includes: Eastern Front Arab States: Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
Syria--capable of sending tanks.

Source: The Military Balance, 1982-1983. London: International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1982

Until recently, this quantitative imbalance was offset by important qualitative advantages in Israel's favor, but these too are eroding. Israel can no longer count on having better weapons than those available to the Arabs. For example, Israel now has a total of about 125 advanced-design combat aircraft (F-15s and F-16s), in service or on order. By comparison, Arab countries now have in service or on order more than 160 Western state-of-the-art jets (U.S. F-15s and F-16s, French Mirage 2000s) not to mention the lastest Soviet models. If in the future the United States, as expected, sells to the Arabs another 200 advanced fighters and the French only add 40, by the end of the decade the Arabs will have 400 to Israel's current 125, making it all the more important that the Administration end delays on authorizing the 75 additional F-16s to Israel. Allowing the qualitative balance of airpower to tip in the Arab favor is definitely not in the interest of the United States. If the Arabs are able to compound their advantage in quantity with an advantage on quality, the temptation to resort to force will grow dramatically.

Equally important, there are growing indications that the Arabs are acquiring sophisticated electronic warfare equipment from Soviet and Western sources, as we are now seeing in Syria. Much of the equipment is state-of-the-art, some developed by Western companies with access to highly secret data about the very weapons that are used by Israel.

There are other disturbing trends. The growing range and payloads of Arab ground attack aircraft may soon mean that the Arabs will have a deep strike capability against Israel, raising the spectre of a surprise attack in the air. The sheer number and diversity of revolutionary new systems being introduced into Arab arsenals at the same time raises the possibility of technical breakthroughs that will give an unforeseen advantage to the Arabs (as new missiles and radars did in 1973). The shift that is taking place in several Arab states, from Soviet to Western sources of arms, worsens Israel's problems, because most of its countermeasures are designed against Communist rather than Western systems. The very plurality of the arms which Israel now faces, in both numbers and types, raises the danger of a saturation effect, a point beyond which Israel cannot cope. Finally, as noted above, the growing interventionary power of the Soviet Union raises an unprecedented danger of escalation to superpower involvement.

These new problems come on top of some asymmetries which have long characterized the conflict. The Arabs are able to maintain standing armies while Israel relies on reserves, creating favorable conditions for an Arab surprise attack. In the diplomatic context of Middle Eastern wars, Israel is expected to allow the Arabs to fire the first shot, thus conceding the advantage of choosing the time and place of conflict. The Arabs can lose one war after another and come back to fight again, but Israel cannot afford to lose even one. If Israel wins on the battlefield, it is not permitted to translate these results into a peace settlement at the conference table, but must settle for mere cease-fires and begin to prepare for the next round of fighting which the Arabs openly declare is their intention.

In sum, the military balance at this moment may seem favorable to Israel because of the sharp divisions which now characterize the situation in the Arab world. But this advantage is temporary and cannot be the basis of sound planning. The longerterm trends in the military balance are disturbing, and Israel's requirement for U.S. aid to offset these adverse trends remains a vital need. The fact that net aid is declining in real terms does not help the situation.

In conclusion, then, the sum proposed for aid to Israel this year is offset by many advantages accruing to the United States and to Western security, and is one of the most cost-effective expenditures made by the United States in foreign policy and intenational security arena. From the pont of view of Israel's legitimate requirements, appropriation of the full amount, which actually represents a decline of 65 percent in net aid after inflation compared to a few years ago, is essential to maintaining a stable military balance. Although the figures before you may seem large in an absolute sense, they are minimal in light of the U.S. interests and vital Israel security needs that are at stake.

3. How does aid to Israel fit in the wider picture of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East?

As the Congress turns its attention to the foreign aid package, it also needs to consider three issues in terms of the wider diplomatic/strategic environment of the Middle East: (a) the situation in Lebanon; (b) problems of U.S. arms sales to Israel's enemies; and (c) United States-Israel relations in the context of the peace process. I would like to take this opportunity to comment on these three key issues.

LEBANON

Israel's actions in Lebanon provide a vivid demonstration of the convergence of Israeli and American interests in the containment of Soviet expansionism in the Middle East, the elimination of the threat of international terrorism, and the creation of conditions necessary for regional peace and stability.

At the outset of Operation “Peace for the Galilee.” Lebanon was in an advanced state of disintegration. It has become effectively partitioned between two Soviet proxies-the PLO and Syria. The PLO's state-with-a-state served as the hub of the international terrorist network. The attacks on Israel from Lebanon provoked Israeli reprisals and thus exacerbated the Arab/Israeli conflict for 12 years. This helped the Arab rejectionists to isolate Egypt and stall the peace process.

Now, Lebanon has the opportunity to reconstruct itself as a stable, orderly, and pro-Western state. Israel's use of force helped create order out of chaos. It destroyed the PLO's infrastructure and removed Lebanon as a source of both regional instability and world wide terrorism. As a result of the war, Moscow was discredited as an arms merchant, as a superpower protector, and as a party with influence in the region. With the defeat of the PLO and Syria-the most committed opponents of the Camp David Accords-the "moderate" Arabs have an opportunity to pursue a more constructive course.

Israel thus made a substantial contribution to the task of combatting the Soviet Union in the Middle East, at almost no cost to the United States. The demonstrated superiority of American weapons will impact favorably on the global military balance. On the diplomatic level, the Reagan Administration is seeking ways to exploit the opportunities created by Israel, in an entirely new Lebanese situation.

But, in a distressing reversal of perspective, U.S. diplomacy in Lebanon, instead of working with Israel as a reliable and effective ally, is defining its interests in opposition to those of the state which made it all possible. The Administration has, surprisingly, lost sight of the basic strategic issues, and is instead obsessed with problems of little real significance for the United States.

What is the United States' national interest in Lebanon? It is, first and foremost, to prevent that country from falling back once again under the influence of Sovietallied forces. Second, it is to strengthen Lebanon's pro-Western government-not necessarily to solve every local problem, but to create conditions under which no challenge to that government by Syria, the PLO, and radical elements within Lebanon, can succeed. Third, it is to bring about peace between Israel and Lebanon, reinforcing both Egypt's position and the peace process. A fourth but probably unattainable objective is to bring about reconciliation between all the diverse factions within Lebanon and to solve its many other social, economic, and political problems.

But what is the Administration doing? It is putting all its effort into the single task of getting Israel out, showing very little concern over the PLO and the Syrian presence. It is opposing peace and normalization between Israel and Lebanon, even though only an alliance with Israel can offset Syrian influence in the country and give the new regime any prospect of long-term survival.

It is doing this on the implausible assumption that, if we only got the Israelis out, the Syrians and the PLO would leave and peace would break out among all the internal factions. In truth, if Israel withdrew precipitously, a more likely result would be chaos, followed by the resumption of the war of each against all, followed by the reemergence of the Syrian and PLO influence.

The first task of U.S. diplomacy should be to secure the removal of the Syrians and the PLO. Former Secretary of State Kissinger recently commented that, "People forget that after Israel's part of this negotiation is concluded, one has to go to the Syrians and see whether they agree. And, if I know anything about the Syrians, they will not accept the results of an Israeli, Lebanese, and American negotiation without a long negotiation by themselves."

Beyond this, why should the United States object to normalization between Israel and Lebanon, and why oppose simple security arrangements in the south, which are all Israel seeks to withdraw? The answer given by Administration officials-that this would impede Christian/Moslem reconciliation in Lebanon and reduce the credibility of the new government in the eyes of Syria and the rest of the Arab world is not convincing. Recreating Christian/Moslem harmony is like teaching the zebra to fly again: it never happened and never will. Moreover, there is a natural alliance between the Christians of Lebanon and the Western world. Most of the Moslems, who look to the East, have never felt any particular affinity with the United States and Europe. The objective interest of the United States in Lebanon is with the Christians and the Israelis.

As to gaining Syrian acceptance of the Lebanese Government, this is a particularly dangerous and erroneous way of describing the U.S. interest. Syria is and seems likely to remain a Soviet ally, a rejectionist state, and an unspeakable tyranny. It has territorial aspirations in Lebanon, has never recognized it as a separate nation, and would destroy the new government there if it could. It is very possible that the Syrians were responsible for assassinating the former President-elect and brother of the current president of Lebanon. The regime in Damascus is a brutal dictatorship which recently killed 10,000 of its own citizens, and it has no strategic or moral reason to feel kindly to the present regime in Lebanon. Premising the future Government of Lebanon and U.S. policy in the region on Syrian approval is tantamount to giving a veto to the most intransigent and dangerous actor in the whole situation. A problem of even greater magnitude but of relatively little interest to the Administration is the growing Soviet military presence in Syria. At this time, SA-5 missiles are being emplaced in Syria which can reach all of Lebanon, northern and central Israel, and deep into Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean. The Missiles and the positioning of Soviet troops indicates that the new Soviet leadership has decided not only to expand significantly its commitment to Syria's war-making capability, but also signals its determination to maintain a position of influence in the Middle East heartland. This activity must be viewed as part of the Soviet global strategy in the Middle East reflected in its occupation of Afghanistan, its designs on Iran, and its alliance with Libya. Paradoxically, the Administration is less con

cerned with the implications of this renewed Soviet activity for NATO and the heightened chance of a superpower confrontation, than with the ejection of its consistent ally, Israel. This is the case even though the Soviet proxies in Lebanon continue to refuse to withdraw.

Another objective of U.S. policy in Lebanon is the establishment of a strong central Lebanese authority which is pro-American and pro-Western. Israel's operation made it possible to join forces with those Lebanese elements who share an organic bond with the United States—namely, the Lebanese Christians and those Moslems favoring a pro-American alignment.

Finally, U.S. policy as it stands ignores Israel's legitimate security requirements in Lebanon. Israel went into that country to wipe out the threat of PLO rockets which held one fifth of its population hostage for over a decade. To withdraw without the necessary security measures would enable terrorists to return to southern Lebanon and threaten to renew the cycle of violence and instability.

Only after progress in Lebanon is decoupled from other problems in the area and negotiations are conducted with a perspective on the wider context of United States strategic interests there-containment of Soviet expansion in the region and the establishment of a friendly Lebanese Government-can a realistic solution be reached.

ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL'S ENEMIES

The Congress will soon face a decision on the sale of advanced fighters and missiles to Jordan. This comes on the heels of major sales to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which have raised serious problems, and the package that is apparently intended by the Administration for Jordan may prove to be the most troublesome of all.

Today, the Arab states on Israel's borders are engaged in a military buildup larger even than the Syrian-Egyptian expansion of 1968-73, involving a larger number of states, a wider array of suppliers, and far more advanced equipment. Particularly alarming is the role of the United States in fueling this buildup. Whereas, before 1973, the Soviet Union was the most important provider of arms to the confrontation countries, today the United States is the principal supplier to four of the five Arab states closest to Israel, and American weapons will almost certainly play an important role for any Arab coalition attacking Israel in the future. By supplying Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which have played minor roles in past wars, the United States is encouraging these countries to play a more significant part in any future attack on Israel. If a conflict does occur, this may produce a situation in which U.S. action has exacerbated the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in which the United States will be torn between the two sides.

Jordan stayed out of the 1973 war because it lacked an air defense system, but the United States is now providing one. Saudi Arabia played a secondary role in 1973 (as it did in 1967 and 1948), because it lacked a significant capability for power projection, but the United States is now building up Saudi capabilities in this area. This is contributing to the dynamic of escalation between Israel and these Arab countries. If in the future they get into a war with Israel and do well, we will have seriously hurt Israel; if they fare poorly, they will blame the United States. We are slipping into a no-win situation.

The Administration says it is providing arms to aid these countries against other regional threats, e.g., Saudi Arabia against Iraq, and Jordan against Syria. But the Saudis themselves consider Iraq an ally and they are providing aid to Baghdad to buy more arms. Jordan will never have the capability to match the far larger Syrian army and air force. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Jordan currently deploys its army as it would if it took these threats seriously as the basis for military planning. Instead, both keep the largest part of their armies on the front facing Israel. The Arabs themselves openly state that they are arming against Israel; only in Washington do we hear the fiction that the purpose is all these other threats.

The Administration also says that it is providing arms to the Arabs in support of the peace process. Yet Saudi Arabia continues to reject the Camp David process, is conceded by Administration officials to be less than helpful in Lebanon and, far from encouraging King Hussein to join the peace process, is holding him back.

In the case of Egypt, we proceeded more sensibly, providing arms only after the peace process was well underway. But even here, it is not clear that arms have cemented the ties of peace. Egypt has dramatically slowed the pace of normalization, restricted trade, and recalled its Ambassador from Israel. It has also moved closer to some of the confrontation states, readmitted Soviet technicians, and cut back on strategic cooperation with the United States (including cancellation of the second part of Operation Bright Star ‘82). As the modernization of its army matures with U.S. help, the pressure within the country to rejoin the struggle against Israel may

intensify. The poor state of the army has been one of the reasons given for standing back from confrontation; as the U.S. arms flow in, this part of the argument will be weakened.

But the next case to come before Congress is arms to Jordan. King Hussein has still not agreed to sit down to talk, but reportedly has been promised advanced aircraft, mobile I-Hawk missiles, and other equipment as well as training for a Jordanian Rapid Deployment Force, not to mention a host of political concessions. From the point of view of Israeli security, Jordan poses a qualitatively unique problem, because it shares the longest border with the Jewish State and has the airfields closest to key targets. Amman is barely 50 miles from Jerusalem; Jaafar is less than 8 minutes flying time from Eilat; and Mafrak is less than 100 miles from Tel Aviv. These conditions make Jordan the state best positioned to spearhead a surprise attack against Israeli airfields and cities. The placement of advanced jets with fast scramble times, excellent ground attack capabilities, and accurate weapons delivery systems in Jordan will force Israel to take strong defensive measures if Jordan is part of a situation of escalating tensions. American arms to Jordan may worsen relations between the two countries instead of advancing the peace process, eroding the modus vivendi which has enabled them to avoid serious conflict for the past 16 years.

To prevent embarrassment to the Administration later, it is important for the Congress to let its views be known now, before notification of the sale is sent to Capitol Hill, that arms to Jordan are unwarranted until King Hussein actually joins serious negotiations. This means not only direct talks, but a substantive position that goes beyond mere posturing. We cannot conduct our Middle East diplomacy solely on the basis of trying to meet every Arab demand to curry their favor. Arms to Jordan at this point simply do not make sense.

THE PEACE PROCESS AND U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS

Finally, this is an appropriate occasion to review the overall state of United States-Israel relations in the context of the peace process. There seems to be general agreement in Washington and in Jerusalem that relations are seriously strained and may in fact be on a collision course. But there is also agreement that the moral and strategic bonds between the two countries are vital to the interests of both. What can be done to stop the deterioration and get back on a constructive basis? Administration officials are placing the blame on Israel. They argue that only changes in Israel will improve the situation. But the direction in which the Administration itself is headed is a major part of the problem, and much could be done on this side of the water to move in a more positive direction.

The Administration has been pursuing a policy premised on and obsessed with conflict with Israel. High Arab officials visiting Washington have been treated royally, including in recent weeks, the Kings of Morocco and Jordan and the President of Egypt. Saudi princes are the object of particular devotion and genuflection. By contrast, visiting Israeli officials are given the cold shoulder, and Prime Minister Begin is not even allowed to come to discuss the problems that exist.

The President's own regard for Israel is said to be favorable. I believe this. Yet, he has not taken a single major initiative in 2 years in office which would reasonably be described as helping to improve the relationship. Although the Administration denies that it considers massive pressures an appropriate way to deal with an ally like Israel, it has in fact invoked more sanctions over a longer time period than any preceding Administration, including: suspending for over a year now the agreement on strategic cooperation; refusing to complete the sale of F-16s which its own specialists have confirmed are necessary to offset the massive quantities of arms going to various Arab countries; holding up approval of technology transfers for the Lavi aircraft; and, most importantly, sending and then leaking to the press menacing notes to the Prime Minister of Israel implying that the entire relationship may be in question. Recently, the Administration has hinted darkly that still more sanctions lie ahead.

Some in the Administration are constantly advising the President that, if only he "cracked down" on Israel, the core problems of the Middle East could be solved. This is a dangerous illusion. Israel is a proud and independent country. As the world knows, it is quite able and committed to defend its vital interests, and it is simply unrealistic to imagine that any arrangements can be arrived at in negotiations between the United States and the Arabs, and then somehow imposed on Israel. Progress toward peaceful coexistence in the Middle East requires working with Israel, instead of treating her as an adversary while consulting intimately with those who would destroy her.