investigations may not be pursued by psychologists. What is meant by that statement is that the task of sociology is far too great to be accomplished as a side issue by any men who are chiefly engaged with another set of problems. Sociology proposes a set of questions that have not been answered by the psychologists nor adequately by anyone else. These questions are distinct from those with which psychology is regularly engaged, and are quite sufficiently demanding to require the utmost endeavors of a large and industrious body of scientists.

Says an eminent psychologist:2

Psychology is concerned in the first instance, not with what is known, but with the process of knowing, not with what is willed, but with the process of willing, not with what is agreeable or disagreeable, but with the process of being pleased or displeased.

These statements may be exactly reversed and then applied to sociology. Sociology does ask what men know and do and enjoy, and why that which certain men in certain places know, do and enjoy differs so widely from that which is known, done and enjoyed by other men in other places. Psychology has to do with "thinking," and not with the conflicting opinions of men, with "volition," not with different forms of civilized or uncivilized activity; but it is with the latter that sociology is engaged-with opinions and beliefs, with ideals, customs and institutions which characterize different populations or social classes. Angell3 says that "psychology is interested primarily in the constitution and operation of consciousness itself," rather than in what he terms "products" of mental processes logical, ethical or aesthetic. The contrast between psychology and sociology may be symbolized, though not adequately expounded by the formula: psychology aims to know how men think, feel and will; sociology aims to know what men think, feel and do, and why that which is thought, felt and done by the men of certain groups or social classes differs as it does from that which is thought, felt and done by other men who belong to other groups or classes. The

contrast between the objects of study of psychology and of sociology, is like the contrast between the mill and its grist.

Wundt in his Methodenlehre writes:

The concept individual psychology [on the next page identified by Wundt with "general psychology"] is here meant to include those investigations which have for their object matter the psychic processes of individual human consciousness, in so far as these possess a typical significance [italics Wundt's] universally valid for normal consciousness.*

This is as much as to say, the problem-facts of psychology are the same in Leipzig, Chicago, or Bombay; and the questions of psychology may be answered from facts observable in either one of these places. Sociology on the other hand is essentially a comparative study describing the different types of experience-activities observable among different peoples, the changes in the experience-activities of the same people and the varying conditions to which such differences and changes are due.

"Thought," "volition," and "emotion," apart from what is thought, done, and felt, are not real experiences but are mere abstractions from real life. They, together with "perception," "memory," "imagination" "reasoning," "deliberation," "conation," and the other concepts which are problem phenomena of psychology, are general classes of experience-activity, which are abstracted from each other and from the variations in experienceactivity which are due to varieties of environment. Religions, conscience codes, political, social, and industrial customs and institutions, and the other concepts that are problem phenomena of sociology, are not due to either of these two abstractions. Sociology does indeed abstract from the minute and intricate peculiarities which differentiate a given experience of a given individual from the experience of all other men, and so describes modes of experience-activity that are sufficiently general and abstract so that they recur in multitudes of scattered cases, or prevail throughout certain groups or social classes; but the peculiar

Zweite Abtheilung, Seite 168: "Unter dem Begriff der Individual psychologie sollen hier die untersuchungen zusammengefasst werden, deren Gegenstand die psychischen Vorgänge des individuellen menschlichen Bewusstseins sind, insofern diese eine typische, für das normale Bewusstsein allgemeingültige Bedeutung besitzen.

abstractions of psychology are far more abstract than the concepts of sociology. Sociology is the farthest step toward the application of the methods of science to the investigation of life itself. The descriptions of sociology retain in a tolerably adequate way the richness and diversity, the variety and detail which give to life its vividness and value. As its problem phenomena are more concrete than those of psychology, their conditioning is correspondingly more complex, and it was necessary that investigation of the simpler abstractions (themselves difficult enough) should precede the attempt to advance the frontier of science so as to include the concreter problems. Knowledge of the peculiar abstractions from life which are made by psychology is necessary before attempting to explain these more concrete phenomena which are presented by the descriptions of sociology. Psychology is fundamental to sociology somewhat as physics is fundamental to dynamic geology, or chemistry to physiology.

The emphasis here laid upon the statement that the psychological concepts are more abstract than the sociological concepts is by no means intended to imply that they differ only in the degree of abstractness, and not also in the kind of abstraction. Yet a difference in degree of abstractness would in itself suffice to mark off the appropriate sphere of a science, that is, an advantageous division of scientific labor, if the more general concepts suffice in interest and importance to occupy the labors of one body of scientists, and if for their elucidation these general concepts require to be abstracted from the more specific and concrete phenomena, and if the special problems presented by the concreter ones, by themselves, suffice in interest and difficulty to occupy the labors of a second body of scientists. Moreover, the difference in character between the most general and abstract and the concrete and complex phenomena, even when the concrete ones include all the elements retained in the abstracter concepts, may amount to a difference in kind. Must we not recognize a difference in kind between such general concepts as belief and desire, abstractly considered, and such concrete realities as the belief in witchcraft, or in the divine right of kings or in the expediency of maintaining a public-school system, or the desire for that

glory which in some societies is attached to successful headhunting, or for the glory in some other societies attainable by ostentatious expenditure of money? Though it be only a difference in the size of the meshes in the dip-nets with which psychologists and sociologists help themselves to those abstractions from the stream of psychic reality which they propose to study, yet the finer meshes of the sociologists' net retain and bring into view ingredients and variants that are excluded from psychology. Concepts which are enriched by these ingredients are of a kind not included among the concepts investigated by the logically antecedent science of psychology. Thus it appears that a difference in the kind of concepts may result from a difference in the degree of abstraction by which the concepts are separated.

But this is not all. There are also differences between the concepts studied by sociology and those studied by psychology, which result from differences not in the degree but in the form of abstracting practiced by the two sciences. The lines of demarkation are not merely in narrower circles, they actually cross. The characteristic abstractions of psychology may not be separated from each other in those of sociology; on the contrary a sociological problem-concept may involve, with no attempt to distinguish them from each other, several or all of the modes of consciousness which psychology differentiates. If all the differences between sociological and psychological concepts were due to the degree of abstraction practiced, then each sociological concept ought to be related to a psychological concept as a species to a genus. A social concept, instead of being thus included under one of the psychological concepts may actually involve several or all of the psychological concepts, disregarding any abstraction of the kind by which psychological concepts are differentiated. This is true of such sociological concepts as taboo, ancestor-worship, the so-called "matriarchate" and the patriarchal system, each of which is a compound of beliefs, desires, and overt practices. Of course such social phenomena are compounded of psychic elements as truly as a plant is compounded of chemical elements, and in their explanation the sociologist may be aided by analyzing them into their psychological elements, as

much as the botanist is aided by organic chemistry. The psychological concepts into which they may be analyzed seem to differ in kind from such sociological concepts as really as chemical elements do from shrubs and trees.

The investigations of sociology are a distinctly different task from those of psychology. In order to give an account of the particular abstractions from human experience, constituting the general outline and framework of conscious life, which are taken by psychology as its problem phenomena, that science has to trace out certain combinations of conditioning phenomena. Sociology, to account for the more concrete modes of activity, which it takes as its problem phenomena, is obliged to trace as far as possible additional combinations of conditioning phenomena. Accordingly sociology may be said to begin where psychology stops.

Thus physiological psychology studies the relations between phenomena of consciousness and the brain and nervous system, by seeking to discover the relations of particular organs and their functions to particular forms of consciousness. Physiological sociology attempts none of this, but, instead, it seeks to trace correspondences between variations in social activity and differences in hereditary temperament, and in bodily condition caused by different habits of life. For example, if certain Englishmen and certain Italians react in characteristically different ways upon similar stimuli, and it can be shown that their contrasting conduct is due to contrasting temperaments, then the hereditary traits to which these differences of conduct are due are to be observed and correlated with their consequences by sociology; and if the physiological effects of depending upon an inadequate diet, or laboring in unsanitary factories, predispose men to certain vices, and undermine the efficiency of labor, then these physiological effects are conditioning phenomena of which sociology must take careful note. Thus the investigations pursued by physiological psychology and those pursued by physiological sociology traverse different paths.

Again psychology, especially in its study of perception, investigates certain relations between states of consciousness and phenomena of the external world, but it is absolutely indifferent