Depository Trust (Cede & Co.) holdings of VEPCO and Montana Power stock for various banks and brokerage houses as of February 28, 1974 follow: THE DEPOSITORY TRUST CO., Hon. LEE METCALF, Chairman, Subcommittee on Budgeting, Management and Expenditures, Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.Č. DEAR SENATOR METCALF: As requested in your June 5, 1974 letter confirming Mr. Reinemer's conversation with me, I am forwarding The Depository Trust Company's Security Position Listings for the Virginia Electric and Power Company and the Montana Power Company as of the close of business February 28, 1974. I appreciate a copy of Part I of your hearings on corporate disclosure and trust that this additional information will be helpful in furthering their purpose. Sincerely, W. T. DENTZER, Jr., Chairman of the Board., Chief Executive Officer. Enclosures. Virginia Electric & Power 1002 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 [Excerpt from Tulane Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 5, June 1972] CORPORATIONS SHAREHOLDER INSPECTION OF CORPORATE Petitioner, a long time opponent of the Vietnam war, discovere that a local company, Honeywell, Inc., was substantially involved i the production of fragmentation bombs for use in Indo-China. i order to encourage the shareholders to cease the company's production of munitions, petitioner purchased several shares of stock and submitted formal demands to Honeywell management requesting that it produce its original and current shareholder ledger and a corporate records dealing with weapons and munitions manufac ture. When the company refused, a petition was filed for writs of mandamus ordering Honeywell to produce the documents. The trin court dismissed the petition holding that the information was sought for an improper and indefinite purpose. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the dismissal and held that a stockholder who was motivated solely by social and political beliefs, and not by a concern for the economic well being of the corporation, could not compel production of a corporation's shareholder lists or business records. State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. 1971). The right of a shareholder to inspect the corporate records may arise in one of three contexts: as a common law right, by statute, or, in some circumstances, under the proxy rules established by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The theoretical basis of the right is that while the corporation is the legal owner of its property, the shareholders are the real and beneficial owners and as such are entitled to certain proprietary information.1 Thus, at common law it is generally recognized that a shareholder2 has the right to inspect the corporate records if he can show "proper purpose," that 1 Nationwide Corp. v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 87 N.W.2d 671, 678 (Minn. 1958). As the Pillsbury court pointed out, in the large firm the inspection right is more akin to a considerably effective weapon in corporate warfare. State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 406, 410 (Minn. 1971). See Cooke v. Outland, 144 S.E.2d 835, 842 (N.C. 1965). 2 Unlike many statutes, the common law does not require the person seeking inspection to be either a holder of record or own or represent any minimum percentage of outstanding stock. Levine v. Pat-Plaza Amusements, Inc., 324 N.Y.S.2d 145 (Sup. Ct. 1971). Cf. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law 624 (McKinney |