utation, but his conduct must have been such as comports with a good character. In other words, he must have behaved-conducted himself-as a man of good moral character ordinarily would, should or does. Character consists of the qualities which constitute the individual; reputation the sum of opinions entertained concerning him. The former is interior, the latter external. The one is the substance, the other the shadow. (N. Y. P. Code, 120; 8 Barb. 603.)

What is "a good moral character" within the meaning of the statute may not be easy of determination in all cases. The standard may vary from one generation to another; and probably the average man of the country is as high as it can be set. In one age and country duelling, drinking and gaming are considered immoral, and in another they are regarded as very venial sins at most. The only authorities I have been able to find upon this subject, are the cases of Ex parte Douglas and Ex parte Sandberg, cited in 2 Bright, Fed. Dig. 25, from 5 West Jur. 171. These cases hold that an alien who lives in a state of polygamy, or believes that polygamy may be rightfully practiced, in defiance of the laws to the contrary, is not entitled to citizenship.

Upon general principles it would seem that whatever is forbidden by the law of the land ought to be considered for the time being immoral, within the purview of this statute. And it may be said with good reason that a person who violates the law thereby manifests, in a greater or less degree, that he is not "well disposed to the good order and happiness" of the country. Good behavior-that behavior for which a person reasonably suspected of an intention to misbehave, may be required to give surety, is defined to be the conduct authorized by law, and bad behavior such as the law punishes. (Bou. Dic. verba, Behavior; 2 Black, 251, 256.)

But perjury is not only malum prohibitum, but malum in se. At both the civil and common law it was classed among the crimen falsi, and wherever, as in this case, it affected the administration of justice, by introducing falsehood and fraud therein, it was, at common law, deemed infamous, and the person committing it held incompetent as a witness and unworthy of credit. (4 Saw. 213.)

There can be no question then, but that a person who commits perjury has so far behaved as a man of bad moral character. But it may be said that an alien who has otherwise behaved as a man of good moral character during a residence in the country of at least five years ought not to be denied admission to citizenship on account of the commission in that time of a single illegal or immoral act. This suggestion is based upon the idea that it is sufficient if the behavior of the applicant was generally good-that the good preponderated over the evil. In some sense this may be correct. For instance, the law of the State prohibits gaming and the unlicensed sale of spirituous liquors. These acts thereby become immoral. But their criminality consists in their being prohibited and not because they are deemed to be intrinsically wrong-mala in se. Now, if an Now, if an applicant for naturalization, whose behavior, during a period of five or more years, was otherwise good, was shown to have committed during that time either of those or similar crimes, I am not prepared to say that his application ought to be denied on account of his behavior. And yet it is clear that anything like habitual gaming or vending of liquors under such circumstances would constitute bad behavior, immoral behavior, and be a bar under the statute to admission to citizenship. But in the case of murder, robbery, theft, bribery or perjury, it seems to me that a single instance of the commission of either of them is enough to prevent the admission. The burden of proof is upon the applicant to prove "to the satisfaction of the court" that during the period of his probation he has conducted himself as a moral man. But when the proof shows that he has committed an infamous crime, it is not possible in my judgment to find that his behavior has been such as to entitle him under the statute to receive the privilege and power of American citizenship.

What effect, if any, does the pardon have upon the application? By the Constitution of this State, Article V., ¿ 14, the governor has power to grant pardons after conviction for all offenses, except treason, "subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law." The criminal code makes no re

strictions upon the power of the governor, except that he must first require the judge or district attorney who tried the case to give him a statement of the facts. (Or. C. C. c. 32.) This pardon does not show that this statement was asked for or obtained, nor does it appear therefrom what gave rise to the alleged doubts as to the defendant's guilt. So far then as this application is concerned the matter stands thus: The applicant was duly convicted of perjury, and the governor, in the exercise of that mercy which belongs to him in his official character, has pardoned him for reasons of his own that are immaterial to this inquiry.

The pardon is now produced by the applicant to show, not only that his crime has been forgiven him, but that it never was, and therefore it can not now be relied upon to prove that he has not behaved as a man of good moral character during his residence in the United States. In Ex parte Garland (4 Wall. 380), Mr. Justice FIELD, speaking for a majority of the court, says: "A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense." This is probably as strong and unqualified a statement of the scope and efficacy of a pardon as can be found in the books. And yet I do not suppose the opinion is to be understood as going the length of holding that while the party is to be deemed innocent of the crime by reason of the pardon from and after the taking effect thereof, that it is also to be deemed that he never did commit the crime or was convicted of it. The effect of the pardon is prospective and not retrospective. It removes the guilt and restores the party to a state of innocence. But it does not change the past and can not annihilate the established fact that he was guilty of the offense. And such, I think, is the doctrine of the authorities cited in support of this opinion, namely: 4 Black. 402; 6 Bac. tit. Pardon H. Blackstone's language is: "The effect of such a pardon by the king is to make the offender a new man; to acquit him of all corporal penalties and forfeit

ures annexed to that offense for which he obtained his pardon; and not so much to restore him to his former, as to give him a new credit and capacity." And the author goes on to state that a pardon does not purify the blood during the period it was corrupted by conviction, and gives the following illustration: "Yet if a person attainted receives the king's pardon and afterward hath a son, that son may be heir to his father, because the father being made a new man might transmit new inheritable blood; though had he been born before the pardon he could never have inherited at all." Bacon says-a pardon makes the party as it were a new man." It removes the punishment and "legal disabilities consequent on the crime." It restores his competency to be a witness, "but yet his credit must be left to the jury." From these authorities it is plain that a pardon does not operate retrospectively. The offender is purged of his guilt and thenceforth he is an innocent man, but the past is not obliterated, nor the fact that he had committed the crime wiped out.

Apply these principles to this case. By the commission of the crime the applicant was guilty of misbehavior within the meaning of the statute during his residence in the United States. The pardon has absolved him from the guilt of the act, and relieved him from the legal disabilities consequent thereupon. But it has not done away with the fact of his conviction. It does not operate retrospectively. The answer to the question, has he behaved as a man of good moral character, still must be in the negative; for the fact remains, notwithstanding the pardon, that the applicant was guilty of the crime of perjury-did behave otherwise than as a man of good moral character.

The fact that the applicant can not obtain title to his homestead unless he is admitted to citizenship can not affect the consideration of the question. Doubtless, in this respect, the matter operates as a hardship upon him. But this only illustrates the truth of the proverb-"the way of the transgressor is hard"-and in the long-run it is better for the world that it should be so.

The proof is not satisfactory that the applicant has behav

ed as a man of good moral character during his residence in the United States, but the contrary; and, therefore, the application is denied. But the applicant having no counsel, and the matter having been submitted without argument, and being now res judicata, if he shall be hereafter advised that there is probable error in this ruling, he may apply within a reasonable time to set aside the judgment denying his application, and for a rehearing thereof.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, of Texas, has been nominated for governor of that State.The judges of the Supreme Court of Michigan have decided that, in cases where the court may be equally divided, they will deliver no opinions, but simply affirm the judgment under the statute. The step has been taken in order to prevent, as far as possible, the evil effects which arise from the unnecessary parade of differences of opinion in the court of last resort. Another advantage will be to keep down, to this extent, the number of reports. The Attorney-General of Illinois has given an opinion that, under the constitution of that State, a notary public has no power to commit a witness for contempt in not obeying a subpoena. The Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations, will open the sixth annual conference at Frankfort-on-the-Maine on the 20th inst. The Lord Chief Baron of England, president of the association, is expected to preside.An English barrister, Mr. C. J. Tarring, has been appointed Professor of English Law, including International Law and Jurisprudence, in the University of Tokio, Japan. He will lecture in English, that having been adopted as the learned language at the University of Tokio.