The above report expresses my views in every particular except as to length of span. On this point I am of the opinion that a channel space of 700 feet in the clear, with one pier resting on the shore, so that the shore itself will serve as a guiding dike to lead into the channel space is equivalent in safety to a channel space from 100 to 200 feet wider not placed near the shore. I therefore hold that 700 feet of clear water-way, placed as proposed, is equivalent to about 850 feet placed away from the shore, as is usually the case. As the last-named length is 350 feet greater than the channel space provided by the bridges over the Ohio at Henderson and Cairo for the same coal tows that pass Memphis, I consider a channel space of 700 feet adjacent to the Tennessee shore as affording ample accommodation to coal fleets, and I believe that whatever will answer their requirements will necessarily meet those of the Mississippi Valley Transportation Company. The bridge location is 3 miles below the mouth of Wolf River and about 1,000 feet below the point at which the curve along the Memphis Front connects with the reverse curve that passes east of President's Island. All tows that pass the lower end of Memphis ought to 'be, and except in case of accident will be, in a position parallel with the shore before they reach the site of the bridge, and therefore they should experience no difficulty in passing through even a narrower space than 700 feet. It is certain that all diagrams of tows passing Memphis which the Board has been able to procure show that this statement is correct in the cases shown thereon. In my opinion this will always be the case, except when the machinery of the tow-boat becomes disabled just above the bridge and the tow drifts down at the mercy of the current. Such a casualty may never happen, and in view of the extraordinary difficulties of building any bridge at Memphis on account of the impossibility of reaching an incompressible stratum, on which to found the piers, and the rapid rate at which the cost of superstructure increases with an increase of span, it does not seem just to the great land-transportation interests, that also deserve consideration, to impose a greater burden than is necessary to meet the ordinary requirements of navigation. If machinery is deranged or stopped above a bridge there is no telling where the tow will land, and a 1,000-foot span may prove no safer than a 700-foot one. The latter is longer than any truss span thus far built in the world, and is only exceeded by the cantalever spans now constructing in Scotland over the Frith of Forth, where the absolute impractibility of intermediate piers made such enormous spans an unavoidable necessity. The latter site has, however, the great advantage over the Memphis site of having foundations of solid rock, either out of water or slightly submerged, or of bowlder clay as hard as rock, and at a mcderate depth below water. It is true that a suspension bridge might be built at this place, but engineers who make a specialty of bridge construction are so much opposed to suspension bridges for railroad purposes, for reasons that they consider satisfactory, that it does not seem right to force on them a kind of bridge which they consider inadmissible. The fact that the great coal-shipping interest neither sent a representative to the meeting of the Board nor addressed them any communication whatever seems to show that it considers the minimum provisions of the law as satisfactory. [Since the above was written Ì have received a dispatch from a committee of the Coal Exchange requesting a channal span of 1,000 feet.] On the other hand, the Mississippi Valley Transportation Company operates a route where there never have been any bridges, and in the absence of experience they appear to exaggerate the difficulties and dangers of passing them. WM. E. MERRILL, Lieut. Colonel of Engineers. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF BOARD OF ENGINEERS. UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE, Galveston, Tex., June 3, 1888. SIR: The Board of Engineers convened at Memphis, Tenn., by Special Orders 26, from Headquarters Corps of Engineers, dated May 10, 1888, to examine and report upon the plans of the proposed bridge across the Mississippi River at that place submitted by the Kansas City and Memphis Railway and Bridge Company, were unable to agree as to the proper width of channel-way which should be provided under the main span. Before leaving Memphis they prepared a report, which they all signed." in which both the majority and minority views upon this point were briefly stated. Subsequently, when the members of the Board had returned to their stations, the senior member, who had the report in his custody and who was in the minority upon the point referred to, changed his mind as to the degree of elaboration which he thought his views should receive, and proposed to make some extensive alterations in the report, at the same time suggesting by mail to the majority that they might likewise make alterations. While the majority had been willing, out of courtesy to the minority, to admit his views to their report, so long as these views were moderately and briefly stated like their own, they could not permit the argument finally adopted by him to become part of their report. The time required to recall and reconstruct the original report could not well be taken, owing to the great distance apart of the members, and the fact that the report had already been called for by the War Department. The majority therefore consented by telegraph to the omission from the report, of the minority views, and to their being appended as a supplemental report, with the understanding that an opportunity should be given them to answer, in a further sup plemental report, the argument of the minority. It seems to them that a fuller statement of their side of the question should be made than was considered necessary in their original report, when the discussion of the question had not assumed a controversial character. They propose to make this statement in the form of an answer to the various points in the argument of the minority. (1) The minority expresses the opinion that if a pier be placed upon the shore, so that the shore itself will serve as a guiding-dike, the channel-way adjoining the pier may be from 100 to 200 feet less in width than if the pier were out in the stream, without increasing the difficulties of passage. Without expressing any opinion as to the accuracy of this estimate, the majority remark that it is not practicable to build a pier which shall occupy the position described at all stages of the river. The shore-line changes as the water rises and falls. A pier placed at or near the shoreline at high water is a long way from the shore-line at low water. (2) From the above the minority concludes that a 700-foot channelway near the shore is equivalent to 850 feet out in the stream, and that this being 350 feet greater than the channel-ways provided at Hender son and Cairo, upon the Ohio River, through which the coal tows pass,, the latter should have no difficulty in passing a 700-foot space at Memphis; also that a space that will accommodate the coal tows will accom. modate the grain tows; hence that a 700-foot space is sufficient. Without commenting at length upon the facility with which 700 is transferred into a number 350 greater than 500, the majority remark that no comparison can be made between the Ohio River and the Mississippi River, particularly the Mississippi River at Memphis, with respect to the difficulties of navigation. The coal tows which have managed to get through the Henderson Bridge do not attempt to navigate the Memphis Bend at night even now, when there is no bridge. If they fear to pass at night through a free river, say, 1,900 feet wide, it is not a fair assumption that they can easily pass in daytime through a space 700 feet wide; at all events the two pilots who appeared before the Board from the coal tows then at Memphis, declared that they required 1,000 feet. (3) The minority states that all tows which "pass the lower end of Memphis ought to be, and except in case of accident will be, in a position parallel with the shore before they reach the site of the bridge." This is the pith of the entire subject. If this be true, than a 700-foot channel-way is sufficient. All of the river-men who appeared before the Board say that it is not true. The members of the majority have personally observed the manipulation of the heavy tows, and they are quite prepared to believe what the river-men tell them. That the tows will generally be straightened out may be granted. That they will sometimes be compelled to pass under the bridge "broadside on" has been proved to the satisfaction of the majority, and this notwithstanding that they be handled with all the skill that the best navigators possess and that all machinery and other appliances be in good order. The diagram submitted with the report of the Board show the positions of a few tows passing through Memphis Bend as they happened to pass upon the days of observation. Naturally the tows are shown in the positions which they generally occupy; that is, "straightened out" by the time they reach the site of the bridge. But these diagrams may be very misleading, for the reason that an idea is conveyed to the mind much more forcibly through the eye than through the ear. The dia grams were forwarded because they are an important part of the infor mation collected, but the statement should be emphasized, that they represent only what is usual, and not by any means all that a bridge must provide for. (4) The minority refers to the great difficulty of building a bridge at Memphis, on account of the compressibility of the soil upon which the piers must rest, to the rapid rate at which the cost of superstructure increases with an increase of span, and to the importance of placing no unnecessary obstacle in the way of the land transportation which desires to cross the river. The Board had before it no estimate of what the 1,000-foot span would cost. The majority consider this a matter of secondary importance. They are thorough believers in the value and importance of land transportation, and they desire to see the bridge built. But they can not agree that the saving of a few hundred thousand dollars, or even millions, to the bridge company will justify placing in the stream an obstruction worse than those which the Government is now expending millions to remove. The soil upon which the piers must rest is not the best, but it is suitable for the support of heavy weights. The practicability of building 1,000-foot spans has not been ques tioned. They can undoubtedly be built, and at a cost, in the judgment of the majority, much less than that of certain other bridges now in operation. (5) From the fact that the great coal-shipping interest did not formally protest before the Board against the 700 foot channel-way provided as a minimum in the law, the minority concludes that that interest considers the 700-foot space sufficient. The evidence of the two pilots engaged in the coal business has already been referred to. They stated that 700 feet was not sufficient, and that they needed 1,000 feet. That the owners did not formally appear before the Board was a matter of surprise. It was explained by the statement that an unexpected rise in the Ohio River had brought upon them a sudden rush of business. But whether they remained absent from good reasons or no reasons, it is not a fair assumption that they are content with 700 feet. They are merely the temporary users of a great public highway which is under the guardianship of the Government, and they might fairly presume that the War Department would protect that highway and would not accord to the opposing interest everything that was not prohibited by law. At all events the Government is not protecting merely the inter ests of those now engaged in river traffic. It is protecting the highway itself for the use of future generations as well as the present. The neglect or indifference of the present coal operators is not good reasons for depriving posterity of the free use of a great river. (6) The minority thinks that the Mississippi Valley Transportation Company exaggerates the difficulties and dangers of passing bridges be cause it operates a route which has heretofore been free of them. The able manager and the experienced navigators of that company, and those who know them, will be surprised to hear that they do not understand what their business requires. But the majority can judge for them selves in this matter. There are the tows of a given size approaching a given site in a given way. They are immense unwieldy masses, floating down an inclined surface in a current of 8 miles per hour. How much space do they require to pass safely under the bridge? A short trip upon one of the tows will enable any intelligent person to form an opinion upon the subject. In conclusion, the majority reiterate their opinion that bad as the approaches to the proposed site of the bridge are now, they are likely to become worse, and can not become better, and that the clear width of channel-way required to prevent the bridge from being an unneces sary obstruction to navigation is 1,000 feet. Very respectfully, your obedient servants, The CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, U. S. A. O. H. ERNST, Major of Engineers. DAN. C. KINGMAN, Captain of Engineers. LETTER FROM MESSRS. MORISON & CORTHELL. WASHINGTON, August 3, 1888. SIR: On the 5th of May, 1888, in accordance with the request of Mr. George H. Nettleton, president of the Kansas City and Memphis Railway and Bridge Company, we presented to you at the hands of our Mr. Corthell, for your approval, the maps, plans, and papers relating to the proposed bridge over the Mississippi River at Memphis, Tenn. In conformity with the indorsement dated July 10, 1888, made by you on the report of the Board of Engineers, provided for in the act of Congress approved April 24, 1888, we now, by the hands of our Mr. Morison, present to you for approval a new plan, elevation, and section in duplicate, in conformity with the requirements of your indorsement of July 10. We understand that all other papers are complete and meet with your approval. We believe that this plan has been made in strict conformity with your opinion, and in behalf of the Kansas City and Memphis Railway and Bridge Company would request that an approval of this revised plan and of the location already made be given as early as is consistent with the rules of your Department. We are, very respectfully, yours, Hon. WILLIAM C. ENDICOTT, Secretary of War. [First indorsement.] MORISON & CORTHELL. WAR DEPARTMENT, August 7, 1888. Respectfully referred to the Acting Judge-Advocate-General to prepare the formal approval of plans submitted August 3, with the condition that the passage of wagons and vehicles of all kinds be provided for, as proposed by Mr. Morison in his letter of August 4. The right to require changes in said structure, if the public interest demands them, being reserved to the Secretary of War in section 9 of said act. By order of the Secretary of War. [Second indorsement.] SAM'L HODGKINS, Acting Chief Clerk. WAR DEPARTMENT, JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL'S OFFICE, Respectfully returned to the Secretary of War, with draught of an instrument for his approval of the plans and map of location of a proposed bridge across the Mississippi River, containing conditions as directed in the preceding indorsement. G. NORMAN LIEBER, Acting Judge-Advocate-General. W W 23. REPORTS RESPECTING INTERFERENCES WITH NAVIGATION BY BRIDGES, CAUSEWAYS, AND OTHER STRUCTURES. LETTER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR. WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington City, December 18, 1885. The Secretary of War has the honor to transmit to the United States Senate, in compliance with section 2 of the river and harbor act of July |