naval purposes, giving them reasonable wages for their labor.

Third. That, as to both property and persons of African descent, accounts shall be kept sufficiently accurate and in detail to show quantities and amounts, and from whom both property and such persons shall have come, as a basis upon which compensation can be made in proper cases; and the several departments of this government

shall attend to and perform their appropriate parts toward the execution of these orders. By order of the President:

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation.
SEPTEMBER 22, 1862.

I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, and commander-in-chief of the army and navy thereof, do hereby proclaim and declare that hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relation between the United States and each of the States, and the people thereof, in which States that relation is or may be suspended or disturbed.

That it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure tendering pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all slave States, so called, the people whereof may not then be in rebellion against the United States, and which States may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, immediate or gradual abolishment of slavery within their respective limits; and that the effort to colonize persons of African descent with their consent upon this continent or elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the governments existing there, will be continued.

That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State the people