Syllabus 113 C. Cls. It is difficult to arrive at a fair valuation. Plaintiffs spent considerable sums in overhauling and replacements in 1931 and 1932 after the first purchase, but while there is some conflict in the testimony as to the condition of the vessel when requisitioned ten years later, it appears that at least some of the articles represented by the expenditure had been stripped from the yacht. The details are set out in finding 14. In the light of all the evidence and circumstances we find that the fair and reasonable value of the vessel at the time of the taking was $30,000. The plaintiffs are entitled to recover as just compensation the sum of $30,000, and in addition, as a part of such compensation, interest thereon at the rate of four percent per annum from July 31, 1942, to November 17, 1943, together with interest at the same rate on $20,497.50 (the amount of the judgment less three-fourths of the amount tendered) from November 17, 1943, to date of payment. It is so ordered. HOWELL, Judge; MADDEN, Judge; WHITAKER, Judge; and LITTLETON, Judge, concur. CENTAUR CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. v. THE UNITED STATES [No. 48869. Decided April 4, 1949. Plaintiff's motion for new trial overruled May 2, 1949]* On Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Jurisdiction of the Court of Claims under the Lucas Act as amended; time limitation of action.-Under the provisions of Section 6 of the Lucas Act (60 Stat. 902) as amended by Section 37 of the Act of June 25, 1948 (62 Stat. 869), a suit brought by a contractor with the Government for relief for losses incurred between September 16, 1940, and August 14, 1945, without fault or negligence on its part in the performance of its contract must have been brought in the Court of Claims within six months from the action of the department with respect to plaintiff's claim and not within six months of the effective date of the amendatory act. *Plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari pending. 288 Opinion of the Court Same. In the instant case on October 26, 1942, while the work was in process under the contract in suit, plaintiff filed with the contracting officer an application for relief under Section 201 of the First War Powers Act (55 Stat. 838), which application was denied, and an appeal was taken to the head of the department, who affirmed the action of the contracting officer. On February 7, 1947, after the enactment of the Lucas Act (60 Stat. 902), plaintiff filed with the department a timely claim under this statute, which claim was denied April 21, 1947. Section 6 of the Lucas Act, then effective, gave plaintiff six months from the agency action within which to file a petition with the United States District Court asking a determination by the court of the equities involved in its claim, and plaintiff, not having filed such suit within the prescribed time limit, is not entitled to sue in the Court of Claims under the provisions of the amendatory act of June 25, 1948, effective September 1, 1948. Defendant's motion to dismiss is sustained and plaintiff's petition is dismissed. Same; intention of Congress.-In the enactment of the amendatory act of June 25, 1948, effective September 1, 1948 (62 Stat. 869), it was not the intention of Congress to revive, for the benefit of some claimants, suits barred by the six months limitation of the original Lucas Act. Same; waiver, if any, under the amendatory act applies only to suits in District Courts.-If the thirty-day period provided in Section 6 of the Lucas Act as amended (62 Stat. 869) was intended to be a waiver of the statute in cases where it had already run under the original act, or an extension, the waiver or extension is applicable only to suits in District Courts of the United States and not to suits in the United States Court of Claims. Mr. Josephus C. Trimble for the plaintiff. Messrs. Harry S. Hall and Philip Lerman were on the brief. Mr. Kendall M. Barnes, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General H. G. Morison, for the defendant. The facts sufficiently appear from the opinion of the court. HOWELL, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: On or about March 1, 1941, plaintiff entered into a contract with defendant for certain construction work at the United States Coast Guard Depot, Curtis Bay, Maryland. On October 26, 1942, while work under this contract was in process, plaintiff filed an application with defendant's contracting officer, for relief under Section 201 of the First Opinion of the Court 113 C. Cls. War Powers Act, which application was denied. From this denial plaintiff took an appeal to the head of the department, who affirmed the action of the contracting officer. On August 7, 1946, Public Law No. 657, Chap. 864, 79th Congress, 2d Session (60 Stat. 902), was approved. This Act provided in part as follows: That where work, supplies, or services have been furnished between September 16, 1940, and August 14, 1945, under a contract or subcontract, for any department or agency of the Government which prior to the latter date was authorized to enter into contracts and amendments or modifications of contracts under Section 201 of the First War Powers Act, 1941 (50 U. S. C., Supp. IV, app., sec. 611), such departments and agencies are hereby authorized, in accordance with regulations to be prescribed by the President within sixty days after the date of approval of this Act, to consider, adjust, and settle equitable claims of contractors, including subcontractors and materialmen performing work or furnishing supplies or services to the contractor or another subcontractor, for losses (not including diminution of anticipated profits) incurred between September 16, 1940, and August 14, 1945, without fault or negligence on their part in the performance of such contracts or subcontracts. Settlement of such claims shall be made or approved in each case by the head of the department or agency concerned or by a central authority therein designated by such head. Section 6 of the aforesaid Act provides as follows: Whenever any claimant under this Act is dissatisfied with the action of a department or agency of the Government in either granting or denying his claim, such claimant shall have the right within six months to file a petition with any Federal district court of competent jurisdiction, * On February 7, 1947, plaintiff filed a claim under this statute with the Commandant of the Coast Guard which claim was by letter dated April 21, 1947, denied. Amendatory to said Public Law 657, 79th Congress, 2d Session, Chap. 864, Congress enacted Public Law 773, 80th Congress, 2d Session, Chap. 646 (62 Stat. 869), approved June 25, 1948, and effective September 1, 1948, and as applicable to petitioner's case provides in part as follows: 288 Opinion of the Court SEC. 37. Section 6 of the Act approved August 7, 1946 (ch. 864, 60 Stat. 903), is amended to read as follows: "SEC. 6. Whenever any claimant under this Act is dissatisfied with the action of a department or agency of the Government in either granting or denying his claim, such claimant shall have the right within six months to file a petition with the Court of Claims or, if the claim does not exceed $10,000 in amount or suit has heretofore been brought or is brought within thirty days after the enactment of this amendatory act, with any Federal district court of competent jurisdiction, On September 27, 1948, petitioner filed its petition with this court based upon the foregoing claim. The defendant has moved the court to dismiss the petition herein on the ground that the court does not have jurisdiction thereof, since such petition was filed more than six months after the determination of plaintiff's claim by the United States Coast Guard (now under jurisdiction of the Treasury Department) on April 21, 1947. Thus, the question presented by defendant's motion is whether plaintiff has filed its petition within the time limited by the statute. The Lucas Act, Public Law 657, supra, effective August 7, 1946, made ample provision for relief to plaintiff for losses incurred between September 16, 1940, and August 14, 1945, without fault or negligence on its part in the performance of its contract with the defendant. Exactly six months after the effective date of said Act, plaintiff filed its claim for relief with the Commandant of the Coast Guard, which as recited above, was denied by letter on April 21, 1947. Section 6 of the Lucas Act which was effective at that time gave plaintiff six months from the agency action within which to file a petition with any Federal District Court of competent jurisdiction asking a determination by the court of the equities involved in its claim. Plaintiff, however, did not evidence its dissatisfaction with the action of the Coast Guard by filing suit in any Federal District Court. Not having filed such suit within six months from the action of the department, plaintiff failed or neglected to register its dissatisfaction in the manner provided by Congress. 838936- 49 -24 Opinion of the Court * 113 C. Cls. Later, Public Law No. 773, supra, amendatory to Public Law 657, supra, was enacted, approved June 25, 1948, effective September 1, 1948. The change in Section 6 related to the forum in which dissatisfied claimants could file their petitions "within six months * with the Court of Claims or, if the claim does not exceed $10,000 in amount or suit has heretofore been brought or is brought within thirty days after the enactment of this amendatory act, with any Federal district court of competent jurisdiction, * * *99 The plantiff's contention is that the effect of Section 6, as amended in 1948, was to permit the bringing of a suit within six months after the enactment of the 1948 amendment, regardless of when a right to sue under the original Lucas Act, enacted in 1946, had accrued by reason of action of a department or agency, which action was not satisfactory to the claimant. Plaintiff contends, in other words, that the six months period specified in Section 6, as amended, was a six months period beginning on September 1, 1948. If this contention were correct, the law would make no provision at all for a suit on a claim based on dissatisfaction with the action of a department or agency, which action did not occur until more than six months after September 1, 1948. We have no idea that Congress intended to revive, for the benefit of some claimants, suits long since barred by the six months limitation period of the original Lucas Act, and at the same time deny any right to sue at all to those claimants whose claims happened to be acted upon by a department or agency more than six months after September 1, 1948. The language and punctuation of Section 6 as amended are consistent with our interpretation. When the statute says that one who is dissatisfied with the action of a department or agency may sue within six months, the natural meaning is that he may sue within six months after the unsatisfactory action, not within six months after some other event, such as the enactment of the amendment. This meaning is particularly plain when the amendment in this regard is a mere repetition of what was contained in the original statute, where it unquestionably meant what we think it meant in the amendment. And any possible remaining doubt as to its |