shall be payable as overtime by the person placing the call. For the purpose of ha this section all calls placed by the Master or other Officer in charge of the vess shall be considered as ship's business. The additional basic wages payable to the Radio Officer under this paragraph shall be treated as base wages for e purposes." A APPENDIX F THE GROUNDING AND SINKING OF THE S.S. "PRINCESS KATHLEEN” (By Harold Lockwood, SS Hawaiian Craftsman) The SS Princess Kathleen struck a jagged ledge while underway at normal speed, being a mile and a quarter off her course at the time. Although over 30 passengers were aboard, the vessel carried only one radio officer. The ship was equipped with D. F., radar, and normal radio telegraph equip‐ ment required for this class of vessel. Also she carried ship-to-shore radiophone being similar to the RMCA 65-watt radiophone which is used by a great many merchant ships of U.S. registry. Like many U.S. ships, the radiophone was installed on the ship's bridge and not in the radio room. This phone was used mostly by the mates and captain of the ship and was not under direct control of the radio officer although he was required to service the phone and perform maintenance work from time to time (with no overtime). When the vessel struck the rocky reef, the radio officer immediately endeavored to get the bridge on this ship's intercommunication system for instructions on whether to send for help or give other information in connection with rescue work, etc. The bridge ignored his calls from the radio room. Being the only radio operator, he was duty bound to stay at his post, which he did, awaiting orders from the captain on the bridge. But none were forthcoming. After waiting for some time, and being unable to gain the attention of the bridge, he asked one of the crew who was passing near the radioroom, to have bridge or captain send some instructions that would be necessary in connection with rescue work, including ship's position. But this too was ignored. In the meantime the vessel was sinking by the stern at such an angle that the radio officer could no longer sit in his chair and was forced to stand up bracing himself as best he could while continuing to maintain his listening watch. While this was going on, one of the bridge officers warmed up the ship's radiophone on the bridge, and without placing the set on the distress band. started hollering: "Mayday." Not being on the distress frequency he was not immediately heard. Due to the Coast Guard watch who was cruising over all bands, they were heard on this off frequency. The Coast Guard immediately made every effort to contact the Princess Kathleen and get position, instructions for possible rescue of passengers, etc., but were unable to get the ship's officer to pass them this information as confusion reigned supreme on the bridge. The phone finally went off the air leaving the Coast Guard in Juneau, Alaska, wondering what it was all about. They immediately put their D. F. and radar equip ment in use. The radar showed the location of the Princess Kathleen, and a Coast Guard cutter was dispatched to the point shown by radar. As soon as they came within sight the Coast Guard realized the precarious position of the ship, and came alongside her and took all passengers off, returning sometime later for the ship's captain and crew who in the meantime had left the ship and waded ashore awaiting rescue. The vessel meanwhile had sunk by the stern at a very acute angle, being about two-thirds submerged. It finally slid off the reef into deeper water and sank with only her masts showing above the water's surface. The only contact the radio officer had was a few minutes prior to the time the vessel slid under water and sank, at which time he was ordered to abandon ship. The point clearly brought to mind is, had the captain notified the radio officer to send for help or given written instructions by messenger regarding the ship's position, nature of the damage, number of passengers aboard and other vital information needed by the Coast Guard, rescue operations would have been speeded up considerably and they would have proceeded immediately on receipt of the distress message, as the radiotelegraph equipment was able to function up till the time the vessel commenced to settle in her final resting place. At a preliminary hearing on these events in Ketchikan, the radio officer was asked why he did not send out any distress information. It was then brought out that he received none whatsoever from the captain or bridge although ad made every effort to get in communication with the bridge. The radio er said that he stayed by his radio equipment on watch until the very last a ordered off. This he was bound to do and was completely exonerated by Coast Guard for so doing. : a hearing conducted later by Canadian officials, blame for the failure of the ophone and lack of distress information was laid on the radio officer. How, he proved that he never left his post in the radioroom, had nothing to do broadcasting of "Mayday" over the ship's radiophone and brought out the t that he was unable to get any information whatsoever from the bridge or captain. he point is that the bridge officers were so busy trying to use the radioe, that the radioroom was completely ignored as was the radio officer's for instructions to be broadcast by telegraph over the usual distress band. APPENDIX G THE "JOAO COSTA" SINKING n September 29, about 3 in the afternoon, approximately 60 miles north of Miguel, the SS Compass came upon three dories filled with 12 men. They e obviously in distress and we picked them up. From them we learned they were a part of the crew of the M/V Joao Costa, a fishing vessel of tuguese registry, that had sunk 300 miles north of the Azores on September They had been without food or water since that time; they were overded, 4 men in each of small 2-man dories, and somewhere around us e were another 62 men in the same condition. We immediately started arch of the area. put my first XXX on the air at 1733, first sending the auto alarm signal from then on worked continuously until late at night. Our information at first a bit garbled, we were working with a language barrier, no one ard the ship speaking Portuguese, but as we got other information from the Survivors, I would go on the air with another urgent message. I must say I had splendid cooperation from all ships and shore stations. Ships with 1 frequency equipment transmitted my urgent messages to various high quency shore stations and I later heard GLD repeating them just as I inally sent them. he other 62 members of the crew of the Joao Costa were picked up at daylight t morning at 0811 GMT just 14 hours 38 minutes after I first sent the news, despite being in open overcrowded boats, without food or water for 7 days, ry man of the crew of the Joao Costa was rescued. I believe that is some sort ecord in the history of the sea. During the time that we had the survivors aboard, we were able to get a tty complete story of the cause of the disaster. The Joao Costa had caught , then exploded. Of the greatest interest to me, however, is the fact that they e unable to send a distress call although there was plenty of time to do so. y were not equipped with radiotelegraph although their radiophone was ged so that it could be keyed. I am not too familiar with such a set but gine that some of the fellows around the hall would be. However, to get back my story, they carried no one who could get the radiophone to working who knew how to operate the key. I look upon this very fact as a screaming ument for the inclusion of a radio operator aboard every ship regardless of or flag. It was only through a happy run of fate that these men were resd. Had the preceding night been clear we would have made our course south he Azores rather than north of them, had not an unexpected current set us 5 es off our course we would have never seen the dories. It is probable that a nber of the men would have made the Azores but it is doubtful if all of them ild have done so. They had been passed by other ships who evidently thought m only fishermen, had we passed them they said that they would have given all hope. What follows is rather embarrassing. We landed the 12 survivors (with rest, d food, and water, quite recovered) at Lagos, Portugal, October 3. We were rded by reporters, photographers, representatives of the Portuguese Governnt. representatives of the owner of the Joao Costa (forgot to tell you, his son s her captain) and God knows who else. These people were extremely flatterand grateful to the captain, Vildo Cerasoli, and he in turn told them that if re were any credit it belonged to me. I explained to them that I had only done my job. That the only reason for a radio officer was to fulfill the requirements of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, and that, ever i l had done my job well, such was no more than I should be expected to do I doubt that they even heard what I said. I was photographed, interviewed had my health drunk (didn't mind that a bit, they included a drink for mej ari, all in all, they made a devil of a lot of fuss over a strictly routine operation. I understand that they have also arranged some sort of reception at the Portugue consulate when we reach Savona tomorrow (October 7). If any credit is due, I think it should belong to the various radio officers whe were alert to my messages and who took part in the rescue operation. My ship could not have made an effective search of the area; we are a slow Liberty we had to have assistance in the search. The radio officers who copied my eas assured that assistance and to them, especially to the radio officers of the other two ships who picked up survivors (don't know the ships' names but have their calls as KROL and DVCO) belongs the credit for the successful rescue of the 72 men.-L. F. Joslyn, Bk No. APPENDIX H We have been hearing a lot lately about replacing radio officers on America: ships with radiophone and combination mate-radio officers. Last June I as radio officer on the SS Gulftrade, had an experience which proves what a terrible mistake that could be. That night at about 8:46 we collided with the Brazilian freighter SS Lode Panama. This happened about 2 miles from Barnegat Lightship in a light fog At 8:47 p.m. I was on the air with an S O S. After I had cleared the air. I repeatedly called the Loide Panama by name and by call letters. She didn't answer. I then asked WSC to try to raise her. He also was unable to raise the Loide Panama. Finally, about 45 minutes after the collision, the Loide Panama sent out an SOS saying that they were abandoning ship. I was then able to raise her for a short Q S O, but she went off the air before I could get any details as to men killed or injured or their ability to launch lifeboats, as she had a very bad list when last seen. We had a severely damaged bow, but the Loide Panama had a huge hole in her hull just aft of the midships house that stretched from bilge to deck and left her in a sinking condition. The two ships had been together most of the time: but we pulled away from them when there was imminent danger of fire, our ship being a loaded tanker. It was nearly half an hour after that that I received details on their condition and casualties from the radio officer on the SS African Endeavor which had arrived on the scene and dispatched her motor lifeboats to rescue the crew of the Loide Panama. I afterwards learned from the FCC that the third mate on the Loide Panama was also the radio operator. He was evidently too busy with his duties on deck to attend to his duties in the radioroom. If my transmitters had been put out of commission by the crash, and our ship had caught fire, there would have been serious loss of life due to his long delay in getting on the air. What would happen if two ships with combination mate-radio operators had a really bad collision? The mate-radio operators would be so busy with their duties on deck that no one would know what had happened. The requirement of a radio officer on board all ships is a safety factor the value of which cannot be easily denied. I was very pleased with the speed with which the air was cleared for me that night. At no time was there any interference with the distress traffic, and all radio officers in the vicinity were more than willing to lend a hand if needed. A few years ago there were always interruptions. This accident certainly made a firm impression in my mind as to the need of a fully qualified radio officer on all ships whose only duties are those of radio officer. JOSEPH T. SILVA, Book No. 1949. APPENDIX I INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF MASTERS, MATES & PILOTS, WILLIAM R. STEINBERG, ident, American Radio Association, York, N.Y. New York, N.Y., November 1, 1963. CAR SIR AND BROTHER: On April 27, 1953, you were notified by Capt. John M. op, national secretary-treasurer of this organization, as follows: We are pleased to advise you that the national executive committee of this nization, in a meeting on April 21, 1953, in the Hamilton Hotel, Washington, unanimously concurred in a resolution to notify you and all other parties erned that we do not claim jurisdiction over proper operation and maintee of any radio or electronic communication devices on American-flag vessels. We agree that this is properly the work of the radio officers on board the ls." thing has transpired in the intervening 10-year period that would require ange in that statement recognizing your jurisdiction of the radio officers rd the vessels over the operation and maintenance of any radio or electronic nunication device, including radiotelephone, on American-flag vessels. anything, experience has confirmed the value of this arrangement and its ›lete workability. Performance of safety communication by the radio officer its the master and licensed deck officers of the vessel to perform their vital s in the safe navigation of the vessel. Fraternally yours, APPENDIX J CHARLES M. CROOKS, CHARLES M. CROOKS, AMERICAN RADIO ASSOCIATION, ident, International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, AFL-CIO, New York, N.Y. CAR SIR AND BROTHER: I am in receipt of your letter of November 1, 1963, conng the position taken by Captain Bishop in his letter of April 27, 1953, on lf of your organization. On May 5, 1953, I replied to Captain Bishop in a r which read as follows: This is to acknowledge your letter of April 27 and we wish to thank you for orthright position taken by the Masters, Mates & Pilots of America in regard he radio officer's jurisdiction over any and all radio and/or electronic comications. We are likewise pleased to notify you that the American Radio Association not claim jurisdiction over any or all electronic equipment, which is now se or which may later be used directly in connection with the navigation of vessel. Our position is that the operation of such navigational equipment thout question under the jurisdiction of your union." r experience in the interim has been similar to yours in confirming the lity and feasibility of the working relationships that were set forth in our ange of letters. As a result of teamwork of the ship radio officer group, supg specialist radio communications service for safety and other purposes. the master and licensed deck officer group, performing their essential navional duties, each group is enabled to perform its duties the better, while groups together have been producing that added margin of safety that has rved life and conserved property at sea. e appreciate the firm and forthright position your organization has been wing in the interest of safety of life at sea, in this and other areas, and forward to the continuing friendship and cooperation of our two unions. Fraternally, W. R. STEINBERG, President. APPENDIX K Pertinent excerpts from Coast and Geodetic Survey, U.S. Department Commerce: "U.S. Coast Pilot, Pacific coast, California, Oregon, and Washin and Hawaii," eighth (1959) edition, revised to January 5, 1963, by fort supplement, published by U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D (based on 7 to 100 years recorded observation, varying with locality; its supplied). "General. The climate of the Hawaiian Islands is unusually pleasant fi tropical area, the result principally of the marked marine influence and the persistent trade winds" (p. 282). "Kona weather.-The word 'Kona' is of Polynesian origin and means leeward It refers to the southerly winds and accompanying weather on the normally ward slopes of the principal Hawaiian Islands which because of the wind shif have temporarily become the windward slopes. "The Konas, which occur most frequently during the months of October through April, provide the major climatic variations of the Hawaiian Islands During these storms heavy rainfall and cloudiness can be expected on the sides of coasts and slopes which, under the usual wind pattern, receive les cloudiness and may have almost no rain. Near gales may occur, especially a points where the air tends to funnel into sharp mountain passes located nea the coasts. At such times leeward anchorages may become unsafe for smaller craft" (p. 283). "Seismic sea waves.-The destructive effect of the great seismic sea wate which have visited the Hawaiian Islands from time to time should not be min mized. The loss of life and property can be lessened if shipmasters and other acquaint themselves with the behavior of these waves so that intelligent actie can be taken when they become imminent." "In general, the destructive force of the waves is greater on the sides the islands facing the oncoming waves. The waves may attain great heights in funnel-shaped bays and at capes or other places where a submarine ridge projects seaward toward the oncoming wave. Unusual heights may also be attained at any place where two waves traveling different paths arrive at the same time so as to reinforce one another. There is much to be learned about such waves and the best course is to avoid them in any way possible."—Pages 281-282. "These waves travel great distances and can cause tremendous damage coasts far from their source. The wave of April 1, 1946, that originated in the Aleutian Trench demolished nearby Scotch Cap Lighthouse and also caused $25 million damage in the Hawaiian Islands 2,200 miles away. "The speed of seismic sea waves varies with the depth of the water, reaching 300 to 500 knots in the deep water of the open ocean. In the open sea they cannot be detected from a ship or from the air because their length is so great. sometimes a hundred miles, as compared to their height, which is usually only a few feet. Only on certain types of shelving coasts do they build up into waves of disastrous proportions."-Pages 32-33. "Anchorages are numerous, except on the northerly and easterly sides of the islands, the first requirement under ordinary conditions being shelter from the trade winds. During Kona weather most of the anchorages on the southerly and westerly sides of the islands are unsafe."-Page 281. Mr. STRICHARTZ. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, my name is Morris Strichartz. I am technical director of the American Radio Association, AFL-CIO, and am a member of its national council and have been for 15 years. Prior to that, for 6 of the previous 8 years during all of World War II and the immediate postwar period, I was a ship radio officer on board every type U.S. merchant vessel. This statement is submitted for the American Radio Association (ARA), for the Radio Officers Union (ROU), the International Or ganization of Master, Mates & Pilots (MMP), both affiliates of the AFL-CIO, as well as the AFL-CIO Maritime Committee, which includes the American Radio Association (ARA), the National Maritime Union (NMU), the Brotherhood of Marine Officers (BMO). the United Maritime Division (UMD), the marine locals of the United |