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The courts in construing the language of the section quoted have been liberal in interpreting the meaning of the term laborer, as there applied, and have held that this term applies to skilled, as well as to unskilled, labor, and includes the professional services of architects.2

As early as January, 1879, the Court of Appeals of New York, in a case arising under a mechanic's lien law of 1862, and already referred to, stated that:

"The general principle upon which the lien laws proceed, is that any person who has contributed by his labor, or by furnishing materials to a structure erected by an owner upon his premises, shall have a claim upon the property for his compensation.

"The dealer who furnishes the paints and oils, the ordinary workman who applies them or the artist who uses his skill and taste in executing a mural painting, are alike protected by the act. And an architect who makes the plans and supervises the erection of a building is within the words and reason of the law." 3

§ 81. Importance of Superintendence.-The decisions in the various States bearing upon the right of the architect to the benefits of the lien laws vary considerably, according, largely, to the tendencies of the various jurisdictions in regard to lien legislation. But there is one very general element which will be found to exist in the ma

2 Rinn v. Electrical Power Co., 3 N. Y. A. D. 305; Thomson-Starrett Co. v. Brooklyn Heights Realty Co., 111 N. Y. A. D. 358; Stryker v. Cassidy,

76 N. Y. 50, reversing 10 Hun. (N. Y.) 18.

8 Stryker v. Cassidy, 76 N. Y. 50, supra.

jority of the cases where liens have been allowed, and that is the element of superintendence. In a great number of cases decided in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and in the Federal jurisdiction this element is found in each instance. In all of the cases last cited the lien of the architect was upheld, but in all, as noted, the element of superintendence was present. In some instances an exception to the general rule has been applied and the lien of the architect has been allowed where superintendence was lacking; but again, even where the architect has prepared plans and specifications and given general directions to the builder, where it appears that the building has been erected under the special superintendence of the builder, a lien has been refused. Where there occurs a change of ownership of the property in connection with which the work is done, and it is agreed by the new owner that certain additional work shall be done under the supervision of the architect of the building, the lat

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Hubert v. Aitken, 15 Daly (N. Y.) 237; Stryker v. Cassidy, 76 N. Y. 50; and see Gurney v. Atlantic, etc., Co., 58 N. Y. 358, distinguishing Ericsson v. Browne, 38 Barb. (N. Y.) 390; Mutual Benefit, etc., Co. v. Rowand, 26 N. J. Eq. 389, reversed on other grounds, 12 C. E. Green (N. J.) 604. Bank of Penn. v. Gries, 35 Pa. St. 423; Phoenix Furniture, etc., Co. v. Put-In Bay Hotel Co., 66 Fed. 683; Johnson v. McClure, 10 N. M.

506; Arnoldi V. Gouin, 22 Grant's Chan. (Ontario) 314; Taylor v. Gilsdorff, 74 Ill. 354; Knight v. Norris, 13 Minn. 473; Friedlander v. Taintor, 14 N. D. (104 N. W. 527), 393; Field v. Consolidated Water Co., 25 R. I. 319; Von Dorn v. Mengedoht, 41 Neb. 525; Mulligan v. Mulligan, 18 La. Ann. 21.

"Freeman v. Rinaker, 185 Ill. 172; Henry, etc., Co. v. Halter, 58 Neb. 685.

Raeder v. Pensberg, 6 Mo. App. 445.

ter having given his services to this work, is rightly held to be entitled to a lien, irrespective of the transfer of title to the building."

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§ 82. The New York Doctrine.-In New York it has been definitely determined that the architect is not entitled to a mechanic's lien for the preparation and furnishing of plans and specifications, unless, in addition, he superintend the work done thereunder. Where, however, the architect does superintend the work, done pursuant to the plans and specifications which he has prepared, it is now the clearly established doctrine of the New York courts that he will be allowed to recover, not merely for the work done in his capacity as superintendent, but for the preparation of the plans and specifications as well. For his disbursements

'Libbey v. Tidden, 192 Mass.

175.

8 Swasey v. Granite, etc., Co., 158 N. Y. A. D. 549; Rinn v. Electric Power Co., 3 App. Div. (N. Y.) 305, distinguishing Stryker v. Cassidy, 76 N. Y. 50, which in turn distinguished Aitken v. Wasson, 24 N. Y. 482, and Coffin v. Reynolds, 37 N. Y. 640, and reversed Stryker v. Cassidy in the court below, IO Hun. (N. Y.) 18; Aimes v. Dyer, 41 Me. 397, where an architect sued for the value of work performed in preparing a set of moulds for the construction of a ship, and for materials used in such construction, and the court held that under

the Maine statute allowing a lien for materials furnished and labor performed, a prepared plan of a house, or a model of a ship, or a mould by which the ship's timbers were to be formed, did not enter into the structure in such manner that they could be regarded as falling within the terms of the statute-and see Bank v. Gries, 35 Pa. St. 423.

• Embury v. 42d St. & Madison Ave. Co. et al., N. Y. L. J. April 16th, 1915; Spannhake v. Mountain Construction Co. et al., 159 A. D. (N. Y.) 727; and see Swasey v. Granite, etc., Co., 158 A. D. (N. Y.) 549, supra.

and expenses incidental to superintendence the architect may recover in full.10

Where plans and specifications for a proposed building are prepared, and these preliminary plans are thereafter abandoned and the building erected pursuant to other plans and specifications, no lien will attach for the preparation of the abandoned plans and specifications.

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§ 83. The Massachusetts Doctrine.-One of the clearest expositions of the doctrine that while the architect may have a lien for labor performed by him in supervising the erection of a building, yet his lien will not extend to labor performed in the preparation of plans and specifications, is to be found in the opinion of former Chief Justice Knowlton of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, delivered when he was an Associate Justice of that court, of which Mr. Justice Holmes, now of the Supreme Court of the United States, was likewise at that time a member. The Massachusetts statute provided that a lien might be had for "labor performed or furnished . . . and actually used in the erection" of the building, and Judge Knowlton said:

"The questions presented by this case are, first, whether an architect, who has drawn plans and prepared specifications for the construction of five houses under a contract to draw the plans and specifications and supervise the construction of the houses, and who has supervised the construction of one of the houses until it was about

10 Rinn v. Electric etc., Co., 3 A. D. (N. Y.) 305, supra.

11 Buckingham v. Flummerfelt, 15 N. Dak. 112.

half completed, and supervised the work of putting in the foundations of two of the others, involving an expenditure of about forty dollars upon one and about fifteen dollars upon the other, can have a lien under the Pub. Sts. c. 191, for the whole amount due him; and secondly, if he can not, whether he can have a lien for the value of his services in supervising the work upon the buildings, considered apart from the preparation of the plans and specifications.

"The Statutes of the different States in regard to mechanics liens differ materially in their provisions, and the cases show a considerable conflict of authority upon the questions before us. But we are of opinion that, under statutes similar to ours, the weight of judicial opinion is in favor of holding that the services of an architect in preparing plans and specifications for a building are not the kind of labor intended to be protected by the statute, and, on the other hand, that services upon a building in supervising the work of construction enters directly into the construction so as fairly to be called 'labor performed or furnished . . . and actually used in the erection' of a building, within the meaning of these words in § 1 of the Statute above cited. It is also generally held that the fact that one who does such work is an architect does not prevent him from recovering for this kind of service, which is often performed by an intelligent mechanic. This is the doctrine of the highest court in Pennsylvania, where the provisions of the statute are similar to ours. (Price v. Kirk, 90 Penn. St. 47; Rush v. Able, 90 Penn. St. 153; Bank of Pennsylvania v. Gries, 35 Penn. St. 423.) Under a like statute in Missouri, it was held in Raeder v. Bensberg, 6 Mo. App. 445, that the services of an architect 'in drawing plans and specifications and giving directions to the builder under whose special superintendence the house is being erected, can not be called, in any proper sense of the words, "work or labor upon the building." A similar decision was made

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