Protest of Inland Bill or Promissory Note.-On the other hand, where, as in the case of an inland bill or promissory note, no protest is required although permitted by statute for purposes of evidence, it has been held that notarial expenses cannot be recovered; but there is authority for a contrary view.2 Note without Indorser.—It is well settled, however, that where a note is without an indorser protest is absolutely useless, and hence the protest fee is not chargeable against the maker.3 Where Note Has a Guarantor.—And though there is a guarantor of the note, it has been held that protest is unnecessary to fix his liability; and hence, in an action by the payee against the maker and the guarantor, protest damages are not recoverable. 4. Notice of Dishonor-a. DEFINITION.-Notice of dishonor means notification of dishonor; and the mere fact that the party to be charged has knowledge of the dishonor will not be sufficient.5 b. NECESSITY OF NOTICE—(1) To Fix Liability of Drawer or Indorser— (a) Generally.—Where a bill of exchange has been presented for acceptance, or a bill or note has been presented for payment, and acceptance or payment has to pay it at maturity, so that it is necessary to protest it in order to charge the drawer and indorser with damages, the acceptor is liable to refund to the holder the notarial fees. In this case the court said: “It would not be pretended but that the drawer and indorser would be bound to refund to the holder the notarial fees, and that they might look to the acceptor for reimbursement. This being the case, it is not conceived why the acceptor should not be primarily liable to the holder." 1. I Parsons on Notes and Bills 646; Johnson v. Fulton Bank, 29 Ga. 261. 2. Thus, in an action against the indorser of a promissory note, it was held that the fees of protest were a proper item in the assessment of damages. Merritt v. Benton, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 117. 3. German v. Ritchie, 9 Kan. 106; Noyes v. White, 9 Kan. 640; Cramer v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 23 Kan. 400; Waddell's Succession, 44 La. Ann. 361. 4. Woolley v. Van Volkenburgh, 16 Kan. 20. 5. Notice of Dishonor Defined. - Burgh v. Legge, 5 M. & W. 418; Carter v. Flower, 16 M. & W. 749; In re Leeds Banking Co., L. R. I Eq. 1; Jagger v. National German-American Bank. 53 Minn. 386; Juniata Bank v. Hale, 16 S. & R. (Pa.) 157, 16 Am. Dec. 558; Old Dominion Bank v. McVeigh, 29 Gratt. (Va.) 559; Brown v. Ferguson, 4 Leigh (Va.) 37, 24 Am. Dec. 707. Presence of Indorser at Time of Presentment Insufficient to Constitute Notice.-The presence of one of the indorsers of a note when the holder presented it to the maker at maturity for payment has been held not to amount to constructive notice. Grant v. Spencer, I Mont. 136. Compare Citizens' Sav. Bank v. Hays, 96 Ky. 365. 6. Notice of Nonacceptance to Charge Drawer or Indorser-England.-Blesard v. Hirst, 5 Burr. 2672; Roscow v. Hardy, 12 East 434; Bartlett v. Benson, 14 M. & W. 733. Alabama.-Riggs v. McDonald, 1 Ala. 641. Kentucky.-Higgins v. Morrison, 4 Dana (Ky.) 100; Lawrence v. Ralston, 3 Bibb (Ky.) 102. Maryland.-Philips v. M'Curdy, 1 Har. & Massachusetts. - Stanton v. Blossom, 14 New York.-Miller v. Hackley, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 375, 4 Am. Dec. 372. North Carolina. Austin v. Rodman, I Hawks (N. Car.) 194, 9 Am. Dec. 630. Virginia. Thompson v. Cumming, 2 Leigh (Va.) 321. Compare Willock v. Riddle, 5 Call (Va.) 358. - Notice of Qualified Acceptance.-Where the holder elects to take a qualified acceptance. notice of the qualification, and not notice of dishonor, should be given to the party to be charged. Chalmers on Bills of Exchange (5th ed.) 141; Sebag v. Abitbol, 4 M. & S. 466; Rowe v. Young, 2 Brod. & B. 165, 6 E. C. L. 83. See supra, this title, Acceptance of a Bill of Exchange-Qualified and Conditional Acceptances. 7. Notice of Dishonor by Nonpayment Necessary -England.-Darrach v. Savage, I Show. 155; Dagglish v. Weatherby, 2 W. Bl. 747; Rushv. Aspinall, Doug. 679; Bridges V. Berry, 3 Taunt. 130; Leach v. Hewitt, 4 Taunt. 731. ton Canada. -Hart v. McDougall, 25 Nova Scotia 38. United States.-Alexandria Bank v. Young, 2 Cranch (C. C.) 52; Magruder v. Union Bank, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 87. Arkansas. Ruddell v. Walker, 7 Ark. 457; Anderson v. Yell, 15 Ark. 9; Winston v. Richardson, 27 Ark. 34. Connecticut.-Dwight v. Scovil, 2 Conn. 654. Illinois.-Walker v. Rogers, 40 Ill. 278, 89 Am. Dec. 348; Bowes v. Industrial Bank, 58 Ill. App. 498. Indiana. Ford v. Booker, 53 Ind. 395. Iowa.-Red Oak Bank v. Orvis, 40 Iowa 332. Kansas.-Liggett v. Weed, 7 Kan. 274. Louisiana.-Grieff v. Kirk, 15 La. Ann. 320; Blum v. Bidwell, 20 La. Ann. 43; Letchford v. Richard, 20 La. Ann. 138; Abott v. Borge, 20 La. Ann. 372; Eichelberger v. Pike, 22 La. Ann. 142. been refused, the holder, in order to hold the drawer or an indorser liable, must give him notice of the dishonor. Maine.-National Shoe, etc., Bank v. Good ing, 87 Me. 337. Massachusetts. New England Bank v. Lewis, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 125; Creamer v. Perry, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 332, 28 Am. Dec. 297; Webber v. Matthews, 101 Mass. 481; Rice v. Wesson, II Met. (Mass.) 400. Michigan.-Stewart v. Port Huron First Nat. Bank, 40 Mich. 348. Minnesota.-Coon v. Pruden, 25 Minn. 105. Mississippi.-Capitol State Bank v. Lane, 52 Miss. 677. New Jersey.-Disborough v. Vanness, 8 N. J. L. 231. New York.-Cayuga County Bank v. Warden, 1 N. Y. 413. North Carolina.-Long v. Stephenson, 72 N. Car. 569. South Carolina.-Kilpatrick v. Heaton, 3 Brev. (S. Car.) 92; Galpin v. Hard, 3 McCord L. (S. Car.) 394, 15 Am. Dec. 640. See also Carolina Sav. Bank v. Florence Tobacco Co., 45 S. Car. 373. Vermont. (Vt.) 39. Virginia.-Davis v. Poland, 92 Va. 225. West Virginia.-Shields v. Farmers' Bank, 5 W. Va. 254. See also Pattillo v. Alexander, 96 Ga. 60 (declaring the common law). For law under statute in Georgia, see infra, this note. Georgia. Under statute in Georgia it is provided that when bills of exchange and promissory notes are made for the purpose of negotiation, or intended to be negotiated at any chartered bank, and the same are not paid at maturity, notice of the nonpayment thereof, and of the protest of the same for nonpayment or nonacceptance, must be given to the indorsers thereon; but that protest is not necessary to bind indorsers, except (1) when a paper is made payable on its face at a bank or banker's office; (2) when it is discounted at a bank or banker's office; (3) when it is left at a bank or banker's office for collection. Code of Georgia, 1882. § 2781; Hartridge v. Wesson, 4 Ga. 101; McLaren v. Marine Bank, 52 Ga. 131. A national bank has been held to be a chartered bank within the meaning of this statute. Falk v. Rothschild, 61 Ga. 595. The requirement as to notice exists also where the paper is payable at the agency of a chartered bank. Beckwith v. Carleton, 14 Ga. 691; Butler v. Marine and F. Ins. Bank, 18 Ga.. 517. Where the place of payment is stated in the alternative, as where the paper is made payable at either of the banks in Macon," it has been held that such paper is payable at a chartered bank within the meaning of the statute, and hence notice will be necessary. Hoadley v. Bliss, 9 Ga. 303. Where, however, paper is made payable on its face "at bank of Banks & Brother," which bank is not chartered, but is simply a private banking office, no notice is necessary in order to charge an indorser. Banks v. Besser, 56 Ga. 199. And generally where the paper is not made payable for the purpose of negotiation, or intended to be negotiated at a chartered bank, notice will not be required. Hartridge v. Wesson, 4 Ga. 101. It was at one time held, however, that the above statute applied only to indorsers, and did not alter, repeal, or annul the commonlaw right of drawers to notice of nonacceptance or nonpayment. Davies v. Byrne, 10 Ga. 329; Hall v. Davis, 41 Ga. 614. But where a person drew a bill not intended for negotiation at a chartered bank, making it payable to himself, and indorsed it over to a third party, it was held that the right of the drawer was the same as that of an indorser, and consequently no notice was required. Gilbert v. Seymour, 44 Ga. 63; Holmes v. Pratt, 34 Ga. 558. At present, however, it is held that in every case of a suit against the drawer of a bill not made for the purpose of negotiation, nor intended to be negotiated at any chartered bank, it is necessary to show notice of dishonor. Williams v. Lewis, 69 Ga. 825; Pannell v. Phillips, 55 Ga. 618, where the court said: "It is true the word 'drawer' is not in the Act of 1826. But if the drafts had been drawn by the defendants, payable to their own order, and they had indorsed the same, they would not have been entitled to notice as such indorsers. Why should they be entitled to notice as drawers and not entitled to notice as indorsers under the statute? The true intent and meaning of the Act of 1826 was to dispense with both protest and notice in regard to the class of paper contained in the record, including the drawers as well as the indorsers thereof; and such is believed to have been the interpretation and construction of that act by the courts of this state, including this court." Under Statute in Texas it is provided that "the holder of any bill of exchange or promissory note, assignable or negotiable by law, may secure and fix the liability of any drawer or indorser of such bill of exchange, and every indorser of such promissory note, without protest or notice, by instituting suit against the acceptor of such bill of exchange, or against the maker of such promissory note, before the first term of the district or county court to which the suit can be brought after the right of action shail accrue, or by instituting suit before the second term of said court after the right of action shall accrue, and showing good cause why suit was not instituted before the first term next after the right of action accrued." Rev. Stat. Texas (1895) 90; McGary v. McKenzie, 38 Tex. 216. Notice to Drawer or Indorser by Payor for Honor. The person who pays a bill supra protest is considered as an indorsee or holder under those for whom he paid it, and should give notice to them of its dishonor, otherwise they are not subject to refund. Goodall v. Polhill, 1 C. B. 233, 50 E. C. L. 233. And this rule has been held to be true Notice to Drawer Unnecessary to Charge Indorser. However, to charge the indorser of a bill, it is sufficient that notice is given to him, and it need not be given to the drawer.1 Notice to Successive Indorsers.--Where there are successive indorsers of a bill or note, the holder may, if he choose, give notice to all of them so as to fix the liability of all. Such notice from the holder to all the parties will inure to the benefit of each party who stands behind him on the paper.3 But the holder need not notify all the indorsers in order to fix the liability of the particular indorser receiving notice; he is only required to notify the indorser to whom he desires to look for payment. Thus the holder's immediate indorser, receiving regular notice, will not be discharged by the neglect of the holder to give notice to a previous indorser, for the reason that the holder may not know, and is not supposed to know, the residence of any of the parties except the one who has indorsed the paper to him. Nor is the holder's liability changed though he live a near neighbor to the prior indorser, since the rule, being reasonable and easily understood, should not be encumbered with exceptions that will render it uncertain. But if the indorser receiving notice wishes even though notice of dishonor has been given previous to the payment for honor. Wood v. Pugh, 7 Ohio, pt. ii., 156. Presumption as to Damage. It seems to have been the law in England at one time, that where the drawer or an indorser set up the want of notice as a defense, it was necessary to show that some damage had been sustained by such default of the holder. Meggadow v. Holt, 12 Mod. 15; Butler v. Play, Mod. 27; Bickerdike v. Bollman, I T. R. 406. But it is well settled now that it is a presumption of law that the drawer or the indorsers are prejudiced by the omission of the holder to give notice. Chitty on Bills 327; Whitfield v. Savage, 2 B. & P. 280; Orr v. Maginnis, 7 East 359; Dennis v. Morrice, 3 Esp. N. P. 158; Hill v. Heap, D. & R. N. P. 57. 16 E. C. L. 435. 1. Notice to Drawer Unnecessary to Charge Indorser-England.-Heylyn v. Adamson, 2 Burr. 669; Rickford v. Ridge, 2 Campb. 537; Beeching v. Gower, Holt 315, note, 3 E. C. L. 130, note; Bromley v. Frazier, I Stra. 441; Moule v. Brown, 4 Bing. N. Cas. 266, 33 E. C. L. 347; Hare v. Henty, 10 C. B. N. S. 65, 100 E. C. L. 65; Prideaux v. Criddle, L. R. 4 Q. B. 455. Kentucky. Piner v. Clary, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 645. Louisiana.-Miller v. Moseley, 26 La. Ann. 667. Missouri.-Moody v. Mack, 43 Mo. 210. New York. -Merchants' Bank v. Spicer, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 443; Gough v. Staats, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 549; Hooker v. Franklin, 2 Bosw. (N. Y.) 500. North Carolina.-New Hanover Bank v. Kenan, 76 N. Car. 340. 2. Notice Given by Holder to All the Successive Indorsers" It is prudent and probably customary for the holders of bills of exchange to give notice of their dishonor to all the parties to the bill. They may not wish to run the hazard of some of the parties being discharged by the omission of such notice." Mead v. Engs, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 303. 3. See infra, this section, By Whom Notice May be Given-In General. 4. Notice to Indorser to be Charged Sufficient. -District of Columbia.—Boteler v. Dexter, 19 Wash. L. Rep. 374. Indiana.-Henry v. State Bank, 3 Ind. 216. Louisiana.-Peyroux v. Dubertrand, 11 La. 32; McCullock v. Commercial Bank, 16 La. 566; Union Bank v. Lea, 7 Rob. (La.) 76, 41 Am. Dec. 275; State Bank v. Hennen, 4 Martin N. S. (La.) 226; Crane v. Trudeau, 19 La. Ann. 307. Maine.-Carter v. Bradley, 19 Me. 62, 36 Am. Dec. 735. Michigan.-Wood v. Callaghan, 61 Mich. 402, I Am. St. Rep. 597. Mississippi.-Wilcox v. Mitchell, 4 How. (Miss.) 272. New York.-Spencer v. Ballou, 18 N. Y. 327. Ohio.-Lawson v. Farmers' Bank, 1 Ohio St. 206. Pennsylvania.-Struthers v. Blake, 30 Pa. St. 139. South Carolina.-Valk v. State Bank, McMull. Eq. (S. Car.) 414. Virginia.-Cardwell v. Allan, 33 Gratt. (Va.) 160. Wisconsin.-Westfall v. Farwell, 13 Wis. 504. West Virginia.-Big Sandy Nat. Bank v. Chilton, 40 W. Va. 491. Thus it has been held that an indorser who has received due notice of the protest for nonpayment of a note held by a bank will not be discharged because a prior indorser was not notified, notwithstanding it was the usage of the bank to give notice of protest to all indorsers. Henry v. State Bank, 3 Ind. 216. Where Holder Attempts and Fails to Give Notice. Also it has been held to be no defense to an action by the holder against an indorser properly notified, to show that the holder attempted to notify other indorsers, but failed. Westfall v. Farwell, 13 Wis. 504. 5. Where Holder and Intermediate Indorser Reside in Same Town.-In West River Bank v. Taylor. 34 N. Y. 128, it was held that if an indorser on a bill or note, though he is a resident of the same town, city, or village with the holder, is not the immediate prior in to have a remedy over against the prior indorser, it devolves upon him to give notice to such prior indorser, and so on through the series of indorsers up to the first. When, however, in this way seasonable notice has been communicated to the antecedent parties, it fixes the liability of one and all of them to the holder.2 Notice of Second Dishonor Insufficient-As between Holder and Drawer or Indorser.-Notice must be given of the first occurrence of dishonor. Thus it has been held that to charge an indorser of a note payable on demand, the holder must give him notice of nonpayment upon the first demand on the maker; and notice of nonpayment upon a second demand on the maker, which would have been in season to charge the indorser if no previous demand had been made, is insufficient.3 In the same way it has been held to be not enough to charge the drawer or an indorser of a bill of exchange to prove that notice of dishonor by nonpayment was sent where there had been a previous dishonor by nonacceptance. And the rule is the same even in the case of bills which need not be presented for acceptance, if in fact they be presented and acceptance be refused.5 dorser of the holder at the time of dishonor, the whole duty of the holder is discharged by the notice to his immediate indorser, and all parties to the bill or note will be charged if they receive notices in due course from their immediate indorsers. To the same effect is Griffith v. Assmann, 48 Mo. 66. Compare Apple v. Lesser, 93 Ga. 749. 1. Notice to Prior Indorser may be Given by Immediate Indorsee Iowa. Van Brunt v. Vaughn, 47 Iowa 145. Kansas.-Seaton v. Scovill, 18 Kan. 433, 26 Am. Rep 779. Maine.-Warren v. Gilman, 17 Me. 360. Massachusetts.-Fitchburg Bank v. Perley, 2 Allen (Mass.) 433; Eagle Bank v. Hathaway, 5 Met. (Mass.) 212; Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass. 227. Michigan.-Wood v. Callaghan, 61 Mich. 402, I Am. St. Rep. 597. New Hampshire.-Manchester Bank v. Fellows, 23 N. H. 302. New York.-Mead v. Engs, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 303; West River Bank v. Taylor, 34 N. Y. 123; Morgan v. Woodworth, 3 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 89. Ohio.-Lawson v. Farmers' Bank, I Ohio St. 207. West Virginia.-Big Sandy Nat. Bank v. Chilton, 40 W. Va. 491. 2. See infra, this section, By Whom Notice may be Given-In General. 3. Rice v. Wesson, 11 Met. (Mass.) 400. 4. U. S. v. Barker, 4 Wash. (U. S.) 464; Thompson v. Cumming, 2 Leigh (Va.) 321. Compare Read v. Adams, 6 S. & R. (Pa.) 356. Notice of Nonpayment where Previous Nonacceptance Insufficient.-In U. S. v. Barker, 4 Wash. (U. S.) 464, Washington. J., said: "The law merchant, as settled by judicial decisions in England and in New York, requires that, in all cases of bills which must be presented for acceptance, due notice of the protest, in case acceptance is refused, must be given without waiting for the maturity of the bill and a demand of payment; such, too, is the rule in Massachusetts and South Carolina. And the rule is the same in England, even in cases of bills which need not be presented for acceptance, if in fact they be presented and acceptance be refused. It is supposed that the cases of Brown v. Barry, 3 Dall. (U. S.) 365, and Clarke v. Russel, Dall. (U. S.) 415, have established a different rule as the law merchant of the United States. We do not so understand those cases. In both of them the action was brought upon the protest for nonpayment, and the objection was that the plaintiff could not recover without showing a protest for nonacceptance. The Supreme Court merely decided that the custom of merchants in the United States does not ordinarily require, to recover on a protest for nonpayment of a bill, that a protest for nonacceptance should be produced, though the bills were not accepted. Thus deciding, in effect, either that a protest for nonacceptance need not be made of a bill payable after sight any more than of one payable after date; or that such protest need not be given in evidence where the declaration is upon a protest for nonpayment. Whether these decisions would now be upheld by the same court may at least be questioned. Few reports of the decisions of the state courts were published when those cases came before the Supreme Court of the United States, and the law merchant respecting bills was certainly not as well understood, and the custom as established in this country as well known, as at the present day. It would not do to speak of the custom in the United States now as the court then spoke, in the face of so many cases decided in the most commercial cities of the United States. Be this as it may, the necessity of giving due notice of the dishonor of a bill which has been refused acceptance is not, in our opinion, dispensed with in those cases. 5. Notice of Nonacceptance Essential, though Presentment for Acceptance Unnecessary. -Goodall v. Dolley, 1 T. R. 712; Smith v. Roach. 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 17; Tennessee Bank v. Smith, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 609; Union Nat. Bank v. Marr, 6 Bush (Ky.) 614; Allen v. Merchants' Bank, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 215, 34 Am. Dec. 289. Thus it has been held that it is not indis As between Second Indorser Taking up Paper without Notice and Prior Indorser.-Where the holder of a bill before it was due, having tendered it for acceptance, which was refused, kept it till due, when it was tendered for payment and refused, and then immediately returned it on the second indorser, who, not knowing of the laches, took up the bill, it was held that the ignorance of the second indorser, when he paid the bill, of the laches of the former holder did not entitle him to recover against the first indorser, who set up that laches as his defense.1 As between Drawer or Indorser and Subsequent Innocent Indorsee. But a bill of exchange will not be a void security in the hands of an innocent indorsee who gives notice of dishonor by nonacceptance, and who has no knowledge that the bill has ever been dishonored because a former holder had omitted to give notice to the drawer that the drawee had refused acceptance.2 (b) Indorser of Note before Delivery-Authorities Conflicting. A great diversity of opinion exists as to the nature of the right to notice of dishonor of one who, not being a party, indorses his name in blank upon a negotiable note before delivery. Indorser Considered as Maker.-In some jurisdictions such anomalous indorser is presumptively the maker of the note he has indorsed, and consequently is not entitled to notice of dishonor.3 Indorser Considered as Ordinary Indorser.-In other jurisdictions his liability is presumed to be like that of an ordinary indorser, and accordingly notice of dishonor is deemed to be necessary. pensable that a bill of exchange drawn payable any number of days after date should be presented until due, but if presented and dishonored, notice must be given to such parties as it is intended to hold responsible. Smith v. Roach, 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 18. 1. Payment by Indorser without Knowledge of Release of Antecedent Parties. Roscow υ. Hardy, 12 East 434; Bartlett v. Benson, 14 M. & W.733. But the payment in such a case may be recovered from the holder as money paid under a mistake of fact. See infra, this title, Discharge and Payment-Recovery of Money Paid under Mistake. 2. Dunn v. O'Keeffe, 5 M. & S. 282. 3. Indorser Considered as Maker.-Massey v. Turner, 2 Houst. (Del.) 79; Perkins v. Barstow, 6 R. I. 505; Mathewson v. Sprague, I R. I. 8; Manufacturers', etc., Bank v. Follett, II R. I. 92, 23 Am. Rep. 418. See also Castle v. Rickly, 44 Ohio St. 490, 58 Am. Rep. 839. In Vermont such an indorser is presumed to be a joint maker, but the presumption is one of fact, and evidence is admissible that he was in fact a guarantor. Thus in Knapp v. Parker, 6 Vt. 642, where a stranger indorsed a note before delivery and at the same time made a verbal guaranty that he would pay the debt, it was held that by his indorsement he assumed an unconditional responsibility and was not entitled to notice. Delaware-Presumption Conclusive.-But in Delaware the presumption seems to be conclusive, and notice will not be required in any event. Massey v. Turner, 2 Houst. (Del.) 79. 4. Indorser Considered as Ordinary Indorser.— In California it has been held that the liability of a stranger who indorses a note in blank before delivery is strictly that of an indorser, although he is in that state termed a guaran 4 C. of L.-26. 401 tor, and notice is a condition precedent to the holder's right of action against him. Pierce v. Kennedy, 5 Cal. 138; Jones v. Goodwin, 39 Cai. 493, 2 Am. Rep. 473. In Indiana such an indorser is prima facie treated as an ordinary indorser, and will be discharged from liability if not duly notified of the dishonor of the note. Bronson v. Alexander, 48 Ind. 244. But proof may be introduced to show that such indorser was intended as a surety, and then notice of dishonor will be unnecessary. Harris v. Pierce, 6 Ind. 162; Scott v. Shirk, 60 Ind. 160; Fitch v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 97 Ind. 215. In Alabama, Milton v. De Yampert, 3 Ala. 648; Hooks v. Anderson, 58 Ala. 238, 29 Am. Rep. 745; Pennsylvania, Leech v. Hill, 4 Watts (Pa.) 448; Taylor v. M'Cune, 11 Pa. St. 460; and Tennessee, Iser v. Cohen, 1 Baxt. (Tenn.) 421; Jamaica Bank v. Jefferson, 92 Tenn. 537, the same rule obtains. And in Georgia a similar rule prevails under statute. Eppens v. Forbes, 82 Ga. 748; Neal v. Wilson, 79 Ga. 736; Camp v. Simmons, 62 Ga. 73. New York-Presumption Conclusive.-In New York such an indorsement upon a negotiable note is regarded conclusively as an ordinary indorsement, and notice to the indorser is required in any event. Spies v. Gilmore, I N. Y. 321; Moore v. Cross, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 534. See further, infra, this title, Liabilities of Parties-Irregular Indorsers. But according to the decisions in this state, in the case of a note nonnegotiable in form, the payee or holder may charge a stranger who puts his name on the back of the note as either maker or guarantor according to the actual intention. Richards v. Warring, 1 Keyes (N. Y.) 576. Massachusetts Statute.-By statute in Massachusetts it is provided that all persons becomVolume IV. |