the executive duty expressly imposed on him by the Constitution of taking care that the laws be faithfully executed, the power at any and all times of removing from office all executive officers for cause to be judged of by the President alone. This respondent had, in pursuance of the Constitution, required the opinion of each principal officer of the Executive Departments upon this question of constitutional executive power and duty, and had been advised by each of them, including the said Stanton, Secretary for the Department of War, that under the Constitution of the United States this power was lodged by the Constitution in the President of the United States, and that, consequently, it could be lawfully exercised by him, and the Congress could not deprive him thereof; and this respondent, in his capacity of President of the United States, and because in that capacity he was both enabled and bound to use his best judgment upon this question, did, in good faith and with an earnest desire to arrive at the truth, come to the conclusion and opinion, and did make the same known to the honorable the Senate of the United States by a message dated on the 2d day of March, 1867 (a true copy whereof is hereunto annexed and marked A), that the power last mentioned was conferred and the duty of exercising it in fit cases was imposed on the President by the Constitution of the United States, and that the President could not be deprived of this power or relieved of this duty, nor could the same be vested by law in the President and the Senate jointly, either in part or whole; and this has ever since remained and was the opinion of this respondent at the time when he was forced as aforesaid to consider and decide what act or acts should and might lawfully be done by this respondent, as President of the United States, to cause the said Stanton to surrender the said office.

This respondent was also then aware that by the first section of “An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," passed March 2, 1867, by a constitutional majority of both Houses of Congress, it was enacted as follows:

That every person holding any civil office to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office and shall become duly qualified to act therein, is and shall be entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed and duly qualified, except as herein otherwise provided: Provided, That the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster-General, and the Attorney-General shall hold their offices, respectively, for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed and one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

This respondent was also aware that this act was understood and intended to be an expression of the opinion of the Congress by which that act was passed that the power to remove executive officers for cause might by law be taken from the President and vested in him and the Senate jointly; and although this respondent had arrived at and still

retained the opinion above expressed, and verily believed, as he still believes, that the said first section of the last-mentioned act was and is wholly inoperative and void by reason of its conflict with the Constitution of the United States, yet, inasmuch as the same had been enacted by the constitutional majority in each of the two Houses of that Congress, this respondent considered it to be proper to examine and decide whether the particular case of the said Stanton, on which it was this respondent's duty to act, was within or without the terms of that first section of the act, or, if within it, whether the President had not the power, according to the terms of the act, to remove the said Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War; and having, in his capacity of President of the United States, so examined and considered, did form the opinion that the case of the said Stanton and his tenure of office were not affected by the first section of the last-named act.

And this respondent, further answering, says that although a case thus existed which, in his judgment, as President of the United States, called for the exercise of the executive power to remove the said Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War; and although this respondent was of opinion, as is above shown, that under the Constitution of the United States the power to remove the said Stanton from the said office was vested in the President of the United States; and although this respondent was also of the opinion, as is above shown, that the case of the said Stanton was not affected by the first section of the last-nained act; and although each of the said opinions had been formed by this respondent upon an actual case, requiring him, in his capacity of President of the United States, to come to some judgment and determination thereon, yet this respondent, as President of the United States, desired and determined to avoid, if possible, any question of the construction and effect of the said first section of the last-named act, and also the broader question of the executive power conferred upon the President of the United States by the Constitution of the United States to remove one of the principal officers of one of the Executive Departments for cause seeming to him sufficient; and this respondent also desired and determined that if, from causes over which he could exert no control, it should become absolutely necessary to raise and have in some way determined either or both of the said last-named questions, it was in accordance with the Constitution of the United States, and was required of the President thereby, that questions of so much gravity and importance, upon which the legislative and executive departments of the Government had disagreed, which involved powers considered by all branches of the Government, during its entire history down to the year 1867, to have been confided by the Constitution of the United States to the President, and to be necessary for the complete and proper execution of his constitutional duties, should be in some proper way submitted to that judicial department of the Government intrusted by the Constitution with the power, and subjected by it to the

duty, not only of determining finally the construction and effect of all acts of Congress, but of comparing them with the Constitution of the United States and pronouncing them inoperative when found in conflict with that fundamental law which the people have enacted for the government of all their servants. And to these ends, first, that through the action of the Senate of the United States the absolute duty of the President to substitute some fit person in place of Mr. Stanton as one of his advisers, and as a principal subordinate officer whose official conduct he was responsible for and had lawful right to control, might, if possible, be accomplished without the necessity of raising any one of the questions aforesaid; and, second, if this duty could not be so performed, then that these questions, or such of them as might necessarily arise, should be judicially determined in manner aforesaid, and for no other end or purpose, this respondent, as President of the United States, on the 12th day of August, 1867, seven days after the reception of the letter of the said Stanton of the 5th of August, hereinbefore stated, did issue to the said Stanton the order following, namely:

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON,

Secretary of War.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, August 12, 1867.

SIR: By virtue of the power and authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, you are hereby suspended from office as Secretary of War, and will cease to exercise any and all functions pertaining to the same.

You wil at once tran-fer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, all records, books, papers, and other public property now in your custody and charge.

To which said order the said Stanton made the following reply:

The PRESIDENT.

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington City, August 12, 1867.

SIR: Your note of this date has been received, informing me that by virtue of the powers vested in you as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States I am suspended from office as Secretary of War, and will cease to exercise any and all functions pertaining to the same; and also directing me at once to transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, all records, books, papers, and other public property now in my custody and charge.

Under a sense of public duty, I am compelled to deny your right under the Con stitution and laws of the United States, without the advice and consent of the Senate and without legal cause, to suspend me from office as Secretary of War, or the exercise of any or all functions pertaining to the same, or without such advice and consent to compel me to transfer to any person the records, books, papers, and public property in my custody as Secretary.

But inasmuch as the General Commanding the armies of the United States has been appointed ad interim, and has notified me that he has accepted the appointment, I have no alternative but to submit, under protest, to superior force.

And this respondent, further answering, says that it is provided in and by the second section of "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices" that the President may suspend an officer from the performance

of the duties of the office held by him, for certain causes therein designated, until the next meeting of the Senate and until the case shall be acted on by the Senate; that this respondent, as President of the United States, was advised, and he verily believed, and still believes, that the executive power of removal from office confided to him by the Constitution as aforesaid includes the power of suspension from office at the pleasure of the President; and this respondent, by the order aforesaid, did suspend the said Stanton from office, not until the next meeting of the Senate or until the Senate should have acted upon the case, but, by force of the power and authority vested in him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, indefinitely and at the pleasure of the President; and the order, in form aforesaid, was made known to the Senate of the United States on the 12th day of December, A. D. 1867, as will be more fully hereinafter stated.

And this respondent, further answering, says that in and by the act of February 13, 1795, it was, among other things, provided and enacted that in case of vacancy in the office of Secretary for the Department of War it shall be lawful for the President, in case he shall think it necessary, to authorize any person to perform the duties of that office until a successor be appointed or such vacancy filled, but not exceeding the term of six months; and this respondent, being advised and believing that such law was in full force and not repealed, by an order dated August 12, 1867, did authorize and empower Ulysses S. Grant, General of the armies of the United States, to act as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim, in the form in which similar authority had theretofore been given, not until the next meeting of the Senate and until the Senate should act on the case, but at the pleasure of the President, subject only to the limitation of six months in the said last-mentioned act contained; and a copy of the last-named order was made known to the Senate of the United States on the 12th day of December, A. D. 1867, as will be hereinafter more fully stated; and in pursuance of the design and intention aforesaid, if it should become necessary, to submit the said questions to a judicial determination, this respondent, at or near the date of the last-mentioned order, did make known such his purpose to obtain a judicial decision of the said questions, or such of them as might be necessary.

And this respondent, further answering, says that in further pursuance of his intention and design, if possible, to perform what he judged to be his imperative duty, to prevent the said Stanton from longer holding the office of Secretary for the Department of War, and at the same time avoiding, if possible, any question respecting the extent of the power of removal from executive office confided to the President by the Constitution of the United States, and any question respecting the construction and effect of the first section of the said "Act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," while he should not by any act of his abandon and relinquish either a power which he believed the Constitution had con

ferred on the President of the United States to enable him to perform the duties of his office or a power designedly left to him by the first section of the act of Congress last aforesaid, this respondent did, on the 12th day of December, 1867, transmit to the Senate of the United States a message, a copy whereof is hereunto annexed and marked B, wherein he made known the orders aforesaid and the reasons which had induced the same, so far as this respondent then considered it material and necessary that the same should be set forth, and reiterated his views concerning the constitutional power of removalvested in the President, and also expressed his views concerning the construction of the said first section of the lastmentioned act, as respected the power of the President to remove the said Stanton from the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, well hoping that this respondent could thus perform what he then believed, and still believes, to be his imperative duty in reference to the said Stanton without derogating from the powers which this respondent believed were confided to the President by the Constitution and laws, and without the necessity of raising judicially any questions respecting the same.

And this respondent, further answering, says that this hope not having been realized, the President was compelled either to allow the said Stanton to resume the said office and remain therein contrary to the settled convictions of the President, formed as aforesaid, respecting the powers confided to him and the duties required of him by the Constitution of the United States, and contrary to the opinion formed as aforesaid that the first section of the last-mentioned act did not affect the case of the said Stanton, and contrary to the fixed, belief of the President that he could no longer advise with or trust or be responsible for the said Stanton in the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, or else he was compelled to take such steps as might in the judgment of the President be lawful and necessary to raise for a judicial decision the questions affecting the lawful right of the said Stanton to resume the said office or the power of the said Stanton to persist in refusing to quit the said office if he should persist in actually refusing to quit the same; and to this end, and to this end only, this respondent did, on the 21st day of February, 1868, issue the order for the removal of the said Stanton, in the said first article mentioned and set forth, and the order authorizing the said Lorenzo Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad interim, in the said second article set forth.

And this respondent, proceeding to answer specifically each substantial allegation in the said first article, says: He denies that the said Stanton, on the 21st day of February, 1868, was lawfully in possession of the said office of Secretary for the Department of War. He denies that the said Stanton, on the day last mentioned, was lawfully entitled to hold the said office against the will of the President of the United States. He denies that the said order for the removal of the said Stanton was unlawfully issued. He denies that the said order was issued with intent to violate the act entitled