alternation between the two points of view. The typical representatives of the objective and observational line of approach are in ancient times Hippocrates, Aristotle, with whom in certain respects is also to be mentioned Heraclitus, and Parmenides; in medieval times, the one conspicuous name (if we leave out of account Machiavelli and Campanella as marking a transitional phase) is Roger Bacon in the Christian world, and, in the Mohammedan world, Ibn Khaldoun; in modern times the representative names are Bodin, Montesquieu, Herder, Buckle, and Le Play. The modern exponents of this line of approach to sociology are usually spoken of as the geographical school. The pioneers of the more subjective and abstract—or, as we might say, the psychological-school are usually reckoned to include Plato (and to some extent also the many-sided Aristotle), Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Hegel. The numerous nineteenth-century representatives of both schools are, with the exception of Buckle and Le Play, purposely omitted.

There is another well-marked line of approach which is more modern in its origin, and which for convenience of reference we may call the historic, or evolutionary. What has most impressed those who have developed this approach to sociology is an idea that has been very slow to unfold itself in the mind of man, although its germs go far back in history. It is the idea of the historic continuity of civilization. Civilization is conceived as proceeding in such a way that a certain stage in the history of mankind the predominant factor in determining social conditions is no longer external nature, nor the individual, but the accumulated pressure of humanity surviving from all previous generations. The popular notion corresponding to this is that of progress, and in biology a modification of the idea has established itself under the name of evolution. The reputed founders of historic, or evolutionary, sociology are usually considered to be Vico, Turgot, Lessing, Herder, Kant, and Condorcet. But indeed all who, like Polybius and Cicero, Augustine and Ibn Khaldoun, Bossuet and Leibnitz, have had a large and moving conception of universal history have here their place as forerunners of sociology. Another conspicuous line of approach

that may conveniently be singled out is that currently associated with the utopists. The characteristic of this variety of sociologist is not his emphasis on observation or on reasoning, but rather on the part played in life by the emotions. Here the pioneer names commonly set down are Plato and Augustine—already cited as characteristic examples of another school — Campanella, More, Harrington; and perhaps to these we may add Condorcet and St. Simon.

Although they are not conventionally classed among the founders of sociology, yet are there not strong grounds for including the great statesmen and ecclesiastical organizers, the constructive philanthropists and the educationists? If it is appropriate to include these more practical types, then our list of founders would have to be extended so as to include men like Charlemagne and Richelieu, Cromwell and Washington; men like St. Benedict and Hildebrand, St. Francis and Loyola; men like St. Bernardin and William Penn; men like Pestalozzi and W. von Humboldt.

It is not contended that this scheme of classification is anything more than a somewhat arbitrary convention for tracing one's ways through the inadequately explored history of the science of sociology. It shows, however, with sufficient vividness the great diversity of type of mind that has gone to the building even of the incomplete foundations of the science of sociology. It would be a hopeless task in the short space of this paper to enter upon a comparison of all these numerous and varied types with a view to discovering what is, as it were, essential to the sociological habit of mind and the social propensity. Numerous and divergent as may be the approaches to sociology, yet can we not find one great exemplar in whom, for his own times, they can all be said to unite? In answer to this question, the names that will at once suggest themselves to most of us will be those of Comte and of Spencer. But Spencer is happily still with us, and it is too soon to indicate and evaluate his position in the history of sociology. From a study of Comte as the supreme type of the sociologist we could not fail to learn 1 This was written in October, 1903.

much, not only as to the essentials of the sociological habit of mind, but also as to those of the propensity of social action. But if, as we have done, we include as a necessary quality active participation in the practical organization of society, then Comte does not perhaps have the same claim to consideration as at least one other among the founders of sociology. I refer to Condorcet, who, indeed, was declared by Comte to share with Hume his 'spiritual fatherhood." Let us endeavor to see by an examination of the life-history of Condorcet how far and to what extent the representative lines of sociological approach, the representative phases of social activity, may be fairly said to be exemplified in him.

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Condorcet's life is almost coincident with the last half of the eighteenth century. The exact dates of his birth and death, by interesting coincidence, are exactly those of another hero and victim of the eighteenth-century illumination, Lavoisier (174394). Representing at once the synthetic and practical character of their age, these two, like so many other men of the eighteenth century, were at once scientists and men of affairs. They made it the object of their lives to organize the fullest resources of science in application to the needs of human life. In the case of Lavoisier, his scientific and practical activities were directed to the material interests of society, and in that of Condorcet, to the moral and social interest. And the reward of both was the same—a violent death at the hands of those whom they only sought to serve. They both belong to the martyrology of social science.

It is not possible to gain any adequate comprehension of the position of Condorcet in the history of sociology unless one realizes something of the spiritual atmosphere into which he was born. Who were his immediate predecessors, who were his contemporaries? Newton and Leibnitz had been dead half a generation when Condorcet was born. But the great movement of mathematical and physical science still had enough predominance to attract many, if not most, of the finest minds of the age. But as the eighteenth century advanced there was an increasing tendency to bring biological and sociological problems into the

movement of science, and these, as the century wore on, became more and more the centers of scientific interest. Buffon was an older contemporary, and Lamarck a younger one (by a year only), of Condorcet. His life overlaps the last part of Haller's and the first part of Bichat's. Locke had died half a generation before the birth of Condorcet, but his psychological work was being continued and developed in one direction by Hume and by Kant, in another by Condillac, who himself was an uncle of Condorcet. Quesnai and his fellow-physiocrats had during the boyhood of Condorcet been laying the foundations of a science of economics, which Adam Smith was to continue as his contemporary. Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws, published in 1748 (its author being then sixty years of age), was passing through edition after edition during the youth of Condorcet. Turgot, a somewhat older contemporary and intimate friend of Condorcet (they stood to one another almost in the relation of master and disciple), was thinking out more clearly than ever before the conditions of a science of human evolution in which the geographical and objective factors should have their due place assigned to them alongside the psychological and libertarian factors. This second half of the eighteenth century was, in fact, the time when a synthetic science of society was first being adequately conceived this conception being made possible by that progress in historical and scientific investigation out of which were arising as distinct systems of study many of the subsciences of sociology, notably psychology, social geography, comparative history, and philology. And though precise and even specialist knowledge in different departments was being built up, yet the characteristic notes of the scientific mind were synthesis and practical applications. Condorcet himself was trained as a mathematician, and, though a peer of France, yet is to be counted in the early part of his life as a professed mathematician. But even here the synthetic and practical character of his mind, as of nearly all eminent minds then, is seen in his efforts to make actual application of his specialism for the benefit of society. The mathematical work he did in applying the formulæ of probability to judicial decisions

entitles him to be counted, along with De Witt, Quételet, and others, as one of the founders of statistical sociology.

Voltaire was past middle life and at the height of his reputation when Condorcet was born. The merely critical and destructive work of the eighteenth century, had, in fact, been done and the Iliumination was entering upon that positive and constructive phase which marks it as one of the great humanistic revivals in history. This is too much overlooked, even among specialist historians of that time, and in that sense there is truth in the remark that "the eighteenth century has still to be discovered.” At the very time that Condorcet was born, Diderot, D'Alembert, and their friends were planning the Encyclopédie, and this great constructive effort was destined in its literary form to serve the purpose of a Bible to the scientific world during at least a generation and a half. And is it not true to say that, when crystallized into the modern German university and its academic imitators, the Encyclopédie was for at least another two generations destined to serve as an organized ritual for men of science throughout the western world?

Into the midst of this fever of enthusiasm for the organization of science as a regenerative and omnipotent spiritual power came Condorcet, and soon became one of the central figures of the drama. At what a very early age he felt the stirrings and promptings of the spirit of his age, and how with increasing vividness he continued to feel this enthusiasm, and to be dominated by it throughout his life, there are many anecdotes to bear witness. In 1790, when he was forty-seven years of age, he wrote: "For thirty years I have hardly ever passed a single day without meditating on the political sciences."

When Turgot was governing his province of Limousin, Condorcet wrote to him in 1772: "You are very happy in your passion for the public good and your power to satisfy it; it is a great consolation, and of an order very superior to that of study." Two years after this, when Turgot became controller-general of France, he gave his friend, what Condorcet had so much longed for, an opportunity to participate in the work of government. But with Turgot's demission of power Condorcet went also, and