decided he does not care to undertake, and that the architect cannot persist in proceeding further under such conditions.24 Similarly, where a contractor has sought to compel the State to proceed with the erection of a public building, which he has been constructing under contract with the State, the specific performance of the contract on the part of the State will not be enforced, and a State statute, although involving a breach of the contract between the State and the contractor, will not, for this reason, be objectionable on the ground of unconstitutionality.25 § 36. Measure of Damages on Refusal to Complete. As to the measure of damages in a case where the defendant by requiring the plaintiff to stop work has violated his contract and thus became liable for the resultant damages to the plaintiff, such damages "would include a recompense for the labor done and materials used and such further sum in damages as might upon legal principles be assessed for the breach of the contract, but the plaintiff had no right by obstinately proceeding in the work to make the penalty upon the defendant greater than it would otherwise have been." 26 8 37. Basis of Computation of Value of Services. It remains to say a word in regard to the basis upon which the value of the architect's serv 24 Clark I 25 Lord v. Thomas, 64 N. Y. 107. 26 Clark v. Marsiglia, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 317. ices is to be determined. In the case of a definite contract, the terms thereof will be controlling and the question of what is the reasonable value of the services rendered will not arise; but where the recovery is sought upon the basis of quantum meruit, proof of what constitutes a reasonable valuation of the work done is requisite. Where it is agreed that the percentage representing the compensation of the architect is to be upon the "estimated cost," the provision is interpreted as referring to the reasonable cost of the building "erected in accordance with the plans and specifications, . . . and not necessarily the amount of some actual estimate made by a builder, nor an estimate agreed upon by the parties, nor yet an estimate or bid accepted by the defendant." 27 The architect may not prove a professional custom or usage which will entitle him to be paid a percentage based upon estimates which he has himself prepared. The determining element should be the time spent upon the work or such understanding, express or implied, as existed.28 If it be shown that the owner was fully cognizant of a custom whereby the percentage would be based upon the architect's own estimates, it seems that a modification of this rule might quite possibly be applied,29 although proof of the custom would not be allowed to vary the terms of a contract entirely specific and definite in its provisions. 29 Scott v. Maier, 56 Mich. 554, supra. 27 Lambert v. Sanford, 55 Conn. 437. 28. Scott v.Maier, 56 Mich. 554. By entering into such a contract, with a knowledge of the special customs at variance with it, the parties would be assumed to be deliberately basing their agreement on the conditions specified in the contract, and in no way upon the conditions prescribed by custom. Under the rule of quantum meruit, where the contract is silent upon the subject of compensation, the architect, as has been seen, will be entitled to a reasonable compensation.30 As to what constitutes reasonable compensation, the decisions will vary in accordance with the circumstances, and any facts which bear upon the reasonableness of the charge will be competent evidence. So, a schedule of customary charges, or proof that the owner was aware of the ordinary charges of the architect, or that the architect had shown to him, without objection on his part, a scale of his own rates of charges, or proof of the charges made for similar work by the profession in the locality where the contract is entered into and the work performed, are all competent as elements of proof on the question of what charge is reasonable. In New York it has been definitely determined that the charge schedule of the American Institute of Architects may be properly introduced as showing the customary legitimate rate of compensation allowable.31 The New York courts have likewise decided that the client is 30 Dull v. Bramhall, 49 Ill. 364; Knight v. Norris, 13 Minn. 473; Mulligan v. Mulligan, 18 La. Ann. 20. 31 Gilman V. Stevens, 54 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 197. chargeable with a knowledge of the standard and regular rates of the architect's fees, where it appears that the client has been charged the same rates by the same architect on several previous occasions.32 It may be that the architect, by some act on his part, may so change the situation as to render incompetent proof which might otherwise be competent on the point of reasonable compensation. Thus in a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, where the plaintiff and his partner, architects, had accepted salaries of $5,000 and $3,000, respectively, the one as architect and the other as chief draftsman, for preliminary work done by them, and to which they devoted their entire time, in connection with the Congressional Library, and then subsequently, upon the building of the library, claimed to be entitled to compensation for this later work on the basis of quantum meruit, the Court held that the compensation for such later work should not be determined on the basis of the schedule of charges of the American Institute, for the reason that the architects, in accepting the salaries specified, had themselves furnished a basis upon which the amount of the reasonable value of their services should be computed, and allowed them $48,000 for six years' services.33 § 38. General Suggestions.-In dealing with this whole general subject of his compensation, 38 Smithmeyer v. U. S., 147 U. S. 342. 32 Gilman V. Stevens, 54 How. Pr. N. Y. 197, supra. the architect, if he would properly protect himself, should exercise the same care to insure that matters be definitely understood and provided for which, it has been seen, it is so desirable that he should exercise in the matter of his powers and liabilities as agent. He should carefully avoid any statements or acts from which may be inferred an agreement that the building shall be erected for a definite fixed maximum cost, and should likewise avoid, where practicable, the submission of any estimate of its probable cost of construction. Where such an estimate is necessary he will do well to couple with it a direct statement to the effect that it is impossible to tell the exact amount which the building will cost, and that it must be understood that his right to his compensation must in no wise be affected by any variation between the estimated amount and the amount of the actual building cost. Especially should he be wary in accepting and undertaking work where the client stipulates, as a condition precedent to payment for services rendered, that the sketches must be satisfactory, for agreement by the architect to such a condition will render him powerless to enforce payment for his services, in the event that the sketches are not approved-unless, perhaps, he can in some way show that the client has not acted or intended to act in good faith in making the condition, and has never intended to accept the sketches under any circumstances. Where a client specifies that a certain style of |