tion of these metals. I have read your recent statements and if I Mr. EDMONDSON. Are there further questions on my left? Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. Christie, just scanning the statement made by the president of the Steelworkers, Mr. McDonald, I notice he said: The market for minerals is international. Therefore, price is set on an internation basis. When supply becomes excessive, lower prices result. Would this tend to bear out what the previous witness has said, that if more production is brought in by this, lower prices will result which might put more of our domestic industry out of business. Mr. CHRISTIE. You really threw a beauty at me. It might, but there, again, I think that one thing the previous witness overlooked and perhaps in your question there, I look for an upswing in the economy, more demand for lead and zinc. There was an article not too long ago in Forbes magazine about increased use of lead by the automobile manufacturers. There is the hope-maybe the only hope in the long run--for the demand, for the economy to get back and get moving. Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. Christie, let me ask you another question. Under point 1 of Mr. McDonald's statement, which is incorporated in the record, he says that as a general rule the big miners are lowcost producers; the small mines are high-cost producers. In No. 5 he then goes on to say some high-cost mines must eventually shut down. Would this lead you to believe that the position of your organization is to shut down the small mines? Mr. CHRISTIE. No, it doesn't lead me to believe that at all. That is a statement that was made after a study of the industry. Maybe some of them might have to in the foreseeable future. I hope they don't. Mr. DOMINICK. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Christie, thank you very much for your statement. We appreciate having you with us. Mr. CHRISTIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. EDMONDSON. We have one further witness present, Mr. Horace White, International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers, Denver, Colo. Would you come forward, please. STATEMENT OF HORACE WHITE, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL & SMELTER WORKERS, DENVER, COLO. Mr. WHITE. Mr. Chairman and other members of the committee, I appear here only as a witness because of the inability of our international president, Mr. John Clark, to appear. As a witness he would probably answer any of the questions you have been directing at these other witnesses. Mr. EDMONDSON. Would you like to have his statement made a part of the record at this point? Mr. WHITE. I would like to very much have his statement made a part of the record at this point, and I would like to read for the benefit of those who will not receive a copy of our union's position on this question of this bill and what should be done in this industry to help solve the problem of unemployment. Mr. EDMONDSON. Is that separate from Mr. Clark's statement now? Mr. WHITE. It is a part of it; it is the last few paragraphs of it. Mr. EDMONDSON. Without objection the complete statement by Mr. Clark, president of the International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers, of Denver, Colo., will be made a part of the record at this point, and the witness may read any portion of it he wishes. Mr. WHITE. Thank you, sir. (The formal statement of Mr. Clark follows:) STATEMENT OF JOHN CLARK, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL & SMELTER WORKERS, DENVER, COLO. The International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers is 68 years oldthe oldest and largest labor organization in the nonferrous metals industry. It represents lead and zinc mine, mill, smelter, and refinery workers, along with those employed in copper and other nonferrous metals production. We appear before this committee, as it considers assistance to the lead-zinc mining industry. on behalf of the hourly paid lead-zinc miners and millmen now employed, who today number fewer than 7,500, and for more than 6,500 in the industry whose jobs have disappeared in the short span of the past 4 years. We believe that any approach to the problems of the depressed lead-zinc mining industry should give consideration to the severe unemployment and job insecurity which has been and continues to be the lot of those whose livelihood depends on employment in this industry. They have a stake in whatever assistance the Government extends to lead and zinc mining-a stake that takes second place to that of no other group concerned. By and large, none but a handful of the 7,500 workers now employed, or of the 6,500 whose jobs have disappeared, have been working in the small domestic mines which would qualify for assistance under the legislation before you for consideration. In 1958, for example, the Bureau of Mines tells us that 35 large lead-zine mines producing 5,000 tons or more of lead and/or zinc, or about 8 percent of all the mines producing lead and zinc in 1958, accounted for 86 percent of the total output. This same group of 35 mines also gave employment to 84 percent of the total number of persons employed in lead-zinc mining, including proprietors. supervisors, white-collar office help, and others, as well as paid production workers. We estimate that over 90 percent of all paid production workers in the industry were employed in these 35 larger mines. The problem of restoring the jobs lost by these workers, and giving greater assurance of stability to those fortunate enough to be still employed cannot be met by a program of assistance to small mines which in large measure utilize the labor of proprietors, and depend only to a minor extent on paid production workers. The current urgency of depression in lead-zinc mining is underscored by the complete shutdown since last summer of the Anaconda zine mines in Butte, which, if reopened, would mean jobs for as many as 500 workers. Since the first of this year, depressed lead and zine prices have forced the closing of the Jack Waite mine in Montana, the National Lead Co. mine at Fredericktown, Mo., and three Tennessee mines operated by the American Zinc, Lead & Smelting Co. These five mines, when operating at capacity, have employed as many as 500 workers in recent years. St. Joseph Lead Co., which operates in New York State the largest zine mine in the United States, has cut back its zinc mine production in New York State by 15 percent, effective the end of February. Other cutbacks and mine closings are under consideration. It is our feeling that a program for lead and zine must be broad enough to meet the problems of all segments of the industry. Our industry is faced with many special problems of a chronic character that have persisted even during periods of relative prosperity, for which special solutions are necessary. Lead and zinc mining has been seriously declining over many years, mainly as the result of policies pursued by the U.S. Government under both the Eisenhower and Truman administrations. These policies stimulated new foreign production of lead and zinc through direct loans and grants, purchases of foreign production under price guarantee agreements, stockpile purchase of foreign-produced lead and zinc. Recognition of Government responsibility for the plight of lead-zinc mining was contained in a letter from Secretary of the Interior Seaton to Vice President Nixon, dated June 19, 1957, transmitting a draft bill to raise tariffs on lead and zinc. The letter, which can be found on page 4 of the Senate Finance Committee hearings on S. 2576 "Import Tax on Lead and Zinc" stated: The threat of injury faced by these industries stems largely from actions taken as a result of the Korean conflict. The Federal Government at that time stimulated production of many essential minerals at home and abroad in the free world. Mineral raw materials were needed to build ships, tanks, guns, and planes for immediate use, and in order to accelerate stockpiling. Price controls in the United States held down the expansion of domestic production of lead and zinc and prevented domestic producers from taking full advantage of worldwide demand. Foreign producers, not subject to such price controls, expanded production rapidly. Following the armistice in Korea, anticipated demand for lead and zinc did not materialize, and prices declined sharply. Domestic producers promptly cut back their production but foreign producers generally did not. Some of them may have been able to write off their plant costs by the high prices they had received in foreign markets, or the grade of ore and labor costs may have permitted them to produce more cheaply. In any event, record imports of these commodities entered the country and domestic producers experienced distress." The Eisenhower administration, over the years, ran the full gamut of possible proposals for alleviating the lead-zinc situation. In 1954 they rejected a Tariff Commission recommendation for higher tariffs on lead and zinc; instead they accelerated the stockpiling program that immediately relieved but ultimately, because of its limited duration and encouragement of imports, compounded the industry's problems. In 1957, Secretary of the Interior Seaton proposed higher tariffs on lead and zinc. In the spring and summer of 1958, Seaton opposed both higher tariffs and quotas and proposed subsidies for lead, zinc, and other metal mines. In the fall of 1958, after the subsidy bill failed to pass Congress and the United Nations Conference on Nonferrous Metals adjourned without taking action, the administration imposed quotas on lead and zine. In 1960, the administration opposed subsidies for small mines, as embodied in the Edmondson bill-the bill was vetoed by President Eisenhower. The Government's import quota program for lead and zinc has been a failure. After nearly 21⁄2 years of operation, the quotas have not sufficiently restricted heavy imports from low-wage areas, nor have they brought about any significant revival of our domestic mining industry. They have, in addition, served to curtail production at many smelters unable to fill their ore requirements from domestic sources. What we think is now needed is to enact a consistent basic minerals policy that will assure some reasonable order and stability in the industry. There seems to be no possibility of reducing imports under a quota system, under present administration policies, to a point where they can be really effective in stimulating domestic production. Nor are we convinced, for economic and political considerations that also apply to higher tariffs on lead and zinc, that this would be the most desirable course. Therefore we favor a fresh approach to the problems of the industry along the following lines: 1. Abandonment of the import quota system, and increased U.S. Government support and encouragement of the United Nations efforts at stabilization of production and international trade in lead and zinc through the negotiation of international commodity agreements. As an example of what we have in mind, we believe that Senator Mansfield's proposal for the calling of an international copper conference to stabilize prices and encourage year-round production, is a constructive suggestion that should be supported. 2. An industrywide subsidy for domestic lead-zinc mine production. The subsidy would apply, as was proposed in Interior Secretary Seaton's "Domestic Minerals Stabilization Act of 1958," to an annual production of 350,000 tons of lead and 550,000 tons of zinc. This is the bill that passed the Senate in 1958 72943-61-7 by a vote of 70 to 12, and failed in the House by the fairly close margin of 159 to 182. Subsidies would be paid to guarantee a return to mine producers equivalent to what they would receive if lead were at 15 cents and zinc at 14 cents per pound. The amount of subsidy available to any one company would be limited, based on recent production, as set forth in the Seaton proposal. The subsidy approach seems to us to be the most reasonable realistic approach to sustaining a domestic lead-zinc mining industry under existing conditions. In operation it would create conditions in the U.S. market which should encourage further efforts at the United Nations level to achieve some worldwide stability in productivity and trade. In the United States, it seems to us the only practicable way of achieving a partial restoration of our historic position as a producer of lead and zinc, and of restoring any substantial number of the jobs which have been lost in the industry. The subsidy approach would increase lead and zinc mine production by about 100,000 tons of each metal annually, above present levels. Estimates presented by the Assistant Secretary of the Interior to this subcommittee, at hearings last year on a somewhat more liberal version of the present H.R. 84, were that the more liberal version would increase domestic production of lead and zinc combined by only about 30,000 tons annually. H.R. 84 could have some adverse effects. The increased subsidized production from small mines could cause a further lowering of lead and zinc prices, with possible further cutbacks and layoffs of workers in the unsubsidized mines. This was one of the factors cited by President Eisenhower in his memorandum accompanying the veto of H.R. 8860 last year. A subsidy program for all mines, with appropriate limits on the production to be subsidized, would, we believe, have a more significant effect on total production and employment. The subsidy approach seems to us, to be the most reasonable and realistic approach to sustaining a domestic lead-zinc mining industry under existing conditions. In operation it would create conditions in the U.S. market which should encourage further efforts at the United Nations level to achieve some worldwide stability in production and trade. In the United States, it seems to us the only practicable way of achieving a partial restoration of our historic position as a producer of lead and zinc, and of restoring any substantial number of the jobs which have been lost in the industry. The subsidy approach would increase lead and zinc mine production by about 100,000 tons of each metal annually, above present levels. Estimates presented by the Assistant Secretary of the Interior to this subcommittee, at hearings last year on a somewhat liberal version of the present H.R. 84, were that the more liberal version would increase domestic production of lead and zinc combined by only about 30,000 tons annually. H.R. 84 could have some adverse effects. The increased subsidized production from small mines could cause a further lowering of lead and zinc prices, with possible further cutbacks and layoffs of workers in the unsubsidized mines. This was one of the factors cited by President Eisenhower in his memorandum accompanying the veto of H.R. 8860 last year. A subsidy program for all mines, with appropriate limits on the production to be subsidized, would, we believe, have a more significant effect on total production and employ ment. Mr. WHITE. In spite of the fact the President has more or less repudiated and has refused to call such a conference. Mr. EDMONDSON. Let me ask you a question, Mr. White. You say he has done that? Mr. WHITE. I believe that is true, that he has refused to call such a conference. Mr. EDMONDSON. That is certainly news to me that he has made any decision about the Senator Mansfield suggestion in this area yet. I hope the gentleman will reenforce that statement with a little direct report of official character if he has it. Mr. WHITE. We sincerely hope that we are mistaken in this, but we have been so advised from our national office. Mr. OLSEN. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. EDMONDSON. Yes. Mr. OLSEN. It is my information from conversations with Senator Mansfield his proposal has been referred to many departments of the executive department of the Government for discussion and there has been no decision made by the President, or by the administrative officers concerning the proposal. Mr. EDMONDSON. The gentleman from Montana has the same understanding I have on it, that it is receiving very serious study in the executive department right now. Mr. WHITE. We certainly hope this is the case. Mr. EDMONDSON. Are there any questions on my left? Mr. ASPINALL. Mr. Chairman, I have no question, but I think that you should check the parentage of the so-called Secretary Seaton's minerals and stabilization act of 1958. It so happens that he sent it up here all right, but he wasn't the first one to give support to it and after it got to the floor of the House it was not his group or the members of his party that supported it. That is a matter that we considered many times beofre 1958. We have never been able since the war days to get that sort of a program favorably supported by Congress except for those five individual metals of the program which was finally disowned by the Appropriations Committee. Mr. WHITE. Thank you, sir. Mr. EDMONDSON. Are there further questions on my right? Are there questions on my left? The gentleman from Iowa. Mr. KYL. To save time rather than asking questions, I would point out some of the inconsistencies of this report. In the paragraph on the second page there is criticism given for the rejection of the Tariff Commission recommendation or higher tariffs and in a later paragraph the statement: This would not be the answer for various reasons. There is also included here a criticism of the stockpiling program which is again later recommended. There is noted in the last paragraph also the statement that H.R. 84 could have some adverse effects, thus recognizing what one of the previous witnesses said. I think that at a later time we should examine these matters. That is all. Mr. ASPINALL. If my colleagues will yield, I think the statement. is all right, but that is what we take up when we mark up the bill. us. Mr. EDMONDSON. Are there any further questions on my left? Thank you very much, Mr. White. We are glad to have you with |