absence of language to the contrary, intended the same construction and effect to be given to the words in the latter as in the former instance. It may be also stated that it is a rule of construction of statutes that provisions extending privileges and exemptions shall be strictly construed. In the case of Cornell v. Coyne (192 U. S., 418), the statement may be found, supported by many authorities, that— Whoever claims a privilege from the Government should point to a statute which clearly indicates the purpose to grant the privilege. But if there be any doubt as to the proper construction of this statute (and we think there is none) then that construction must be adopted which is most advantageous to the interests of the Government. The statute, being a grant of a privilege, must be construed most strongly in favor of the grantor. The provision here in question is an exemption or privilege extended to certain mutual insurance companies, and all doubts and ambiguities therein must be resolved in favor of the Government, and no presumptions can be indulged in extending its benefits in doubtful cases. The strict construction placed upon the said provision, therefore, by this office seems both warranted and required. Finally it may be stated that the opinion that the definition of the words "not for profit" placed upon them by this office is no broader than would be upheld by the courts is supported by the late case of Sargent Land Co. v. Von Baumbach (207 Fed., 423), in which the court said: My present opinion is that the words "organized for profit" are used to distinguish these corporations from charitable corporations, that any corporation organized by private persons for their own advantage and interest, and not for social, charitable, or beneficent purposes, is organized for profit. I have also had a comparison made with the corporation tax act of August 5, 1909, and the act of October 3, 1913, imposing an income tax, to discover, if possible, the general attitude of Congress toward mutual fire insurance companies, and nothing has been found therein indicating a desire particularly to favor such companies. Indeed, on its face, the earliest of these acts seems positively to discriminate against them, since it imposes taxation only upon such corporations and companies in general as are organized for profit, while it taxes every insurance company. The language used denotes that the apparent discrimination may have been unintentional, but we have no right to assume that, and indeed all reasonable doubt of the phraseology of the act having been advisedly adopted disappears if we accept the interpretation of the words "organized for profit" suggested by the court in the case of Sargent Land Co. v. Von Baumbach, referred to, since if that be the correct interpretation, the words would be meaningless when applied to insurance companies, for in the very nature of things they are not organized for social, philanthropic, or beneficent purposes. At any rate, whether we accept or not the judge's interpretation of the words "organized for profit," there is nothing to indicate in the paragraph in which they occur any tendency to favor mutual companies. In the act of October 3, 1913, we find the provision— That mutual fire insurance companies requiring their members to make premium deposits to provide for losses and expenses shall not return as income any portion of the premium deposits returned to their policy holders, but shall return as taxable income all income received by them from all other sources, plus such portions of the premium deposits as are retained by the companies for purposes other than the payment of losses and expenses and reinsurance reserves. In other words, only in the case of a certain limited number of such companies is money returned to members as unused premium deposits to be excluded in computing the taxable income of mutual fire insurance companies, thus requiring that money received from investments shall be included as taxable income, and putting such profit or gain upon the same footing as though it were profit made by a stock company. If at the time of passing the act of October 3, 1913, Congress took the view that such increment of the investments of mutual companies was properly taxable as income or profit, it seems a logical inference that the same body had the same funds in view as constituting profit when passing the acts of June 13, 1898, and October 22, 1914. For these various reasons, this office feels compelled to adhere to the rule adopted in T. D. 2114, that with certain exceptions mentioned therein, companies or associations which obtain profit either from premiums received from nonmembers or from the investment of their funds, do not come within the exemption of the act of October 22, 1914, covering "cooperative or mutual fire insurance companies or associations carried on by the members thereof solely for the protection of their own property, and not for profit." Respectfully Hon. W. H. OSBORN, Commissioner of Internal Revenue. (T. D. 2196.) Emergency revenue law-Powers of attorney. Ruling made in paragraph 6 of T. D. 2134 reversed, and power of sale clause embodied in a mortgage or deed of trust held not taxable as power of attorney. TREASURY Department, OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Washington, D. C., May 8, 1915. SIR: Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of the 29th ultimo, addressed to Deputy Commissioner Gates, referring to your two previous letters, and inclosing copy of a mortgage in which there is embodied a power of sale clause, which, under the ruling made in paragraph 6 of T. D. 2134, is held taxable as a power of attorney, at the rate of 25 cents. In reply, you are advised that this office has reconsidered the above ruling, and has decided that the power of sale generally embodied in a mortgage, real or chattel, and deed of trust, differs from a power of attorney in many respects, one of which is that the latter always creates an agency or a representative relation, whereas a mortgagee under a power of sale acts on his own behalf and for his own benefit. It is, therefore, now held that such power of sale is not taxable as a power of attorney within the meaning of the act of October 22, 1914, and all rulings inconsistent herewith are hereby revoked. Respectfully, W. H. OSBORN, Mr. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. (T. D. 2197.) Emergency revenue law-Express and freight. Limited by exceptions enumerated and other exceptions relating to intercity shipments and operations by rail and water all movements of freight from one city to another or within the limits of a city or place required to be covered by stamped receipts. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Washington, D. C., May 8, 1915. SIR: This office is in receipt of your letter of the 19th ultimo, from which it appears that the practical effect of the construction given to the rulings of this office relative to the application of the provision of the act of October 22, 1914, imposing taxation upon receipts required to be given by express companies and other carriers, is that no stamps are generally being affixed to receipts issued both by interstate express companies and purely local hauling concerns covering the movement of packages and freight within the five boroughs into which the city of New York is divided, the local concerns claiming their receipts to be exempt under the said rulings and the interstate companies failing to require that stamps be attached to their receipts on the ground that for them to do so while no stamps are required to be attached to receipts given by concerns with which they are competing for local business would be a very great handicap to them. This office does not desire the provisions of the act in question to be so administered as to place any unnecessary handicap upon any concerns in competition with others for the same class of business, and it is therefore now held, in accordance with your recommendation, any previous rulings to the contrary notwithstanding, that receipts shall hereafter be issued and tax stamps be required thereon in every case covering all packages or freight received for transportation to any point whether within or without city limits by every person, corporation, or concern engaged in the business of moving merchandise for hire, regardless of whether such persons or concerns be engaged solely in the transportation of goods within the limits of a city or town or whether they are also engaged in the transportation of merchandise between different cities and towns. This ruling shall not, however, be held applicable to the movement of household furniture in use as such from one residence to another solely by wagon or similar road vehicle, or of trunks, hand baggage, etc., of a passenger to and from railroad depots, steamship piers, etc., or to the movement of packages and freight under contract covering any period whereby for a lump sum or an amount measured by the number or weight of packages transported, one party contracts to deliver all of the packages or all of a certain kind of packages which the other party may have for delivery generally or in a certain neighborhood during the period, or whereby the sole use of certain trucks, lighters, or other similar means of local transportation is obtained for a given space of time, or under contracts or agreements establishing the relationship of employer and employee rather than that of consignee and carrier, respectively; neither will any stamps be required upon receipts for movements accessory to or in connection with the transportation of freight between different cities or towns, such intercity shipments being covered by duly stamped bills of lading or corresponding documents, it being further held that stamp tax is not required under the circumstances recited in this paragraph, whether or not goods in such cases are transported beyond the limits of a city or town, except that the exemption regarding movements under general contracts shall not be applicable to transportation beyond the limits of a city or town and its immediate suburbs. Whenever, also, a number of orders or shipments are consigned in bulk to a local hauling concern for distribution among the ultimate consignees, a receipt, to which a stamp must be affixed, shall be issued covering each individual order or shipment. In other words, in general terms, the rule which this office desires to be followed by all officers charged with the enforcement of the internal-revenue laws, limited only by the exceptions enumerated above and the various other exceptions relating to intercity shipments and operations by rail and water published from time to time, is that all movements of freight, whether from one city to another, or entirely within the limits of a given city or place, are to be regarded as being required to be covered by stamped receipts. All previous rulings construed as extending exemption from the necessity of issuing receipts, or of stamping such receipts when issued, to purely local movements of freight by means of wagons or similar street or road vehicles, as distinguished from vehicles operated upon fixed tracks, should be disregarded. Respectfully, Mr. W. H. OSBORN, Commissioner of Internal Revenue. (T. D. 2198.) Special excise tax on corporations-Decision of court. 1. TAXES DUE FROM STOCKHOLDERS. Under the State law, where banks pay the State tax imposed on shareholders, but have a lien until reimbursed on the shares of stock and all dividends, the tax is not imposed on the banks. 2. TAXES NOT Deductible. State taxes so paid can not be legally deducted from gross income in returns made by banks under the corporation tax act.—T. D. 1763 sustained. 3. POWER TO MAKE NEW ASSESSMENT. The commissioner has power to make a new assessment within three years in case an incorrect return has been made. 4. FALSE RETURNS. There is no necessity of construing the word "false" where it is used with reference to the time in which the commissioner shall act to mean fraudulently false. 5. DECISION OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Affirmed. The decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri (211 Fed., 743; T. D. 1991) is affirmed. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Washington, D. C., May 5, 1915. The appended opinion of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, in the case of the National Bank of Commerce v. Allen, collector, is published for the information of internalrevenue officers and others concerned. W. H. OSBORN, Commissioner of Internal Revenue. UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT. No. 4260. DECEMBER TERM, 1914. National Bank of Commerce in St. Louis, plaintiff in error, v. E. B. Allen, Collector, defendant in error. IN ERROR to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri, [March 25, 1915.] Before Hook and CARLAND, Circuit Judges, and AMIDON, District Judge. CARLAND, Circuit Judge: This is an action by the bank against the collector to recover the sum of $5,304.57 paid under protest as taxes assessed pursuant to section |