interpretation of the New York court, does not forbid an assertion of the usury. Merchants' Exch. Nat. Bank v. Commercial Warehouse Co. (1872) 49 N. Y. 635, reversing (1871) 1 Jones & S. 317. But in Illinois it is held that the statute applies although the corporation was not a borrower or in any respect a party to the usurious transaction. Union Nat. Bank v. International Bank (1887) 22 Ill. App. 652, affirmed in (1888) 123 Ill. 510, 14 N. E. 859, citing Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Hadden (Ill.) supra. Representatives of corporations. The receiver of a corporation, it has been held, is precluded by the statute from setting up usury. Dorothy V. Commonwealth Commercial Co. (1917) 278 Ill. 629, L.R.A.1917E, 1110, 116 N. E. 143, affirming (1916) 198 Ill. App. 601; Ovsiovitch v. Federal Tool & Mfg. Co. (1923) 94 N. J. Eq. 744, 121 Atl. 611, reversing (1922) 94 N. J. Eq. 85, 119 Atl. 2; Felin v. Arrow Motor Mach. Co. (1924) 96 N. J. Eq. 44, 124 Atl. 448; Curtis v. Leavitt (1857) 15 N. Y. 86; Butterworth v. O'Brien (1861) 23 N. Y. 275, affirming (1858) 28 Barb. 187. "By the letter of the act, corporations alone are forbidden to interpose the defense. But the assignees or representatives of a corporation should be regarded as within its spirit; and, therefore, the act is so construed that the receiver of a corporation, who represents both it and its creditors, and as a general rule may allege on behalf of the latter what the corporation is estopped from asserting, can neither defend its obligations on the ground of usury (Curtis v. Leavitt (1857) 15 N. Y. 230), nor pursue and recover, for the benefit of the creditors, the excessive interest which the corporation may have paid (Butterworth v. O'Brien (1858) 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 187, affirmed in (1861) 23 N. Y. 275)." Rosa v. Butterfield (1865) 33 N. Y. 668. Creditors of corporations. Creditors of a corporation may not plead that a mortgage given by it is usurious and void as against them be cause bonds .secured thereby were sold at a discount below the legal rate of interest. "The statute is for the protection of the lender to corporations; and this purpose would be thwarted if his security could be detroyed by a defense of usury interposed by creditors, as much as if that defense were allowed to be interposed by the corporation itself." The Vigilancia (1895; D. C.) 68 Fed. 781 (construing New York statute). And a junior mortgagee of corporation may not attack the claim of senior mortgage creditors, because the mortgagor corporation was precluded from doing so by the statute at the time of the execution of the junior mortgage. Lembeck v. Jarvis Terminal Cold Storage Co. (1906) 70 N. J. Eq. 757, 64 Atl. 126. Persons liable collaterally. As to the right of a guarantor or surety of a corporation to set up the defense of usury where the corporation is prevented by statute from doing so, see 6 A.L.R. 586. V. Extraterritorial operation of statute. By the statute all corporations, whether foreign or domestic, are debarred from setting up usury in the forum of the statute, regardless of where the contract is made or of the lex loci by which it is to be governed. Freese v. Brownell (1871) 35 N. J. L. 285, 10 Am. Rep. 239 (giving effect to New York statute and decisions); Southern L. Ins. & T. Co. v. Packer (1858) 17 N. Y. 51; Rosa v. Butterfield (1865) 33 N. Y. 674. If the law of the place of performance of the contract of a corporation is to govern, and such place in a given case is the forum of the statute, the court of a foreign jurisdiction will give effect to the statute. Lyon v. Ewings (1863) 17 Wis. 62 (New York statute). The statute has been held to apply in case of a suit on bonds of a corporation payable in the state of the statute, although the suit is instituted in a foreign jurisdiction. Junction R. Co. v. Bank of Ashland (1871) 12 Wall. (U. S.) 226, 20 L. ed. 385 (New York statute). The same has been held to be true of a suit upon a note made by a corporation. Lane v. Watson (1889) 51 N. J. L. 186, 17 Atl. 117, affirmed in (1890) 52 N. J. L. 550, 10 L.R.A. 784, 20 Atl. 894 (New York statute); United Divers Supply Co. v. Commercial Credit Co. (1923; C. C. A. 5th) 289 Fed. 316 (Maryland statute). A somewhat contrary view has, however, been taken in Craven v. Atlantic & N. C. R. Co. (1877) 77 N. C. 289, wherein the court said: "It is said, however, for the defendants that these bonds were delivered in New York, and are made payable there, and that consequently they are governed by the law of New York in respect to the rate of interest which they may legally be made to bear, and we are referred to a statute of New York by which corporations are forbidden to plead usury as a defense. It will be admitted that the statutes of the states can have no extraterritorial operation. The act cited cannot and does not profess to control corporations other than those created by the law of New York; or if it be regarded as an act regulating the practice of the courts of New York, it might, perhaps, apply to corporations created by a foreign state when sued in the courts of that state. It cannot govern a corporation of this state sued in this state." It is to be observed, however, that the court held the bonds in suit to evidence a North Carolina contract, See also M. Lowenstein & Sons v. British-American Mfg. Co. (1924; D. C.) 300 Fed. 853, reversed on ground that no usury was shown in (1925; C. C. A. 2d) 7 F. (2d) 51. But the statute is not operative in a suit against a corporation of the jurisdiction of the statute, which is brought in a foreign jurisdiction on a contract of the latter jurisdiction. M. Lowenstein & Sons v. BritishAmerican Mfg. Co. (Fed.) supra; Stack v. Detour Lumber & Cedar Co. (1908) 151 Mich. 21, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 616, 114 N. W. 876, 14 Ann. Cas. 112. VI. Effect of statute in equity. Where it appears that one or more of the managers of the corporation voting for the usurious transaction were interested therein, a court of equity may, notwithstanding the statute, set the transaction aside on the ground that it is oppressive and unjust. Higgins v. Lansingh (1895) 154 Ill. 369, 40 N. E. 362. But where there is no connection shown between the corporation's management and the creditor, a stockholder cannot maintain an action to set aside a usurious transaction entered into by the corporation, under a statute denying the defense of usury to corporations. MacQuoid v. Queens Estates (1911) 143 App. Div. 134, 127 N. Y. Supp. 867; Scheidell v. Llewellyn Realty Co. (1918) 177 N. Y. Supp. 529. T. A. M. Nuisances, § 3-dwelling house 241 Pac. 367.) spite. A dwelling house placed by the owner upon his residence lots for legitimate and profitable improvement of the same and for a lawful purpose is not subject to abatement as a private nuisance, merely because it detracts from the desirability of adjoining dwellings and obstructs the view of their occupants, even though its exact location upon such lots may have been chosen through spite. [See annotation on this question beginning on page 27.] Headnote by BUDGE, J. APPEAL by defendant from a judgment of the District Court for Bannock County (Baum, J.) in favor of plaintiff in an action brought to abate a private nuisance. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Mr. Walter H. Anderson, for appellant: A private dwelling house cannot be a nuisance. Quintini v. Bay St. Louis, 64 Miss. 483, 60 Am. Rep. 62, 1 So. 625. A building that is merely unsightly and located in a residence district is not a nuisance. Acme Fertilizer Co. v. State, 107 Am. St. Rep. 232, note. An owner may erect on his own premises anywhere he likes, for useful purposes, though done maliciously. Kuzniak v. Koxminski, 107 Mich. 444, 61 Am. St. Rep. 344, 65 N. W. 275; Letts v. Kessler, 54 Ohio St. 73, 40 L.R.A. 177, 42 N. E. 765; Pickard v. Collins, 23 Barb. 458; Dawson v. Kemper, 32 Ohio L. J. 15; Jenkins v. Fowler, 24 Pa. 308. A man may erect on his own proper ty structures, even though he acts maliciously, and if it otherwise is not a nuisance, the state of mind cannot make it so. Phelps v. Nowlen, 72 N. Y. 39, 28 Am. Rep. 93; Anthony Wilkinson Live Stock Co. v. Mcllquam, 14 Wyo. 209, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 733, 83 Pac. 364; Falloon v. Schilling, 29 Kan. 295, 44 Am. Rep. 642; Metzger v. Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267, 50 L.R.A. 305, 81 Am. St. Rep. 841, 83 N. W. 308; Jones v. Williams, 56 Wash. 588, 106 Pac. 167; Bordeaux v. Greene, 22 Mont. 255, 74 Am. St. Rep. 600, 56 Pac. 218; 20 R. C. L. § 45, p. 430. Messrs. Finis Bentley and H. B. Thompson for respondent. Budge, J., delivered the opinion of the court: This is an action to abate a private nuisance. As the facts upon which the injunction is sought, the complaint alleges that Sixth avenue south, in Pocatello, is a street devoted exclusively to neatly kept residences, with the east front of all houses on the west side of the street located approximately 25 or 30 feet back from the sidewalk line; in block 266 respondent is the owner of lots 1 and 2, the south half of lot 5, and all of lot 6, on the west side of the street, and had erected upon lot 6 and the part of lot 5 a There are also allegations in the (— Idaho, —, 241 Pac. 367.) placed and of appellant's refusal to reach an agreement with respondent to sell the same. Further allegations recite that, due to certain business transactions, appellant in placing the frame building on his premises was prompted to do so by reason of malice and ill will, for the sole purpose of injuring the respondent in the lawful use of his property, and that the location of said building by appellant upon the lots above described was done with the intent and for the purpose that the same should be offensive to the senses of any one purchasing or occupying respondent's building on the adjoining lot, and be an obstruction to the comfortable and free use and enjoyment of the same. The location by the appellant of his building on said lot would in fact be without any benefit or advantage to appellant, and would greatly reduce both the rental value and the sale value of respondent's building. The complaint further alleges that the respondent has no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law, and concludes with a prayer that an injunction issue enjoining and restraining the appellant from locating or continuing to maintain said building on said lot, and, pending the final determination and decision of said cause, that the defendant be restrained and enjoined from further proceeding with the permanent location and construction of his building. An injunction was issued by the trial court, a motion thereafter filed seeking its dissolution, which was denied. To the complaint a demurrer was filed which was overruled. Appellant thereafter answered admitting ownership of the respondent in the lots as alleged in the complaint, and ownership in himself of the lots upon which he also admits the frame building is located, and that he placed the same thereon as alleged in the complaint, but denies that he did so by reason of ill will toward the respondent or for the purpose of revenge, or at sacrifice of his own best interests, or that the respondent would be damaged or injured thereby. The cause was tried to the court, judgment was had in favor of the respondent perpetually enjoining the appellant, his agents, servants, attorneys, and employees, and all persons succeeding to appellant's rights in the premises, from proceeding with the erection or maintenance of the house or building on the lot heretofore referred to except in such position that it will be at the same distance back from the street line as other houses situated on the same side of the street in said block on each side of the appellant's premises, or from constructing, locating, or maintaining the same in such manner or position except that when finally located it will be at such distance back from the street line. Appellant was further required within thirty days from the date of the entry of the judgment to relocate the house at a point generally speaking on a line with the houses on the same side of the street in the same block, and to so construct it that it is not offensive to the sight or senses of the persons adjacent to the said premises on either side thereof, or of others. From this judgment this appeal is prosecuted. Coming to the question of what is a nuisance and whether the appellant has created a nuisance such as respondent is entitled to have abated, we are first met by the general doctrine that every man may regulate, improve, and control his own property, may make such erections as his own judgment, taste, or interest may suggest, and be master of his own without dictation or interference by his neighbors, so long as the use to which he devotes his property is not in violation of the rights of others, however much damage they may sustain therefrom. It is alleged in the complaint, and supported by proof in the record, that approximately 50 per cent of the value of the respondent's building lies in its location on an attractive residence street, and that re spondent would be damaged in the sum of $1,500 should appellant be permitted to maintain the building upon his lot. Damages such as alleged and testified to are not of such a character as would warrant abatement of the building or support a permanent injunction against the owner denying him the right to complete the same as his business judgment or finances may dictate. The rule seems to be well settled that "a landowner may erect upon his land the smallest or most temporary kind of a dwelling house in close proximity to the finest mansion, and that for the mere sake of spiting the owner of such mansion ... by the contrast, without becoming subject to restraint at the hands of the courts. In other words, if the improvement itself is legitimate and lawful, it is not per se a nuisance; the law will not inquire into the motives" of the party. Falloon v. Schilling, 29 Kan. 295, 44 Am. Rep. 642. Before the question of motive can be gone into, or, at least, before it can be allowed to have any bearing upon the result, the unlawful character of the act complained of must be established. From the record in this case it appears that the building was located entirely upon the lot of the appellant, that it was being placed there to be used as a residence, that in its location and construction and use there would be nothing injurious to the health or morals, indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of the property of the respondent, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property; therefore it would not be a nuisance falling within the provisions of Comp. Stat. § 6420. The fact that it is unsightly or out of harmony in construction with adjacent buildings, and therefore not pleasing to the eye, would not make it offensive to the senses within the meaning of Comp. Stat. § 6420, so as to warrant a holding that the building is a nuisance within the terms of that statute and subject to abate ment. Crossman v. Galveston, 112 Tex. 303, 26 A.L.R. 1210, 247 S. W. 810. The building in no way interferes with the right of ingress or egress to the property of the respondent and in no manner encroaches upon it so as to interfere with its comfortable enjoyment, nor does it endanger the lives of the inhabitants thereof. We do not think that the cases cited by appellant, Sweet v. Ballentyne, 8 Idaho, 431, 69 Pac. 995; Hunter v. Wood, 277 Pa. 150, 120 Atl. 781; Kobielski v. Belle Isle East Side Creamery Co. 222 Mich. 656, 31 A.L.R. 183, 193 N. W. 214; and other cases along the same line, are in point, for the reason that it is not shown in the record that by reason of the location and completion of appellant's building, conditions would result paralleling those complained of in the cases relied upon. Neither do we think that it would fall within that class of cases where mining activities have been enjoined as nuisances within a residential section, or where creamery plants have been held to be nuisances where located within a residence district by reason of the noises at night from the movement of vehicles, the clinking of cans and bottles, and the loud talking of men, thereby depriving the occupants of sleep and rest, or in that class of cases that enjoin and declare to be a nuisance morgues, undertaking parlors, and the like. The record does not justify the conclusion that appellant seeks maliciously to use the building to the injury of the respondent, and for no benefit or advantage to himself, and we are therefore of the opinion that the case of Hibbard v. Halliday, 58 Okla. 244, L.R.A.1916F, 903, 158 Pac. 1158, is not controlling. that case it appeared that the defendant constructed and maintained a high brick wall on the line between adjoining lots without advantage or benefit to himself in any legitimate manner, but erected and maintained it for the sole purpose of maliciously injuring the plaintiff in and about In |