QUESTIONS SUBMitted by Senator Carl Levin

B-2 BOMBER PROGRAM

Senator LEVIN. Section 131 of the 1992 and 1993 Defense Authorization Act requires the Secretary of Defense to report and certify to various aspects of the B-2 program. These certifications should include one that the B-2 aircraft has sufficiently demonstrated through flight testing that critical performance characteristics will allow a high degree of confidence in mission accomplishment. What mission does DOD intend to include in the certification?

Secretary ASPIN. The certification mission uses a future Southwest Asia scenario that uses combat missions planned, with an emphasis on operational realism, to destroy high priority targets while maintaining high survivability. The Defense Intelligence Agency provided an estimate of Iraqi defenses for the year 2010 and Air Combat Command operational planners selected high priority targets similar to those attacked during the 1991 Desert Storm campaign.

Senator LEVIN. It is understood that the B-2s will have different mission capabilities as they are delivered. These different capabilities are identified by "Blocks" 10, 20, 30. The Block 10 aircraft has limited operational capability while Block 20 and 30 aircraft improve that operational capability. How does DOD intend to relate the Block 10, 20, and 30 capabilities to the satisfaction of section 131 of the act, i.e. will the certification assume the achievement of a Block 30 capability?

Secretary ASPIN. The following describes how the Air Force plans to deliver Block capability.

• From its initial delivery (December 17, 1993), the B-2 will be able to participate in any worldwide conflict.

• The initial Block 10 aircraft offers a degree of survivability well beyond that of the B-1 and B-52.

• The Block approach allows the crews to become proficient while the aircraft grows in capability.

The Air Force intends to certify that the B-2 will meet Block 30 capabilities.

Senator LEVIN. What is the schedule for providing the Block 20 and Block 30 capabilities to the flight test program for flight testing and for operational use by the Air Combat Command?

Secretary ASPIN. The schedule for delivering the Block 20 software to the Combined Test Force (CTF) for flight testing is November 1994. It will be certified and delivered beginning in July 1995 to Air Combat Command.

The schedule for delivering the Block 30 capabilities to the CTF for flight test is September 1996. Block 30 will be certified and delivered beginning in September 1997 to ACC.

Senator LEVIN. When will the Air Force complete the flight testing of the B-2 integrated offensive and defensive avionics suite (using a B-2 aircraft)?

Secretary ASPIN. Testing to support the fiscal year 1992 congressional requirement for Offensive and Defensive Avionics is complete. All remaining avionics flight testing on board the B-2 will be complete in early 1997.

Senator LEVIN. When does DOD plan to submit the certification required by section 131(c)(6) of the Fiscal Year 1992 Defense Authorization Act?

Secretary ASPIN. I plan to certify completion of the requirements and forward that information to the congressional committees during the summer 1993 time frame, prior to the fiscal year 1994 authorization conference.

B-2 TEST PRIORITIES

Senator LEVIN. Has the Air Force taken special measures or changed test priorities since section 131 of the act was passed, in order to assure adequate testing would be accomplished to satisfy the act's requirements by mid-1993, especially for the offensive and defensive avionics systems?

Secretary ASPIN. While the essential content of the test program has not changed, we have rearranged the test program schedule to meet congressional time restrictions.

B-2 BOMBER

Senator LEVIN. GAO reported in its December 1992 report on the status of compliance with the 1992 and 1993 acts that software integration into the B-2 aircraft for avionics would not be completed until after the certification schedule. As a result, much of the capability planned for the offensive and defensive avionics could not be flight tested in a B-2 in time to meet legislative requirements. Has this integration schedule changed so that these avionics capabilities can be integrated and flight tested in the B-2 before certification? If so, explain the changes.

Secretary ASPIN. No, the integration schedule has not changed. The entire program is a building block approach to aircraft development and testing. The Air Force uses the best information available, from a number of sources, to determine if the test program is meeting objectives. These sources include: basic research, computer modeling, laboratory analysis, component development and analysis, static testing, ground testing and flight testing. All sources form the foundation from which any program certification or decision is made.

It was never intended that the B-2 program exhibit its full capabilities prior to Secretary of Defense certification of mission accomplishment. Instead, the items called for by the Defense Authorization Laws are a snapshot, if you will, of the B-2 program as it exists at that time. We must all understand that what we are looking at is not the endgame capabilities of the B-2, but rather the capabilities as they exist at the current stage of the testing program.

The B-2 flight test program is following the revised test schedule that was identified in 1991 and reported to Congress. I will be able to certify a high degree of confidence in mission accomplishment based on extensive laboratory testing, computer modeling, component analysis and exhaustive ground and flight testing.

Senator LEVIN. If the full capabilities of the B-2, especially the offensive and defensive avionics, have not been integrated into a B-2 and flight tested in an operational situation (as required by DOD Regulation 5000.2 for weapon system acquisition), what measures does the Secretary of Defense plan to use to assure high confidence in the B-2 performing its intended mission?

Secretary ASPIN. It was never intended that the B-2 program be able to exhibit its full capabilities prior to Secretary of Defense certification of mission accomplishment. Instead, the items called for by the Defense Authorization Laws are a snapshot, if you will, of the B-2 program as it exists at the time of the snapshot. We must all understand that what we are looking at is not the endgame capabilities of the B-2, but rather the capabilities as they exist at the current stage of the testing program.

The B-2 flight test program is following the revised test schedule that was identified in 1991 and reported to Congress. I will be able to certify a high degree of confidence in mission accomplishment based on extensive laboratory testing, computer modeling, and exhaustive flight testing.

The offensive avionics systems have undergone extensive laboratory testing wherein all 19 modes of the radar have been tested. That laboratory testing was followed-up with exhaustive flight test in the Avionics Flying Test Bed. The B-2 test program itself has evaluated the most critical modes of the radar. Based on this broad range of testing, I will be able to certify a high degree of confidence in mission accomplishment.

The Air Force has always emphasized an incremental approach to defensive avionics integration. That integration will be accomplished incrementally via integration and test of three increasingly capable software drops to the Defensive Management Systems. The B-2s defensive avionics have completed extensive testing in the lab and will have completed sufficient initial Defensive Management System flights to allow certification with a high degree of confidence.

Senator LEVIN. Does the B-2 have the potential to experience similar problems in developing and integrating the offensive and/or defensive avionics as experienced by the B-1B? Please explain the differences between the B-2 and the B-1B relative to avionics.

Secretary ASPIN. No, the Air Force does not believe the B-2 will experience development/integration problems similar to the B-1. Comparison of B-2 and B-1B defensive avionics and assertions that the B-2 defensive avionics could suffer the same fate as the B-1Bs are disturbing. The Air Force has established an incremental approach to the incorporation of defensive avionics in the B-2 to preclude the type of problems experienced by the B-1B.

The B-2 defensive system, which does not employ jammers, is unlike the B-1 system. The B-2 is detection only, while the B-1 system also controls complex jamming response. The B-1 defensive suite is much more complex, containing over 100 Line Replaceable Units weighing approximately 5,000 lbs. The B-2 has only 16 Line Replaceable Units weighing approximately 500 lbs.

B-2 FLIGHT TEST PROGRAM

Senator LEVIN. The B-2 flight test program is scheduled to continue through the middle of 1997. Provide for the record the numbers of months and flight hours incurred through March 31, 1993, and the number of months and flight hours remaining in the flight test program.

Secretary ASPIN. AV-I first flew 44 months ago on July 17, 1989 and as of March 31, 1993 has compiled 1,110 flight test hours. This leaves an estimated 3,390 scheduled flight test hours before the completion of the EMD flight test program in July 1997, 52 months hence.

B-2 PRODUCTION SUPPORT FUNDING

Senator LEVIN. In building its fiscal 1994 estimate, has the Air Force transferred production support funding to O&M account? If so, will the acquisition costs be reduced by this amount? If acquisition costs are not reduced by this amount, explain why?

Secretary ASPIN. Yes, the Air Force transferred production support funding to the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) account. The Air Force restructured the B-2 program from 75 aircraft to 20 aircraft for the first time in the fiscal year 1993 President's budget. When the initial estimate was done for the 20 aircraft program, the support concept for a significantly smaller operating fleet had not been defined. The initial 20 aircraft budget (fiscal year 1993 President's budget), included Interim Software Support (ISS) funding in the aircraft production appropriation because the support concept was not totally defined. The fiscal year 1994 President's budget revises the Air Force's support concept (to include software) and plans for contractor support. The Air Force plans to complete a detailed analysis by December 1993 that will lay out the final software support concept structure. The fiscal year 1994 President's budget, consistent with budget policy, realigned production software support funding in the O&M appropriation. Budget policy states that software support activities are funded with the O&M appropriation for primarily maintenance related efforts with anticipated software changes being relatively minor in scope.

No, the Air Force did not reduce acquisition costs by this amount. This reduction of ISS was offset by the addition to RDT&E funding for a deployable mission planning system and to production for Readiness Spares and Engine Spares in the initial spares line. These changes are consistent with Integrated Weapon System Management (IWSM) concept.

B-2 SUPPORT CONCEPT

Senator LEVIN. Define the B-2 support concept as currently conceived by the Air Force. In doing so, provide current plans for basing, maintenance at all levels, and the mix of contractor and organic support. What is the cost of this support concept? Secretary ASPIN. At the unit level, the B-2 program has one main operating base (MOB) at Whiteman AFB, MO. At this level the program will be organically supported beginning with the delivery of the first operational aircraft in December 1993.

Currently, all other program maintenance and support outside of the MOB is mixed and comprises organic support, Interim Contractor Support (ICS), and Contractor Logistics Support (CLS). The final Department decision concerning life cycle maintenance and support (fully organic support, fully contractor support, or a mix of contractor and organic support) will be based on two interim steps comprising trade studies, cost benefit analysis, and a Decision Tree Analysis. The first step will culminate in June 1993 for the hardware and the second step in December 1993 for the software. The first depot maintenance cycle will be contractor supported at Palmdale, CA. This first maintenance cycle is driven primarily by aircraft availability considerations. The follow-on depot maintenance cycles are currently envisioned

to be organically supported at Tinker AFB, OK, starting around the year 2000. The current cost of the B-2 support concept through the first Depot Maintenance cycle is between $1,640 million and $1,750 million. This cost includes Interim Contractor Support, Initial Software Support, Aircraft Depot Maintenance for the first depot maintenance cycle, support equipment, technical publications, and Contractor Logistics Support (CLS).

FLYAWAY COSTS

Senator LEVIN. In building the fiscal year 1994 estimate, the Air Force estimated that recurring flyaway costs for production will increase over $700 million. This increase is mostly in airframe category. How much of this increased cost is labor cost resulting from delays? What category of program cost will be reduced to absorb these cost increases?

Secretary ASPIN. Nearly $400 million of additional sustaining labor costs (nontouch labor) was added to the fiscal year 1994 Budget Estimate Submission (BES) to account for the delay in delivering block 30 configured production aircraft. The remainder of the increase in recurring flyaway resulted from an accounting change that transferred a contingent liability for idle facilities/capacity from the non-recurring line to the airframe line. To absorb this cost increase, support costs (such as Interim Software Support) were reduced.

COST SAVINGS OF BLOCK 30 UPGRADE

Senator LEVIN. What costs savings would be achieved by skipping block 20 as a depot maintenance procedure and upgrading the affected aircraft directly to block 30 from block 10?

Secretary ASPIN. No cost savings would be realized by skipping block 20 as a depot maintenance procedure and upgrading the affected aircraft directly to block 30 from block 10. Block 20 is predominantly a software upgrade that will be done in-line during the production build-up, at Whiteman AFB, and at the contractor depot.

No depot maintenance procedures are being implemented for component repair in the block 20 configuration. Only stripping and painting could be considered a depot maintenance procedure and is being planned for contractor depot maintenance, thus no cost savings would be realized in this area.

TERMINATION COSTS

Senator LEVIN. Describe all termination costs that the government must pay as part of the 20 operational aircraft program. If the program is curtailed at 15 operational aircraft, how are these termination costs affected? How much of the curtailment cost would be absorbed by sustaining labor funds if the program is cut to 15 operational aircraft?

Secretary ASPIN. Curtailment cost consists of removal, storage, shipment, or other disposition of assets (such as tooling and test equipment) used on the B-2 program. Subcontractor curtailment effort is already underway. Curtailment activity and costs would not be impacted further by the reduction from 20 to 15 operational aircraft. However, contingent liability clauses involving idle facilities, business base, and subcontractor rates might increase when going from 20 to 15 operational aircraft.

The specific curtailment cost impacts on sustaining labor funds are still being worked. Specifically, Northrop has proposed a cost reimbursable contract, with a value of $495 million, for the 20 operational B-2 aircraft curtailment effort. This proposal is still in factfinding and Northrop is updating their proposal. When factfinding is complete, the Air Force will provide Senator Levin with a more complete

answer.

FUNDING FOR PRODUCTION AIRCRAFT

Senator LEVIN. How much funding has been obligated for the remaining five aircraft production aircraft? In terms of manufacturing standards, how complete are these five aircraft?

Secretary ASPIN. As of April 1, 1993, $1.442 billion has been obligated for the remaining five production aircraft.

Based on manufacturing standards established by the government and reported in Northrop's January 2, 1993 Cost Performance Report, the last five aircraft have the following percent completes:

Senator LEVIN. In fiscal year 1994, the B-2 cost estimate to develop, test, and rework six aircraft (five of which will become operational) was $24.2 billion, the same as in fiscal year 1993. However, the manufacturing and test schedules for the program were further delayed by one year. Explain_the_reason for the schedule delay. What is the cost impact in terms of: flyaway costs, T&E costs, and other government costs?

Secretary ASPIN. The reasons for the flight test schedule extension include: incorporation of pending initiatives into the schedule; unscheduled maintenance on the test vehicles; and manufacturing delays. The pending initiatives included the Contrail Management System, Advanced Narrow Band Voice Terminal, Global Positioning System (GPS), JP8 Conversion, Milstar UHF, Low Observable Closure Plan, Disk Drive Unit, Alternate Power Source for Airborne Time Transfer Unit, and miscellaneous modifications. The unscheduled maintenance time was driven by the aft deck modification, rudder hinge, radar radome, elevon and outboard trailing edge, and low observable closure fixes in extended lay-up periods. Manufacturing slips occurred due to a high level of engineering change traffic, late software deliveries, line replaceable unit availability, and systems checkout.

The recurring flyaway costs for the B-2 program increased by a total of $609 million (then year (TY) dollars) from the fiscal year 1993 President's budget to the fiscal year 1994 President's budget. This recurring flyaway increase is still within the $44.4 billion program. Of the $609 million, $118 million is associated with the first 10 (air vehicles (A/V) 7-16) production aircraft contract and the balance is associated with the last 5 (A/V 17-21) production aircraft. The $118 million increase is based on actual contractor performance. The balance of the increase recognizes a better understanding of sustaining labor, identification of which pending initiatives would be done in the production line, and incorporation of current labor rates which better reflect a 20 B-2 aircraft business base at the contractor's and subcontractors' facilities.

For the B-2 test program, there is little change to total T&E funding from the fiscal year 1993 President's budget to the fiscal year 1994 President's budget. The test program estimate decreased approximately $24 million and was rephased from the fiscal year 1993 President's budget to the fiscal year 1994 President's budget. The Air Force incorporated schedule risk funding in the fiscal year 1993 President's budget T&E estimate for an anticipated schedule slip. Therefore, there is not an overall increase in the T&E budget when comparing it to the fiscal year 1994 President's budget. The absolute change and rephasing of the test budget resulted from two activities: a reassessment of funding needed for future test activities and a reallocation of test funds for pending initiatives from system test. There is no associated increase in other government costs.

B-2 EMD PROGRAM COSTS

Senator LEVIN. In estimating the EMD program costs for fiscal year 1994 budget, how has the Air Force absorbed approximately $1 billion in cost increases to areas such as sustaining labor? Be specific in describing cost saving measures in other

areas.

Secretary ASPIN. The B-2 program has not incurred a $1 billion increase in EMD. The EMD program total cost, between the fiscal year 1993 President's budget and the fiscal year 1994 President's budget, of $24.212 billion remains unchanged.

B-2 COST ESTIMATE INCREASES/ENGINEERING CHANGES

Senator LEVIN. The cost estimate for engineering changes on the program has more than doubled in the fiscal year 1994 budget, going from $98 million to $200 million. Explain why costs estimated for these changes are increasing at this point