It will be assumed, for the purposes of this motion, as alleged in the petition, that the officers entered the defendant's premises and seized the property in question without a search warrant and without his consent, and that the seizure was illegal. It is entirely well settled that the court has the power, in a summary proceeding such as this, to order the return to the accused of papers and documents wrongfully seized and in the possession of the district attorney, or other officers of the court. Weeks v. United States, supra; Wise v. Henkel (220 U. S., 556); United States v. Mills (185 Fed., 318); United States v. McHie (194 Fed., 894); United States v. Wilson (163 Fed., 338). In United States v. McHie, supra, and in Rex v. Barnett (3 C. & P., 600), and in Rex v. Kinsey (7 C. & P., 477), power to summarily order the return of personal property, other than papers and documents, was recognized and exercised. There would seem to be no good reason for any distinction between the kinds of personal property which may be ordered returned, where the seizure has been illegal. The question at once arises, Has the court the same power, in a summary proceeding of this kind, to order a revenue officer to return property wrongfully seized and which is still under his control? This question calls primarily for a determination as to whether a revenue officer, in making seizures and retaining possession of property by virtue of the above-mentioned section of the Revised Statutes, is an officer of the court. As far as anything before me shows, no proceedings have been taken to enforce the forfeiture provided for in section 3453 of the Revised Statutes. It was held in the case of In re Chin K. Shue (199 Fed., 282; D. C. Mass.) that customs officers, assuming to act by authority of a similar statute, were not, in making the seizure and dealing with the goods before the collector had proceeded against them for forfeiture, acting as officers of the court, and the power of the court, upon petition, to direct the collector to return the property so seized, was denied. In United States v. One Case of Silk (4 Ben., 526; 27 Fed. Cas., 15925), where the question presented was whether the marshal or the collector of customs was entitled to the custody of certain goods which had been seized by the collector for a violation of the revenue laws, Mr. Justice Blatchford (p. 254, Fed. Cas.) said: The property is, in contemplation of law, after process, in the custody of the court, although the marshal does not take it into his custody, provided it remains in custody, under a seizure for forfeiture, while the proceedings in court against it are pending. The collector is its official keeper, for the court, after process, and the court has, after process, as full control over it in the hands of the collector, and as full power to compel obedience by the collector to all orders of the court respecting it, as if it were in the hands of the marshal, under process. The views there expressed are in harmony with those of Justice Story in Burke v. Trevitt (1 Mason, 96; 4 Fed. Cas., 2163) and were quoted, with approval, in the case of the G. G. King (16 Fed. 921; D. C. S. D. Fla.). In all of those cases, however, the property was not considered to be in custody of the court until after process in forfeiture proceedings had been issued. That feature distinguished the case at bar and the In re Chin K. Shue case from the cases last cited, and, I think, is decisive. I am entirely well satisfied that the conclusion reached by Judge Dodge in the In re Chin K. Shue case was correct and that revenue officers who have seized property pursuant to assumed legislative authority are not officers of the court in the sense that the court has power, in a summary proceeding of this kind, to order the return of property illegally seized; at any rate before steps have been taken to have it forfeited. They are officers of another branch of the Government and in this case did not assume to act pursuant to any judicial authority or process. If the seizure was unlawful, the defendant undoubtedly may have redress in a plenary action. The question whether the property seized can be used as evidence against the accused on the trial of a criminal indictment is not and can not be presented in a proceeding of this kind. The petition will therefore be dismissed. (T. D. 2192.) United States gaugers at rectifying houses. Postponing action under T. D. 2176, relative to discontinuance of services of United States gaugers at rectifying houses. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, To collectors of internal revenue: Washington, D. C., April 22, 1915. Referring to T. D. 2176, dated March 15, 1915, in which you were advised that pursuant to the act of March 4, 1915, regulations were then in preparation which if approved by the Secretary of the Treasury would take effect on the 1st proximo, dispensing with the services of United States gaugers at rectifying houses, you are informed that the regulations referred to are not ready for issue. You will therefore postpone any action in this regard until otherwise instructed. Meanwhile, the regulations heretofore existing will continue in full force. W. H. OSBORN, Commissioner of Internal Revenue. (T. D. 2193.) Income tax-Compromises. Minimum amounts which will be accepted in settlement of the specific penalty. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, To collectors of internal revenue: Washington, D. C., April 24, 1915. With reference to corporations and individuals who have failed to file returns of annual net income within the prescribed time for the year 1914, you are advised that it has been determined by the Treasury Department to accept offers in compromise of the specific penalties in minimum sums as follows: $10 from corporations and $5 from individuals. Where such delinquents failed to file returns for 1913 within the prescribed time, offers for 1914 delinquencies will be accepted as follows: $15 from corporations and $7.50 from individuals. The foregoing applies only to those cases where there was no intention to evade the law or escape taxation. The minimum sum of $15 also applies to corporations "not organized for profit" which were relieved of the specific penalty for failing to file returns within the prescribed time for 1913. In preparing compromise cases for transmission to this office, a notation should be made on Form 656 in the case of corporations and individuals also delinquent for 1913, in order that proper consideration can be given the offers in accordance with the above schedule. In the case of delinquent withholding agents, offers in compromise of not less than $5 in settlement of the specific penalty may be accepted for deposit where it is believed that the delinquency was due simply to oversight or lack of information concerning the requirements of the law. It should be made clear, however, that each case will be decided upon its merits, and where the facts indicate carelessness or disregard of the law such offers will no doubt be rejected. Offers in compromise can not receive favorable consideration in cases where the returns for the year in question have not been filed. In such cases the recommendation that the offer be accepted should be made "subject to the filing of the return," the date of filing to be furnished promptly upon receipt of the return. Narcotic law-Synthetic substitutes-Registry of manufacturers, etc. Persons using or having in possession cocaine, alpha or beta eucaine, or any of their salts or any synthetic substitute for them, required to register, pay the special tax, and comply with all the provisions and regulations issued under authority of the act of December 17, 1914, known as the Harrison narcotic law. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Washington, D. C., April 26, 1915. In exempting from its provisions certain preparations and remedies the act (sec. 6) expressly excludes from such exemptions "preparations which contain cocaine or any of its salts or alpha or beta eucaine or any of their salts or any synthetic substitute for them." To effect the obvious purpose of this provision of the act, the words "synthetic substitutes" are held to apply to any artificial substance or preparation which is or may be substituted for cocaine, alpha or beta eucaine, or any of their salts as ordinarily prescribed or used, and not necessarily to a purely synthetic substitute which, chemically, is identically the same as the drug for which it may be so substituted. Further, both the title and section 1 of this law include "opium or coca leaves or any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, or preparation thereof," and under a liberal interpretation of the word "derivative" from a chemical point of view, the several cocaine substitutes would also be clearly included. Manufacturers of, dealers in, and physicians prescribing any such substitutes, as above defined, should therefore register and otherwise conform to the requirements of this law and the regulations issued thereunder. W. H. OSBORN, Approved: WM. P. MALBURN, Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Acting Secretary of the Treasury. (T. D. 2195.) Emergency revenue law― Mutual insurance companies. Construction of the proviso of the act of October 22, 1914, exempting from taxation the policies of mutual fire insurance companies carried on by the members thereof for the protection of their own property and not for profit. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Washington, D. C., April 23, 1915. MY DEAR SENATOR: I have the honor to refer to a visit made by you to this office some time ago, at which time we discussed the subject of the construction of the proviso of the act of October 22, 1914, exempting from taxation the policies of mutual fire insurance companies carried on by the members thereof for the protection of their own property and not for profit. You expressed disagreement with the interpretation of this provision made by this office as applied to the case of the Mutual Fire Insurance Co. of Montgomery County, Md., the policies of which have been held to be subject to tax in view of the fact that it has invested funds upon which profit is realized, and as I recollect your remarks in the matter, your contention was that the fact that the company had small investments upon which a low rate of interest was paid, which interest went into the general treasury of the company, did not take it out of the exemption in question, since the fund invested consisted only of such surplus as was essential as a sinking or safety fund, to guard against any period of extraordinary losses which might occur. It was agreed that the whole subject would be reconsidered and taken up by this office de novo. The matter has been delayed until such time as it could be gone into thoroughly, which was scarcely possible for a considerable period after your visit, owing to the very considerable amount of corre 78411'-VOL 17-15-11 spondence caused by the act, and the fact that Congress had not provided for any additional force in this office for its administration. The matter has now, however, been thoroughly considered, and while of course no question is raised as to the company in which you are interested being purely a cooperative and mutual organization, this office does not feel warranted in departing from its previous ruling that a company which invests its funds and realizes profit thereon is not covered by a provision applicable only to concerns carried on without profit. In concluding that, as used in the paragraph of the act in question, the word "profit" must not be understood as meaning merely dividends paid to stockholders or cash payments to preferred members, but must be regarded as including all financial gain or benefit, accruing either to the organization as a whole, or to its individual members, directly or indirectly, through investments, and that profit on invested money is none the less profit because the earnings of invested capital are paid and received as deductions from amounts otherwise payable by the beneficiary as the cost of the insurance of his property rather than as actual cash, or because the investments upon which profits accrue are called reserves or surplus rather than capital, this office was guided by the construction placed, in a number of different decisions, upon the similar provision of the act of June 13, 1898, in one of which, for instance (T. D. 20020, published under date of September 2, 1898), it was held that— If the receipts of your company are in excess of your liabilities, and they are invested and profit is made thereon, your policies would become taxable because your company would be conducting a business for profit, and the purely cooperative feature would be eliminated. The mere fact that there is no capital stock would not of itself render your company a purely cooperative company. There are other features in mutual companies than these. Numbers of mutual companies are conducted for profit, and the profit is represented by investments, by reduction in premiums, and other incidents of profit. Companies of this class are subject to taxation. This construction was not overruled or questioned in any court decision of which this office is aware, and it is furthermore a logical and legal inference that Congress took into account the construction placed by this office upon the provision of the former act, and, by reenacting the same identical provision in the present act, intended that the same construction should be placed upon the existing statute. As stated in 23 Att. Gen. Opin., 3— What is known as departmental construction of a statute is, in proper instances, a very important method of determining the true legal construction to be placed upon the acts of Congress. As was said by Mr. Justice Brown in Schell's Executors v. Fauche (138 U. S., 562-572): "In all cases of ambiguity the contemporaneous construction, not only of the courts but of the departments, and even of the officers whose duties it is to carry the laws into effect, is universally held to be controlling." When there is added to this departmental construction the subsequent readoption of the same language by Congress in another act, it is conclusive that Congress, in the |