there is no express stipulation that they shall be fit for that purpose, there is an implied warranty that they shall be fit." This is certainly a very equitable and just principle, and one which is quite susceptible of controlling the present case, without any unreasonable extension. We believe the tendency of modern decisions, in regard to the harsh and unreasonable application of the I. F. R. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. CHASE VS. MILLER. Contested Election—Constitutionality of Military Vote outside of State. 1. This Court has jurisdiction to review and correct the proceedings of inferior Courts, except where it is expressly excluded by statute, or in a case stated by the parties, wherein they agree to submit their disputes to auditors or referees of the Common Pleas without expressly reserving their right to a writ of error. The presumption in the latter case is, that the parties mean to bind themselves by the award of the domestic tribunal of their own choice. 2. This Court has jurisdiction of a contested election, on certiorari, where it appears from the record that no facts were in dispute; hence the rulings of the Court below upon questions of law purely are reviewable here. 3. This Court is as much bound to take cognisance of questions involving the constitutionality of the election laws, even though they may be raised in a contested election, as they are to pass upon the constitutionality of an Act of Assembly relating to any other subject, as long as the Legislature does not take away that jurisdiction. 4. The 155th section of the Act of 2d July, 1839, giving to Courts of Quarter Sessions the same powers that are conferred on committees of the Legislature, to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of papers in contested elections, is only a grant of power for the specific purposes named, and does not make the decision of the Court below, like that of the Legislature, final and conclusive. 5. Bills of exceptions are not allowed in the Courts of Quarter Sessions, therefore no question which arises outside of the record can be reviewed by this Court. 6. Election districts, within the meaning of our statute, denotes subdivisions of Pennsylvania territory, marked out by known boundaries, prearranged and declared by public authorities; and election districts mean in the Constitution just what they mean in the statute. The Constitution recognises them as among the civil institutions of the State, which can neither be created, nor controlled by the military power. 7. The term "residence" in the Constitution is the same as domicil-a word which means the place where a man establishes his abode, makes the seat of his property, and exercises his civil and political rights. 8. The right of a soldier to vote, under the Constitution, is in the district where he resided at the time of his entering the military service. 9. The 43d section of the election law of 2d July, 1839, allowing soldiers to vote outside of the boundaries of the State, is in direct conflict with the amended clause of the 3d article of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, and is, therefore, null and void. Appeal from and certiorari to the Quarter Sessions of Luzerne County. A complaint of upwards of twenty qualified electors of Luzerne county, setting forth an undue election and false return of Ezra B. Chase to the office of District Attorney of said county, was filed 29th November, 1861. On December 24, 1861, an agreement between the parties as to the facts to be submitted as a case stated, was filed. This agreement submits the question of the constitutionality of an Act of Assembly of Pennsylvania, allowing volunteers in military service to vote wherever they may be on the day of election, and the commanding officers to transmit their return of votes, tickets, &c., to their respective counties to be counted in the general return. The facts of the case appear at large in the opinion of the Supreme Court. The Court below decided in favor of the constitutionality of the military vote, and decreed accordingly. The case was argued on behalf of the appellant by Messrs. Stanley Woodward, and Lyman Hakes, who cited Sect. 1, Art. 3, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania; McDaniel's Case, 4 Penn. L. Jour. 312; Cooper vs. Gilbraith, 3 W. C. C. R. 546; Story's Confl. Laws 50, 51; Kent's Com. 431, note E.; 1 Bouv. Inst. 96, 99; Guier vs. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. 352; U. S. vs. Penelope, 2 Peters' Adm. 450; 9 Deb. Penna. Const. 300. The Constitution requires a residence of ten days immediately preceding the election in the election district. This restriction is to be strictly construed. The Legislature have no power to modify a constitutional restriction upon the voting privilege. Messrs. S. P. Longstreet and G. M. Wharton, for appellees, cited Overseers vs. Brown, 1 Harris 390; Canal Co. vs. Keiser, 7 Harris 134; Carpenter's Case, 2 Harris 486; Commonwealth vs.. Nathans, 5 Barr 124; Wallington vs. Kneass, 3 Harris 313, 7 Watts 527; Mifflin Township vs. Elizabeth, 6 Harris 17; Commonwealth vs. Clarke, 7 W. & S. 127; Act of 26 April, 1844; Commonwealth vs. Hartman, 5 Harris 119; Commonwealth vs. Mc Williams, 1 Jones 70; Commonwealth vs. Maxwell, 3 Casey 458; R. R. Co. vs. Casey, 2 Casey 300; Kilpatrick vs. Commonwealth, 7 Casey 215; Bank of Kentucky vs. Schuylkill Bank, 1 Parsons 223. A constitution is not to receive a technical but a liberal construction. There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent the Legislature from establishing for the convenience of the people, different places to receive votes for the same election district; nor is there anything to prevent their establishing, for the convenience of the voters of a district, a place outside of the district for holding the election. Express prohibition is necessary to oust the authority of the Legislature. The opinion of the Court was delivered May 22d, 1862, by WOODWARD, J.-This is a case of contested election. It comes up to us by writ of certiorari. A motion was made and fully argued, to quash the writ on the ground that the decree of the Court below is final and conclusive, and that we have no jurisdiction to review it. The first point to be considered, therefore, is our jurisdiction; for if there be any doubt on that head, we shall be more than willing to escape the constitutional question upon the record. [A portion of the opinion, not referring to the main question of constitutionality, is omitted, on account of the extreme length of the case.] An election for District Attorney was held in Luzerne county, last October, at which Ezra B. Chase and Jerome G. Miller were the candidates. After counting what the return judges considered legal votes, they gave their certificate of election to Chase, but twenty qualified electors filed their complaint in writing, setting forth an undue election, and a false return of Chase, and thus this contest was inaugurated. Besides complaining of a large number of fraudulent votes cast within the county, the petitioners set forth that "on the day of election certain citizens of the Commonwealth, being qualified electors of the county of Luzerne, and then in the actual military service in certain detachments or companies of volunteers, under a requisition from the President of the United States, and by the authority of the Governor of the Commonwealth, did, agreeably to law, hold an election for the purpose of electing county officers of Luzerne;" and then follows a detailed statement of the votes cast by different companies for the office of District Attorney, and a complaint that the return judges excluded the vote of the volunteers, and issued their certificate in disregard of it. The petitioners did not give the names of the military voters, nor tell the Court where they voted. Exceptions were filed to the complaint, one of which was that the place of voting was not disclosed, but the Court overruled the exceptions, and refused to quash the complaint or compel it to be amended in this particular. Pending the proceedings upon this petition, the parties, on the 24th of December, 1861, entered into, and, with the leave of the Court, filed of record, a written agreement in these words: "It is agreed the following facts be submitted as a case stated' for the Court's decision. Admitted that of the votes polled within the county of Luzerne, Ezra B. Chase received 5811 votes, and that Jerome G. Miller received 5646, and that the said number of votes by each received be counted by the Court as legal votes. That of the votes polled by the volunteers in the army, Ezra B. Chase received 58 votes, Jerome G. Miller received 362 votes. But the legality of the votes polled by the volunteers in the army not being admitted, the question as to the legal effect thereof is submitted as a matter of law for the Court. If the Court should be of opinion that the army vote is constitutional and legal, the same to be allowed by the Court, and added to the vote cast in the county for the party or parties in whose favor they may be, and then the Court to decree in favor of the party having the greatest number of votes. If no part of the army vote is received, the decree to be in favor of Mr. Chase, the army vote being taken as above stated, the objections to it being all waived, except as to its constitutionality." On the 6th of January, the Court made their decree "upon the written statement of facts agreed to by the parties, and filed upon the 24th December ultimo, no other evidence being offered," which was to the effect that the army vote was legal, that it should be counted, and that it gave a majority to Miller, to whom the office was awarded. * * * * The "army vote," as it is most loosely called in the agreement of 24th December, was cast somewhere, and counted in pursuance of section 43d and the sections immediately succeeding of the general election law of 2d July, 1839, Purdon 289. The 43d section is in these words: "Whenever any of the citizens of this Commonwealth, qualified as hereinbefore provided, shall be in any actual military service in any detachment of the militia or corps of volunteers under a requisition from the President of the United States, or by the authority of this Commonwealth, on the day of the general election, such citizens may exercise the right of suffrage at such place as may be appointed by the commanding officer of the troop or company to which they shall respectively belong, as fully as if they were present at the usual place of election: Provided, That no member of any such troop or company shall be permitted to vote at the place so appointed, if at the time of such election he shall be within ten miles of the place at which he would be entitled to vote if not in the service aforesaid." This section and its sequents are virtually a reprint of the Act of 29th March, 1813, 6 Smith's Laws, p. 70. The proviso of that Act prescribed two miles from his usual place of voting as the condition on which the volunteer in actual service might exercise suffrage elsewhere. Such a proviso, whether two miles, as in the Act of 1813, or ten miles, as in the Act of 1839, is an intimation |