that purpose might deem necessary for the comfort and support of the debtor's family, not exceeding in value fifty dollars at cash valuation." By the act of 1859, the exemption was extended to fifty acres of land in the county, or two acres in a town, of not greater value than five hundred dollars.

On the 22d of January, 1869, the premises in controversy were duly set off to the defendant in error as a homestead. He had no other real estate, and the premises did not exceed a thousand dollars in value. On the 6th of March, 1869, the Sheriff, under executions issued on the judgments, sold the premises to the plaintiff in error, and thereafter executed to him a deed in due form. The regularity of the sale is not contested.

The act of August 22, 1868, was then in force. The acts of 1854 and 1859 had been repealed. (Wilson vs. Sparks, 72 N. C. 211.) No point is made upon these acts by the counsel upon either side. We shall, therefore, pass them without further remark.

The plaintiff in error brought this action in the Superior Court of Granville County, to recover possession of the premises so sold and conveyed to him. That court adjudged that the exemption created by the Constitution and the act of 1868 protected the property from liability under the judgments, and that the sale and conveyance by the Sheriff were, therefore, void. Judgment was given accordingly. The Supreme Court of the State affirmed the judgment. The plaintiff in error thereupon brought the case here for review. The only federal question presented by the record is, whether the exemption was valid as regards contracts made before the adoption of the Constitution of 1868.

The counsel for the plaintiff in error insists upon the negative of this proposition. The counsel upon the other side, frankly conceding several minor points, maintains the affirmative views. Our remarks will be confined to this subject. The Constitution of the United States declares that "no State shall pass any * * law impairing the obligation of contracts." A contract is the agreement of minds, upon a sufficient consideration, that something specified shall be

*

done, or shall not be done. The lexical definition of impair is "to make worse; to diminish in quantity, value, excellence, or strength; to lessen in power; to weaken; to enfeeble; to deteriorate."-Webster's Dict. Obligation is defined to be "the act of obliging or binding; that which obliges; the binding power of a vow, promise, oath, or contract," etc. -Id. The word is derived from the Latin word obligatio, tying up; and that from the verb obligo, to bind or tie up; to engage by the ties of a promise or oath, or form of laws; and obligo is compounded of the verb ligo, to tie or bind fast, and the preposition ob, which is prefixed to increase its meaning." (Blair vs. Williams and Lapsley vs. Brashears, 4 Litt. 65.)

The obligation of a contract includes everything within its obligatory scope. Among these elements nothing is more important than the means of enforcement. This is the breath of its vital existence. Without it the contract, as such, in the view of the law, ceases to be, and falls into the class of those "imperfect obligations," as they are termed, which depend for their fulfillment upon the will and conscience of those upon whom they rest. The ideas of right and remedy ar inseparable. "Want of right and want of remedy are the same thing." (1 Bac. Abr. tit. Actions in General, letter B.)

In Von Hoffman vs. Quincy (4 Wall 552), it was said: "A statute of frauds embracing pre-existing parol contracts, not before required to be in writing, would affect their validity. A State declaring that the word ton should, in prior as well as subsequent contracts, be held to mean half or double the weight before prescribed, would affect its construction. A statute providing that a previous contract of indebtment may be extinguished by a process of bankruptcy, would involve its discharge, and a statute forbidding the sale of any of the debtor's property, under a judgment upon such a contract, would relate to the remedy." It can not be doubted, either upon principle or authority, that each of such laws would violate the obligation of the contract, and the last not less than the first. These propositions seem to us too clear to

require discussion. It is also the settled doctrine of this court that the laws which subsist at the time and place of making a contract enter into and form a part of it as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms. This rule embraces alike those which affect its validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement. (Von Hoffman vs. Quincy, supra; McCracken vs. Hayward, 2 How. 612.)

In Greene vs. Biddle (8 Wheat. 92), this court said, touching the point here under consideration: "It is no answer that the acts of Kentucky now in question are regulations of the remedy and not of the right to the lands. If these acts so change the nature and extent of existing remedies as materially to impair the rights and interests of the owner, they are just as much a violation of the compact as if they overturned his rights and interests." "One of the tests that a contract has been impaired is that its value has by legislation been diminished. It is not by the Constitution to be impaired at all. This is not a question of degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its obligation--dispensing with any part of its force." (Planters' Bank vs. Sharp et al., 6 How. 327.) It is to be understood that the encroachment thus denounced must be material. If it be not material, it will be regarded as of no account.

These rules are axioms in the jurisprudence of this court. We think they rest upon a solid foundation. Do they not cover this case, and are they not decisive of the question before us? We will, however, further examine the subject.

It is the established law of North Carolina that stay laws are void, because they are in conflict with the National Constitution. (Jacobs vs. Smallwood, 63 N. C. 112; Jones vs. Crittenden, 1 Car. Law, 385; Barnes vs. Barnes, 8 Jones, 366.) This ruling is clearly correct. Such laws change a term of the contract by postponing the time of payment. This impairs its obligation by making it less valuable to the creditor. But it does this solely by operating on the remedy. The contract is not otherwise touched by the offending law. Let us suppose a case. A party recovers two judgments—one against A, the other against Beach for the sum of fifteen

hundred dollars upon a promissory note. Each debtor has property worth the amount of the judgment and no more. The Legislature thereafter passes a law declaring that all past and future judgments shall be collected "in four equal annual installments." At the same time another law is passed which exempts from execution the debtor's property to the amount of fifteen hundred dollars. The court holds the former law void and the latter valid. Is not such a result a legal solecism? Can the two judgments be reconciled? One law postpones the remedy, the other destroys it—except in the contingency that the debtor shall acquire more property-a thing that may not occur, and that can not occur if he die before the acquisition is made. Both laws involve the same principle and rest on the same basis. They must stand or fall together. The concession that the former is valid cuts away the foundation from under the latter. If a State may stay the remedy for one fixed period, however short, it may for another, however long. And if it may exempt property to the amount here in question, it may do so to any amount. This, as regards the mode of impairment we are considering, would annul the inhibition of the Constitution, and set at naught the salutary restriction it was intended to impose.

The power to tax involves the power to destroy. (McCulloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 430.) The power to modify at discretion the remedial part of a contract is the same thing.

But it is said that imprisonment for debt may be abolished in all cases, and that the time prescribed by a statute of of limitations may be abridged. Imprisonment for debt is a rule of ancient barbarism. (Cooper's Justinian, 658; 12 Tables, Tab. 3.) It has descended with the stream of time. It is punishment rather than a remedy. It is right for fraud, but wrong for misfortune. It breaks the spirit of the honest debtor, destroys his credit, which is a form of capital, and dooms him, while it lasts, to helpless idleness. Where there is no fraud it is the opposite of a remedy. minded man must rejoice when such a blot is removed from the statute book. But upon the power of a State, even in

Every right

this class of cases, see the strong dissenting opinion of WASHINGTON, J., in Mason vs. Hale (12 Wheat. 370).

Statutes of limitation are statutes of repose. They are necessary to the welfare of society. The lapse of time constantly carries with it the means of proof. The public as well as individuals are interested in the principle upon which they proceed. They do not impair the remedy, but only require its application within the time specified. If the period limited be unreasonably short and designed to defeat the remedy upon pre-existing contracts, which was part of their obligation, we should pronounce the statute void. Otherwise we should abdicate the performance of one of our most important duties. The obligation of a contract can not 'be substantially impaired in any way by a State law. This restriction is beneficial to those whom it restrains, as well as to others. No community can have any higher public interest than in the faithful performance of contracts and the honest administration of justice. The inhibition of the Constitution is wholly prospective. The States may legislate as to contracts thereafter made as they may see fit. It is only those in existence when the hostile law is passed that are protected from its effect.

In Bronson vs. Kenzie (1 How. 311), the subject of exemptions was touched upon, but not discussed. There a mortgage had been issued in Illinois. Subsequently the Legislature passed a law giving the mortgagor a year to redeem, after a sale under a decree, and requiring the land to be appraised, and not to be sold for less than two-thirds of the appraised value. The law was held to be void in both particulars as to pre-existing contracts. What is said as to exemptions is entirely obiter, but coming from so high a source, it is entitled to the most respectful consideration. The court speaking through Chief Justice TANEY, said: "A State may, if it thinks proper, direct that the necessary implements of agriculture, or the tools of the mechanic, or articles of necessity in household furniture, shall, like wearing apparel, not be liable to execution on judgments. Regulations of this description have always been considered in every civilized