and, further, in order to aid it in seeking the causes of social changes by furnishing a methodical comparison of different evolutions. Thus history and sociology render one another mutual services, by providing one another with: (1) methods of work history a method of analysis, sociology a method of synthesis; (2) bodies of knowledge — history the knowledge of past evolutions, sociology the knowledge of causes drawn from the observation of actual society. So long as sociology shall not have settled upon its vocabulary, it will be best for each study to preserve its own. If the historian today should adopt the vocabulary of one school of sociology, it would only complicate the work of the others. History, then, will make known the facts in common language language which everyone understands, giving to words a precise and concrete meaning and avoiding abstractions; while to sociology will fall the further task of formulating the general laws of social phenomena. Lecture by M. C. Bouglé. In sociological researches it is not enough that sociology should draw upon psychology and biology; it must utilize the data furnished by the historian. It is necessary for the sociologist to know and to practice historical methods. Sociology cannot content itself with being either an illustrated psychology or a transposed biology; it must be an analyzed and compared history. But does history have any need of sociology? The historian binds facts together, explaining one fact by another fact, but does not concern himself with the knowledge of laws. If one can explain historical facts without having recourse to sociology, of course the historian may leave it out of account; but that is the question. As a matter of fact, if the narratives of the historians seem to us to offer explanations, it is in proportion as, apart from individual accidents, they take account of the constant relations which unite social phenomena. The entire explanatory thread of their recitals is found, in a word, in the sociological laws expressed or implied to which they make reference. But how much more intelligible would be the explanations if these laws of social phenomena were handled consciously and methodically! — MARCEL POURNIN, "La sociologie et les sciences sociales," in Revue internationale de sociologie, March, 1904. E. B. W. Neighborhood Evolution. -Away out in Kansas I once overheard a man talk with bated breath of Middle Alley in Philadelphia. It stood for all that was unsavory in social life, and for half a century had carried the palm. Today Middle Alley is only a tradition, and when visitors try to find it they experience difficulty, because the street has changed its name; and, when found, they are disappointed, for it bears none of its former characteristics, and the whole neighborhood is very much like others where poor and ignorant people live. But what has produced this change in a community that bore a world-wide unsavory reputation? About eleven years ago two social settlements planted themselves in the heart of this community, the College Settlement and Neighborhood House: and these, with the influence of the Starr Center on the west flank and Bedford Street mission on the south, proved the forces which have altered the entire social life of the community. None of these was a mission in the accepted sense, and two were strictly social settlements. Planted in the midst of unsanitary surroundings, the residents began to live their lives, and at once the unsanitary surroundings became apparent. This led to a complete system of under-drainage and street-paving which made it possible for Neighborhood House to have the first bath-tub in the street and to pump its cellar, which was filled with sewage. Thus far the residents merely took care of themselves, but in doing so the entire community received the benefit. Others could now have bath-tubs and drainage; and thus the forces became social. This story would be an interesting one, and a sad one if it were told how the authorities neglected the street-cleaning, and the streets themselves were in such a condition that cleaning was impossible; and how there was no pretense of gathering garbage until the residents astonished the city hall by requests from the alley. The residents simply wished to live civilized lives, and demanded service. But when they received it, their neighbors got the benefits as well as they. It was a neighborhood affair. This sanitary reform alone justifies the whole cost of maintenance of these social centers. But they did not pose especially as reformers; they simply wished to live natural, healthy lives, and they pulled up conditions to the level of their necessities. Then followed a change of the moral conditions. In this again the residents of the settle:nents did not pose as reformers; they simply wished to sleep at night, and the one arrest that was made was on account of noise. It happened to strike other disorders, and it was the beginning of a long and gradual improvement, in which the police took part. The attitude of the police has always been sympathetic. This was due to the fact that the residents of the settlements were people who were a part of the community, living and voting there, and were placed in no unnatural or forced relations with the community. The police stood ready at all times to enforce just demands, and they found these residents extremely conservative, just, and reasonable -no cranks, and thus always having the respect of the police. Moreover, it was not a spurt, but an evolution in the most natural of ways, and the personal influence and work of the residents upon their immediate neighborhood were the chief forces that wrought the change. There was no attempt to reform anybody nor to save anybody; but the residents only reformed the conditions so that they could breathe and wash and sleep; and in this way they saved themselves, and with themselves pulled up their neighbors. It is typical of how social changes must be wrought. Let the individual in the community in which he lives do his part and not try to shift it all on the police. If there is no such man or family in the community, then plant a social settlement there, whose members will lead perfectly natural lives, and protest when protest they must, and it will be worth a room-ful of paid detectives. One long-headed, conservative Vassar girl will put baby-blue leading strings on the stalwart police, and they will take orders from this quiet little woman, because she is so reasonable, is no politician, no crank, no intoxicated enthusiast, but simply a plain little woman wishing to lead a quiet, reasonable life in the community of her choice. It will alter the very attitude of the police, and this attitude will make unnecessary much of their usual work. Neighborhood House (Philadelphia), April 9, 1904. E. B. W. THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY VOLUME X SEPTEMBER, 1904 NUMBER 2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY.1 THE turbid stream of social theory which flowed out of the past into the nineteenth century carried a confused mass of knowledge and speculation about every aspect of collective life. The penetrating idealism of Plato, the realistic insight of Aristotle, the semi-humorous sanity of More, the shrewd analysis of Machiavelli, the upheaving dialectic of Hobbes, the wide vision of Vico, the contagious paradoxes of Rousseau, the naturalistic explanations of Montesquieu, the scientific generalizations of Adam Smith, the optimistic dreams of Condorcet, the mystical interpretations of Lessing and Bunsen-all these conflicting, overlapping, or partial theories formed a bewildering tradition which it has been the task of nineteenth-century philosophers and scientists to sift, enlarge, and systematize. The one common idea appearing in many forms throughout this mass of speculation was that of law as finding expression in the affairs of men. This recognition of inevitable sequences and coexistences, to whatever cause attributed, was the fundamental principle which the social philosophy of the nineteenth century received from the past. The elaboration of this vast tradition has involved both analysis and synthesis. The mass had to be classified, differentiated. At the outset economic science alone had begun to assume a distinctive form. With the increase of observation and reflection 1 An address delivered at the International Congress of Arts and Science, Department of Sociology, September, 1904. still other facts were set off into specialized fields of research. Thus one outstanding achievement of the century has been the division of a confused tradition into a number of fairly welldefined social sciences. But there has also been a persistent effort to resist this dissolution into parts, to restore to their larger relationships the abstracted elements; i. e., to preserve the unity of social theory as a whole. Such is the secular antithesis between analysis and synthesis, between science and philosophy. The term "sociology" is used in at least four different senses, two of which are directly related to the present discussion: (1) as a vague general term to include the entire field of social fact and theory; (2) as a social philosophy which aims at a unifying conception of society as a whole; (3) “pure” or “general” sociology seeks recognition as a science, classifying facts and discovering the laws which underlie association as such; (4) "practical" sociology describes the scientific treatment of the problems of social organization and welfare.2 To the development of sociology as philosophy and as science this survey must be confined. As to method of treatment, several ways lie open. Each has certain advantages. The division of sociologies into (1) classificational,3 (2) biological, (3) organic, and (4) psychological, affords seemingly definite criteria and a natural developmental series. Traditional philosophic dualism displays itself also in social theories, which may be classified as objective or naturalistic on the one hand, and subjective or idealistic on the other. Again, the division into individualistic and collectivistic has a certain significance. So also the chronological treatment of men and theories is of unquestioned value. In the present case, however, no one of these methods seems sufficiently flexible or comprehensive. While, therefore, reference will be made, as occasion may demand, to one or another of these classifications, this survey will select certain typical problems of social science and philosophy, and will attempt to show (1) what kind of problems have engaged the attention of sociologists, and (2) what develop 2 This should be not an isolated art, but organically related to 'general Bociology." BARTH, Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie, p. 58. ment of theory has been associated with each. The problems which have been selected for this purpose are the following: 1. The problem of conceiving society as a whole. 3. The problem of the psychical nature of the group-the social mind. 4. The problem of the individual and society. 5. The problem of the influence of natural environment on the social group. 6. The problem of social progress. 7. The problem of the province of sociology as a science. The conception of society as an organic whole enduring through secular time, extending over wide areas, and unified by natural forces from without and by conscious consensus from within, was fundamental with Comte. His "law of the three stages" swept into its ken an unbroken continuity of generations which were later idealized into an object of worship — Humanity. True, this idea had been implicit in all the philosophies of history, and the organic simile is traceable to remote antiquity, but Comte was the first—with the possible exception of Vico-to present in a realistic and vivid way this view of the unity of mankind. The "hierarchy of the sciences" was only another means of emphasizing this idea. Step by step the mind is led up from physical and chemical combinations to organic and thence to social unities. This conception, familiar as it seems, was in Comte's time by no means obvious, and today it is far from generally accepted. Persons and small groups, not vast social wholes, are the striking surface facts which hold the attention of the average observer. Biological sociology has elaborated the conception of social unity and centralization. Comte merely outlined the idea of the social organism. Spencer carried the analogy to a high degree of definite detail, insisting especially upon parallels of structure. Lilienfeld laid all the stress upon the nervous system, as does Novicow in his theory of the social élite. So, too, Fouillée classifies social organisms according to the degree of centralization Novicow, Conscience et volonté sociales (Paris, 1897), pp. 32 f. 4 |