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And in the case of toy chests, the Commission deferred to a voluntary standard, yet they found that over 50 percent of the identified firms were not in conformance with the toy chest voluntary standard.

So, we believe that you need to follow up if you are going to defer to a voluntary standard, to make sure that they are being complied with and that they are, in fact, adequate.

In light of all of our study, we have made four recommendations, which we go into in more detail in the report and in our testimony. To summarize this very briefly, we recommend that there be citizen standing to challenge reliance on voluntary standards, so that someone can come before the Commission where they are alleging that it is taking too long, or where they are alleging that the voluntary standard is inadequate, and force the Commission to take a look at it.

Second, we recommend that every reference in the Consumer Product Safety Act and the Federal Hazardous Substances Act be amended to say "consensus voluntary standards," so that we are not in the position, or the Commission is not in the position of deferring to an industry standard that was not developed with all interested parties present.

We feel that there needs to be a time requirement to preclude lengthy delays between the publication of an ANPR and the publication of a proposed rule.

Remember, the Commission always has the prerogative to end a proceeding if they find that a problem has been taken care of. But we are disappointed when, such as in the case of ATV's, that the Commission can publish an ANPR and then wait around for years and years before they take the next step.

And fourth, we think it needs to be made clear that the deferral to voluntary standards be deferral to existing standards and not a deferral hoping that the industry will come forward with a voluntary standard.

The problems highlighted in our CPSC report are not intended as a full list of CPSC sins. Rather, they exemplify the types of problems, the inaction, the delay, and the failure to protect consumers which is currently being played out by this Commission.

CFA calls upon this committee to rein in this Agency and demand that it carry out its consumer product safety mandate. Thank you.

[Testimony resumes on p. 164.]

[The prepared statement of Ms. Fise follows:]

Statement

of

Mary Ellen Fise

Product Safety Director
Consumer Federation of America

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am Mary Ellen Fise, Product Safety Director for the Consumer Federation of America. CFA represents over 200 national, state and local consumer organizations with a combined membership of more than 30 million people.

I want to thank you for the opportunity to present our views on reauthorization of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission

(CPSC).

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As the nation's largest consumer advocacy organization, CFA has carefully watched with great dismay the significant decline of a critical health and safety agency. By dragging its feet and increasingly avoiding regulatory intervention, the CPSC has signalled to industry that it need not act expeditiously or even effectively to address consumer safety problems. Adequate safety measures have been sacrificed by an agency eager to defer to industry - apparently at almost any cost.

Once considered among the government's most cost-effective agencies, the CPSC's recent track record reflects an agency frustrating its very purpose and squandering taxpayer dollars as a result.

CFA has just released a report entitled The CPSC: Guiding or Hiding From Product Safety?, which we present today as part of our testimony. We urge the Subcommittee to examine the findings of the report and to carefully consider CFA recommendations in the course of agency reauthorization.

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A product of careful examination by CFA, The CPSC: Guiding or Hiding From Product Safety? finds an agency failing in its

mission to protect consumers from exposure to hazardous products.

The report documents the recent unwillingness of the CPSC to either regulate or enhance private sector safety initiatives and the resulting costs to this nation.

Over the past six years, the CPSC has demonstrated an increasing reluctance for regulatory intervention.

Rulemaking

has drastically diminished; in fact, the report finds that the agency has not promulgated a final rule under the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) since 1984. By removing this threat of government intervention, the incentive for timely private sector response has been quickly lost. So, while the agency delays regulatory action waiting for industry to act, thousands of people continue to be injured and killed by hazardous products that remain needlessly in the marketplace.

Productivity and efficiency within the CPSC have also dropped accordingly. Commission consideration of safety issues has plummeted in the past six years, evidenced by the alarming cancellation rate of Commission meetings and the number of safety issues considered. 1986 witnessed a 650% increase over 1979 in the number of meetings cancelled by the Commission. In 1979, the CPSC considered 237 agenda items; in 1986, only 80.

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In 1981, Congress amended the CPSA to permit agency deference to voluntary standards, with the intent of spurring private sector initiatives for product safety and of avoiding duplication. Yet, the agency's current over-zealousness to defer to voluntary standards has resulted in a failure to effectively and expeditiously address dangerous consumer products. hardly be what Congress intended in 1981. Nor is it feasible to believe that Congress intended the consequent costs of such inaction: thousands of lives and tens of thousands of serious injuries, billions of dollars, and increased product liability litigation. But that is where we find ourselves today.

-- A Disturbing Record of CPSC Inaction

CPSC's recent disturbing record is best illustrated by the products it has failed to regulate.

* All Terrain Vehicles (ATVs) have been associated with
more than 700 deaths and over 298,000 serious injuries
since 1980. Sales of these motorized vehicles have
jumped dramatically over the past several years. Their
popularity however has been accompanied by a staggering
increase in deaths and injuries, with nearly half of
the victims estimated to be under 16 years of age. As
the chart below graphically demonstrates, injuries
treated in hospital emergency rooms have skyrocketed
from 4,929 in 1980 to 86,400 in 1985. The death toll
too has risen dramatically: in 1980, there were 6 ATV-
related deaths; in 1985, 244 deaths.

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It is hard to imagine a better case for swift intervention by the agency. Yet CPSC has refused to take strong regulatory steps, waiting instead for industry to act. The wait for a voluntary standard has been long and perhaps for naught, as CPSC's own staff now appear to consider the proposed industry standard inadequate. Thus, two years after publishing an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR), these highly dangerous vehicles remain on the market

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sold, without restraint.

The CPSC failure to intervene and to push industry for expeditious and adequate protection reflects the agency at its worst, where its pattern of excessive delay and inaction has resulted in continuing deaths, injuries, and costly litigation. In the first three months of 1987 alone, there have already been an estimated 15,400 additional injuries related to ATVs. How much more time must pass and how many more people must die and be injured before the agency regulates this known hazard?

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