lation with other facts is concealed. On the other hand, every fact in human experience has a value of its own as an index of the social process that emerges in part in the fact. In so far as the historian hunts down facts for the purpose of finding the social process revealed in the facts, his interest is identical with that of the sociologist. The difference between them is again merely a difference of greater or less attention to different steps of one and the same approach to knowledge of the social reality. We might imitate a verbal distinction familiar in a related field, and say that as ethnography is to ethnology, so is historiography to historiology. I would by no means concede that the subject-matter of sociology is confined to the past. It is still more concerned with interpretation of the social process in the present. This term "historiology" is suggested as a synonym for one segment of the arc of sociology, and merely as a temporary expedient in this particular part of the argument. To point the contrast between mere discovery of details of past experience, and the work that the sociologists want to do, we may fairly call the former historiography and the latter historiology.

The real progress of the historians toward promotion of science is not in the line of which many of them have recently grown so proud. History does not become more scientific by shifting its attention from relatively insignificant kings and soldiers to equally insignificant common folks. History becomes scientific in proportion as it advances from knowledge of details toward reconstruction of the whole in which the details have their place. The sociologists have entered the field of social science with a plea for a fair share of attention to that correlation of knowledge, notorious neglect of which has thus far been the paradox of our era of "inductive science."

Recurring to the titles from Stubbs, we may add that investigation of such details may, and indeed must, proceed in the first instance with severe disregard of collateral details. The test of historical work, however, is not where it begins, but where it ends. It is a misconception of fact and a misuse of terms to speak of any

All this has been anticipated and stated so conclusively by Professor Ross that there remains little room for discussion. (Vide loc. cit., pp. 194 ff.)

program that begins and ends with details as "scientific." Historiography as such is not science; it is merely a technique. The output of that technique is raw material of science. There is no more scientific value in knowing merely that William the Conqueror, or William the Red, or any of their successors in past centuries, did this or that, than there is in knowing what Edward VII. and the Kaiser did on their yachts at Kiel last summer. We do not reach science till we advance from knowledge of what occurred to knowledge of the meaning of what occurred. On the side of the meanings of occurrences, whoever follows connections as far as they can be traced, whether he calls himself historian or sociologist, pursues the essential sociological interest."

7 Tarde charges both historian and sociologist with attention to the particular in disregard of the general. For instance, he says that physicists, chemists, and physiologists" show us the subject of their science only on the side of its characteristic resemblances and repetitions; they prudently conceal its corresponding heterogeneities and transformations (or transsubstantiations)." He then alleges a contrast in the case of the social sciences as follows: "The historian and sociologist, on the contrary, veil the regular and monotonous face of social facts that part in which they are alike and repeat themselves - and show us only their accidental and interesting, their infinitely novel and diversified, aspect. If our subject were, for example, the Gallo-Romans, the historian, even the philosophical historian, would not think of leading us, step by step, through conquered Gaul in order to show us how every word, rite, edict, profession, custom, craft, law, or military manoeuvre, how in short every special idea or need which had been introduced from Rome, had begun to spread from the Pyrenees to the Rhine, and to win its way after more or less vigorous fighting against old Celtic customs and ideas, to the mouths and arms and hearts and minds of all the enthusiastic Gallic imitators of Rome and Caesar. At any rate, if our historian had once led us on this long journey, he would not make us repeat it for every Latin word or grammatical form, for every ritualistic form in the Roman religion, for every military manoeuvre that was taught to the legionaries by their officer-instructors, for every variety of Roman architecture, for temple, basilica, theater, hippodrome, aqueduct, and atriumed villa, for every school-taught verse of Virgil or Horace, for every Roman law, or for every artistic or industrial process in Roman civilization that had been faithfully and continuously transmitted from pedagogues and craftsmen to pupils and apprentices. And yet it is only at this price that we can get at an exact estimate of the great amount of regularity which obtains in even the most fluctuating societies." The Laws of Imitation; English by Parsons, New York, 1903, pp. 8, 9. Whether Tarde is right or not in grouping historians and sociologists equally under this censure, our point is substantially the one that he makes viz., that knowledge does not pass from scraps into science until its regularities are recognized and their laws discovered. The sociologists rather than the historians are making the fight for use of this theorem in the social sciences.

Happily it is impossible for the most atomistically minded historiographer utterly to overlook the pointings of each event or situation toward connections with other events and situations. Even a list of topics like the one we have cited at random testifies of this necessity. "Results," "state," "growth," "policy," "introduction," "maintenance,” “transitional," are all terms of relationship. Moreover, the relationships implied are not merely those of nearness in time or. space, nor of series. They are relationships of working-with, of process. This process may be contemplated merely within an arbitrarily restricted area; e. g., causes and effects so far as they appear in contrasts between the before and the after of relations of classes, of economic systems, of constitutional principles, of legal enactments, of social customs, of religious conventions in a certain population. In this case there is rudimentary, but narrowly restricted, recognition that specific knowledge gets its value by correlation with other knowledge. The interest of the historian converges toward that of the sociologist in the precise degree in which the former desires to advance from knowledge of occurrences as such, not merely to their immediate correlations, but to their last discoverable meanings as indexes of the whole process of social evolution. At one extreme is sheer interest in bare details. At the other extreme is interest that rates everything short of dynamic interpretation of the details as mere preliminary.

The same distinction may be stated in terms of discrimination between the economic and the sociological interest. Again, it should be urged with all emphasis that every use of words which implies an exclusive division of subject-matter among the social sciences is merely a convenient concession to a condition which the progress of science should at least mitigate. As we have said above, from the sociological view-point different workers in the social sciences are not working on different kinds of material. They are merely carrying on different divisions of labor upon one material. That material is human experience in general. The total purpose of social science, up to the point where it ceases to be mere knowledge and begins to pass over into power, is to discover the meanings of human experience. Our present illustration

should bring out another real difference between degrees of approach toward this end.

In his Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre, Book II, chap. vii, Professor Schmoller draws the outlines of a description of modern forms of industrial enterprise. His subtitles are as follows: "The Conception of Industrial Enterprise (Unternehmung);" "Its Starting-Points, Trade, Labor, Community, Family; ;""The Development of Rural Economic Enterprise; ""Hand Labor; ""Movements in the Direction of Larger Enterprises and Organizations in Community and Corporate Form up to 1800; Domestic Industry (das Verlagssystem);" "Modern Enterprise, Wholesale Business, the Factory;" "The Social Problem of Large Business;" "Public Stock Companies;" "The Newer Economic Associations;" "The Combinations of Traders and Promoters, Syndicates, Rings, and Trusts;" "Conclusion, Bird's-eye View of the Social Constitution of Industry, Particularly of Capitalistic Enterprise."

99 66

Instead of selecting our illustration from economic topics which are extremely fractional, as it would be easy to do, we prefer to take specimens of a sort more representative of recent tendencies. In the above titles we have references to economic phenomena of highly developed and complex types. Correlation of most intricate nature is implied in all such analyses. Can there be any room in the premises for any scientific interest distinct from and in addition to the economic interest? The answer depends entirely upon the extension which the economists claim or allow for their interest. As in the case of the historians, the subject-matter may be so defined as to merge the economic interest at last completely with that of the sociologist. On the other hand,

8 Third edition, Leipzig, 1900.

9

For a striking illustration of the tendency among recent economists to see these things essentially as the sociologists see them, vide SOMBART, Der moderne Kapitalismus, Vol. I, Introduction, pp. xxv ff. Professor Sombart is not directly discussing the relationship which we have in mind. His argument virtually amounts to a special application of the general principle which we are formulating, i. e., to know any economic relationship fully, its connections have to be traced with the whole process of human activities. Thus : "Was nämlich von dem Wirtschaftstheoretiker der Zukunft verlangt werden wird, sind wieder lange

the economic interest may be so circumscribed that attention is restricted to an economic mechanism merely as such, an endless chain composed of the main links, capital, labor, production, consumption. In proportion as this latter is the case, the economic activities of life are wrested by an intellectual tour de force from the real social process, and are looked upon as an entity sufficient unto itself. From the sociological view-point, economic activities are merely a division of the manifestations of the human process as a whole. That process begins with the power of individuals to feel wants, and to act in response to the stimulus of wants. It continues through limitless cycles of differentiation of wants, of individual types characterized by variations of wants, of groupings of individuals incidental to effort to satisfy the wants, and of institutions and other achievements deposited in the course of this incessant endeavor. To the sociologist every type of individual, every combination of activities, every institution, whether economic, political, artistic, scientific, or religious, is of interest, not for its separate self, but so far as it can shed or reflect light about the articulations and the motivations of the process as a whole, in which each detail in its own degree is an incident. Without involving ourselves in a boundary dispute with the psychologists, we may repeat that the sociological interest begins with individuals feeling wants. How do those wants bring them into contact with other individuals feeling wants? How do the individuals thus in contact modify each other's wants? How do the wants of the separate individuals become a species of environment, conditioning all the individuals? How does the reaction between the elements, i. e., individuals, physical environment, and social environment, become complex, and ever more complex, in the progressively varying reaction of cause and effect within the combination? How do types of want, and of individual and social contact, and of environment result from the different stages of this process? What significance, at any stage of the process, have Gedankenreihen, die heute ganz aus der Mode gekommen zu sein scheinen. Der Theoretiker von heute bästelt fast immer ein beobachtetes Phänomen an die nächstliegende Ursache an, wenn er es nicht vorzieht, durch Messung an einem bereitgehaltenen (meist ethischen) Massstabe seiner Herr zu werden, etc., etc."