A DOT/FAA FLIGHT STANDARDS SAFETY PUBLICATION

A recent survey of the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database on incidents involving general aviation (GA) aircraft revealed that one third of the GA incidents were associated with communications difficulties. These problems included failure to comply with ATC clearances, communications equipment malfunctions, and poor radio technique. The results of this survey suggested to our research team that GA communications issues were an appropriate topic for further ASRS research. We were also aware that past ASRS research on general aviation issues has not focused on this subject. It largely has been confined to weather-related topics, such as single-pilot IFR; pilot judgment issues; and flight phasespecific problems such as landing incidents. --ASRS Editor

he 1996 Nall Report, published by the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) Air Safety Foundation, further focused our attention on dual instruction. [For the purposes of this study, dual instruction is considered primary or advanced flight training that involves a student or rated pilot who actively handles the aircraft controls (usually from the left seat of the aircraft, except in tandem configurations) and a certified flight instructor who observes the trainee's actions (usually from the right seat of the aircraft) and has the capability of intervening in control and communications actions.] Although flight instruction overall is one of the safest operations in general aviation, according to the accident statistics from the 1996 Nall Report: Accident Trends and Factors for 1995, there was a notable

concentration of fatalities and accidents during dual instruction: the only fatal go-around accident, four of the five fatal maneuvering accidents, and five out of seven non-fatal maneuvering accidents occurred during dual instruction. This cluster of accidents and fatalities in dual flight instruction raised the question of whether problematic communications, both inside. and outside the aircraft, might have played a role.

A final motivation for this study was research by NASA and others which has shown that in shared decisionmaking situations similar to those that occur in GA dual flight instruction, there is often a failure of individuals to take responsibility for actions, including communications. At the 1995 Ohio State University (OSU) Symposium, Carolyn Prince and Renee Stout pre

he pilot flying, who was also acting as the pilot-in-command, had performed flawlessly during the flight. Flight planning, crew briefing, passenger boarding, takeoff, cruise, descent, and approach to low IFR minimums with a squeaker landing to top off a boffo performance-what more could a fella ask? Before we heap praise and accolades on this super-pilot, let's see what happens next.

The next leg was flown by the very experienced pilot who occupied the right seat on the previous leg. Mr. Super, now relegated to the right seat, soon showed signs of slowing down. The passengers beat him to the aircraft at boarding time, he was behind in setting up the Flight Management System (FMS), flubbed the clearance readback, failed to have the silent checklist items completed before the pilot asking for the challenge-and-reply items, mis-computed takeoff weights and speeds, and misdirected the pilot in finding the proper taxi route. And this was all prior to takeoff! Maybe he's just a bit behind the demands of the right seat after having performed so well on the other side-we'll see....

Things went from bad to worse as the flight progressed; more flubbed clearances, mis-set radios, inability to find charted intersections, poor fuel balance control, and general lack of support for the pilot flying marked the remainder of the flight. What happened to Super Pilot? Sadly, super pilots sometimes make poor copilots.

The pilot flying is preoccupied with the need to act, to plan for action and to be directly involved with the immediate concerns of where the aircraft will be in the next 30 seconds or so. While longer range planning and foresight are necessary, most of the pilot's actions are rooted in the present and near future. Action and the next few minutes are his real concerns.

Conversely, the copilot is charged with a more reflective, supporting role. His life should be concerned with what will happen in 10 miles, 15 minutes, the next altitude assignment, or after the next frequency change. A principal mission of the copilot is to think ahead and sort out the options available to the aircraft and the pilot flying. The copilot forms the supporting cast to the pilot flying's lead; at their best copilots observe, evaluate, advise, an

ticipate, direct, assist, and counsel. The phrase, "at their best" is key here.

At their worst copilots create high amounts of induced drag on cockpit operations. A poor or behind-thecurve copilot can prove to be a distraction, hindrance, source of frustration, and a bona fide safety hazard.

There must be a willingness to serve within the copilot, a predisposition to helping another (the pilot) toward a common goal. Without this key ingredient the copilot may as well stay at home or be replaced by an automated checklist.

While all of us started in the right seat, we used it as a vehicle from which to learn more about either the aircraft itself or aviation in general. We learned that we served the person in the left seat. When we got good enough we were allowed to graduate to the left seat, first under supervision, and then permanently as pilot-in-command. But what happens when both pilots are well or equally qualified? What happens to the quality of work performed from the right seat?

Ideally, the work should be of equal or better quality to that performed from the left seat. This is especially true for