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the Irish parliament in favor of the treaty. Important features of the above record are developed in detail in the following paragraphs together with a review of the discussion to which they gave rise.

ELECTIONS. The elections for parliament were held, May 13. With the exceptions of four imperialist candidates returned for Dublin University, all the other members returned-for southern Ireland, one hundred twenty-four in number, were Sinn Feiners who had refused to take the oath of allegiance to the crown and would thus prevent the new parliament for the South of Ireland under the Government of Ireland Act from coming into existence. Among Sinn Feiners elected were: Mr. de Valera, John MacNeil, Michael Collins, Arthur Griffith. The Nationalist leader, Joseph Devlin, was also elected. Members were elected to the northern parliament on May 24.

ULSTER PARLIAMENT. The new Government of Ireland Act, described in the preceding YEAR Book, was passed by the House of Commons in December, 1920. It did not go into effect for the South of Ireland where it was denounced by the Sinn Feiners. It provided, as noted in the preceding YEAR Book, for a northern and southern parliament and for a central parliament consisting of representatives from both the North and the South. The northern or Ulster parliament came into existence in 1921, Ulster having accepted the act and held elections as above noted, May 24. Its organization took place at Belfast, June 7, under the presidency of the new viceroy, Viscount Fitzalen, formerly Lord Edmund Talbot. The ministry was as follows: Prime Minister, Sir James Craig; Home Secretary, Sir Dawson Bates; Finance, H. M. Pollock; Education, Marquis of Londonderry; Labor, J. M. Andrews; Agriculture, E. A. Archdale. R. W. A. O'Neill was elected speaker. The session of the northern parliament opened, as noted above June 22. The King in his address to the new body appealed to all Irishmen to forgive and forget and strive for conciliation and peace.

NEGOTIATIONS. Steps were taken from the beginning of the year toward an agreement between the two governments. On January 6 Michael O'Flanagan, vice-president of the Sinn Fein, held a conference with Lloyd George, and attempts to arrange a peace parley continued at intervals throughout the early part of the year. On March 7 the Irish leader, Eamonn de Valera, published a declaration which had been agreed upon at the general meeting of the Irish republican parliament and addressed to the representatives of foreign nations demanding self-determination for Ireland. After the failure of the London conference of July 14-21, noted above, negotiations began again early in August between the British government and the representatives of the so-called "Irish Republic" for the working out of some kind of settlement. The correspondence consisting of long letters from the respective parties was published in the press. It began with a letter from Jan C. Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa, August 4, in which he said that while it was to the interest of Ulster to be included under the United Ireland Constitution, yet, in view of her opposition he advised the Irish representatives to leave her out for the present. They ought to concentrate their efforts upon securing the independent constitution

for the remaining twenty-six counties, and, when this was accomplished, he believed that Ulster would eventually be drawn into the new state. On August 14 notes were made public showing the attitude of Mr. de Valera and Prime Minister Lloyd George. These showed that the British proposals dated July 26 aimed at putting an end to the present conflicts and for this purpose advocated the immediate assumption by Ireland of the status of a dominion. Along with this degree of self-government Ireland should have charge of its own taxation and finance and should possess its own courts, army for home defense, police, postal service, and organizations concerned with education, agriculture, mine, and forestry labor, etc. The British government made only these conditions: The seas around Ireland should be under the control of the Royal Navy and Irish territorial forces should be raised by Great Britain in the same proportion as the military establishments in other parts of the British Isles; no protective duties were to be adopted and Ireland was to be responsible for her share of the debt of the United Kingdom. The reply of Mr. de Valera, August 10, said that he had already declared his opinion at the London conference that the Irish parliament would not accept these proposals and he was still of this opinion. These proposals included conditions which were inconsistent with the vital principle of Irish independence, namely, absolute separation. Dominion status was an illusion, for the degree of independence enjoyed by the dominions was not the result of their legal status as dominions, but of their distance from Great Britain. As to the independence of Ulster he said that it concerned the Irish alone, but that if the problem could not be solved on that basis, he was willing to submit it to arbitration. Lloyd George replied, August 13, that no British government could compromise on the right of Ireland to secede and no such right could ever be acknowledged by it. As to referring differences to foreign arbitration, that must be squarely rejected. He said in conclusion that the government had made these proposals in a sincere desire for peace but could not go beyond them.

After the proposals in respect to Ulster_were made known Sir James Craig, the Ulster Prime Minister, set forth the Ulster position in a letter to Lloyd George. After referring to the sacrifices made by Ulster in agreeing to a parliament for Northern Ireland and saying that the Irishmen of the South had repudiated the Government of Ireland Act and were asking for wider powers, he said that Ulster must decline to interfere in the arrangement between Great Britain and South Ireland. Ulster did not stand in the way of peace, but she could not permit any interference with her parliament and her rights. There could not be any meeting between himself and Mr. de Valera until the latter recognized the direct dependence of Northern Ireland on the King and the Parliament of the United Kingdom.

The Irish republican parliament known as the Dail Eireann was formally opened at Dublin, August 16, many well-known leaders being present. Professor John MacNeill was elected Speaker. Mr. de Valera made an address in which he likened the Irish movement to the American Revolution, renewed Ireland's claim to separation and declared that the cabinet of this Irish parliament was the only government recognized by the Irish people.

The parliament went into secret session August 23 to frame a reply to the proposals of the British government. After these deliberations a letter signed by Mr. de Valera was sent to Lloyd George, August 25. This rejected the British arguments that were based on geographical propinquity, and the British claim that Ireland must subordinate herself to British military necessities, saying that if nations that have been forcibly annexed to an empire lose thereby their title to independence, there can be for them no re-birth of freedom. Ireland had not sought war, but, if war were made upon her, she would defend herself. If the British government insisted upon imposing its will by force, the responsibility for the continuance of the conflict would rest upon it. Peace could be secured on the basis of the principle that government depended on the consent of the governed. Lloyd George replied, August 26, with a denial that the British proposal involved the surrender of Ireland's national tradition. He said on the contrary under these proposals Ireland would have complete control over her own national existence and, in fact, be free in every respect of national activity of development, but Great Britain would refuse any demand for absolute independence. He likened the situation to that of the United States during the Civil War. In conclusion he said he was ready to continue negotiations in the hope of finding a basis of agreement. The Irish parliament replied to this, September 2, that the conditions which Lloyd George tried to impose would divide Ireland into two mutually destructive states. This letter brought the Ulster question into the foreground. At this serious juncture Lloyd George who was on a vacation called a cabinet meeting at Inverness, Scotland, September 2. The reply of the government was ready the same afternoon. It declared that government by consent of the governed was the basis of the British constitution, but a conference could not be based on such an interpretation of this principle as would commit the British government in advance to any demand that the Irish representatives might make. The Irish representatives would attend such a conference with a perfect right to discuss the British proposals on their merits and to raise such questions in respect to guarantees as they saw fit. To decline to discuss such a settlement was merely to repudiate all allegiance to the Crown. If that was what the Irish note meant to convey, further discussions would be of no use. Such was the course of the negotiations down to September 12. In the meanwhile the Ulster parliament maintained its firm attitude, the Speaker of the Ulster parliament saying in a public address that any diminution of the rights and privileges of the new Ulster parliament would lead to civil war. From time to time during these negotiations rioting and other disturbances occurred. For example, there were serious riots, August 21, August 29, and August 31, resulting in the killing of fifteen persons and the wounding of thirty-four. The centre of these disturbances was Belfast

SITUATION IN SEPTEMBER. Lloyd George in a message to the president of the Trades Union Congress at Cardiff indicated that he would not give way on the principle asserted in his reply of September 2 to the Irish representatives. În the same message he sought to conciliate American opinion by appealing to the authority of Lincoln to the effect that bloodshed is preferable to the

breaking up of a political organism whose unity and strength are essential to the liberty of the world. Critics were not slow to point out the great difference between the two situations and to attribute Lloyd George's interpretation of Lincoln's words as a misreading of history, for obviously there was no parallel between relations of the North to the South on the one hand and of the Irish to the English on the other. As to the opinion on the Continent, it was not won over by his phrases. Foreign critics said that on this principle Lloyd George might soon be making equally forc ible arguments on behalf of British policy in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and India. During the first part of September the situation was as follows: The British Government seemed determined to refuse any discussion of an independent and sovereign Irish republic and also to refuse to force Ulster to submit to the government of the south of Ireland. On the other hand, the Sinn Feiners were insisting not only that Ireland must be an independent republic but a united and indivisible state to which Ulster, consisting only of a minority, must submit. In the third place, Ulster in its turn was unwilling to recognize any other authority than the British crown and had established a separate government at Belfast. Even if Ireland seceded from the British Empire Ulster was determined to continue as a part of the United Kingdom. Sir James Craig, Prime Minister of Ulster, declared that it was for Mr. de Valera and the English people to come to an agreement in respect to the territory outside his own jurisdiction. When that agreement had been reached he could promise on the part of the north of Ireland a cordial coöperation on an equal footing with south Ireland. Thus there were three distinct points of view and for the time they seemed irreconcilable. The Ulster problem was difficult and the hands of Lloyd George were tied in large measure by commitments to the Ulster Unionists. In short it was a question how London could satisfy Dublin and Belfast at the same time. The Sinn Feiners fully understood this difficulty but in spite of it they remained firm and Mr. de Valera steadily refused to abandon any of his claims. Lloyd George's letter to Mr. de Valera objecting to the reference to an Irish republic proposed a new conference which should take place September 20. Pressure was brought to bear on the Sinn Feiners by many of their friends and they were urged to accept the prime minister's invitation.

THE ULSTER QUESTION. The Sinn Feiners aimed not only at an independent but a united Ireland, and this meant that Ulster must be included in it. The proceedings at the conference were not published, but it seemed evident that the main question turned on the demand of Sinn Feiners either for the inclusion of Ulster or a greater degree of independence for the rest of Ireland if Ulster were left out. It was inferred in the press that this was the basis of the bargaining between the two parties to the dispute. The main points in the Ulster situation were as follows: Geographically Ulster comprises nine counties, but politically it consists of only six. These six counties under the jurisdiction of the new northern parliament had in 1911 a total population of 1,250,531, of whom the Roman Catholics made up 35.19 per cent or 430,161. In the other three counties the Roman Catholic percentage ranged

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from 74 to 81. Now in certain parts of the six counties under the new parliament the Roman Catholic percentage is much greater. In Fermanagh the Roman Catholics numbered 34,740 out of a total of 61,836 or 56.18 per cent, and in Tyrone there were 79,015 out of a total of 142,665 or 55.39 per cent. This was a considerable area and despite its Roman Catholic majority it was handed over to the Ulster government. On the principle of self-determination the Sinn Feiners might claim that this region should be taken from Ulster and turned over to southern Ireland. In the elections to the county councils in January, 1920, Fermanagh gave of its 27 seats, 9 to Sinn Fein, 7 to Nationalists and 11 to Unionists, and Tyrone gave out of a total of 28, 14 to Sinn Fein, 3 to Nationalists and 11 to Unionists. In the rural district councils of Fermanagh and Tyrone the Sinn Feiners and Nationalists also had a majority in almost all of the districts, and the same was true of the Boards of Guardians under the Poor Law. The above is sufficient to indicate the difficulty and complexity of the situation.

In July the Prime Minister of Ulster, Sir James Craig, was invited to London for the purpose of coming to an agreement in respect to Ulster, thus implying that the acceptance by Ulster of the conditions of settlement in advance was necessary to any solution of the problem. In November, however, the situation had so far changed that the basis of settlement appeared to be an agreement between the British government and the Sinn Fein representatives to which Ulster was expected to conform. This was characterized by the Ulster partisans as a betrayal of their cause and it was said in the press that the people of Ulster would never consent to an arrangement that would turn Ireland into a dominion and Ulster into a self-governing province in that dominion. This point of view rested on the fact that Lloyd George himself had established the Ulster parliament and guaranteed its independence and its direct relation to England. He therefore was blamed for undoing his own work and breaking his engagements. The division of Ireland into two zones, however, comprising on the one hand the six counties of the north and on the other the twenty-six counties of the south, was put through by the British government in the belief that it could not actually be worked out unless both the south and the north of Ireland supported it. Moreover, it was held by the opponents of Ulster that this northern zone did not really represent the self-determination of the inhabitants for it included several districts in which Sinn Feiners were in the majority and had been determined merely by a group of politicians. It was held by these Irish sympathizers that Ulster had no just ground for refusing to reopen the matter for discussion. Much was said in favor of a solution by turning over the two counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh, the centre of the Sinn Fein majorities, to the southern section and then arranging a form of separation for the rest of Ulster. The objection to this was that in Belfast there would remain a disaffected minority of Catholics and anti-Unionists and that the causes of friction in the future would be increased. On the one hand there was the extreme view of the Sinn Feiners that the unionism of Ulster was of no political significance and on the other the extreme view of many leading English politicians since the Ulster rebellion of

1913 that Ulster must be protected as the centre of loyalty to the Empire. The Unionists of Ulster maintained that they stood for unionism with the Empire. In answer to this their opponents said that the proposed settlement involved Ireland's inclusion in the Empire and that Ulster was therefore in no danger of exclusion. If the republicans after their savage repression in 1916 were ready to accept a solution that would leave them within the Empire, it seemed unreasonable that Ulster should reject this solution. In November, it appeared that Lloyd George had so advanced in the direction of a possible understanding with the Sinn Feiners that the real obstacle that stood in his way was the irreconcilable attitude of Ulster. The general feeling in Liberal circles in other countries, especially in the United States, was that if Ulster persisted in this course, its narrow and selfish attitude ought not to stand in the way of a settlement and that in general the British government had shown altogether too much consideration for the wishes of this small minority.

The Irish

AGREEMENT IN A CONFERENCE. leader wrote, September 15, that while his people were ready to enter the conference, he felt it his duty to repeat that his nation had formally declared its independence and recognized itself as a sovereign state. To this Lloyd George replied that an acceptance on this basis would imply an official recognition by the British government of the separation of Ireland from the Empire and its existence as an independent republic. Therefore a conference on this condition must be refused. Nevertheless he left the door open for further negotiations. De Valera replied next that those whom he represented desired above all to set the conference on such a basis as would make a settlement possible, and to this Lloyd George replied, September 18 that a conference was impossible unless the words employed by De Valera in respect to Irish nationality and independence in his letter of the 12th were withdrawn, but that he was ready to meet the delegates as the representatives of the great majority in southern Ireland to discuss the association of Ireland with the British commonwealth. This brought another note from the Irish leader, September 19, in which he protested against the attitude of Lloyd George, but suggested that a properly arranged treaty would end the dispute between the two nations. Such a treaty could not be negotiated if the British Prime Minister imposed conditions which the Irish must regard as involving the surrender of their whole position. He then asked Lloyd George whether his letter of the 7th was intended to demand such a surrender. After a conference with his ministers, Lloyd George sent a note, September 29, including the following new offer: "We therefore send you herewith a fresh invitation to a conference in London on October 11. Here we can meet your delegates as the spokesmen of the people whom you represent with a view to ascertaining how the association of Ireland with the community of nations, known as the British Empire, may best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations." This was followed by a brief acceptance from Mr. de Valera, September 30. The British representatives as announced, October 7, in addition to the Prime Minister were as follows: Lord Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor; Sir Hamar Greenwood, Chief Secretary for Ireland; Austen Chamberlain, Government Leader in the House; Sir Laming Worthing

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