ment agreement, Timken similarly does not believe that it is in the US's interest to negotiate an investment agreement within the WTO. Finally, Timken supports technical assistance to developing country members to assist them to come into conformity with WTO obligations but believes that all countries that are not in compliance should be required to provide periodic reports on efforts being undertaken to bring themselves into compliance.

Sincerely,

LARRY R. BROWN

Statement of Torrington Company, Torrington, Connecticut Founded in 1866 at Torrington, Connecticut, as a maker of sewing machine needles, The Torrington Company is now a leading worldwide producer of high-quality, precision bearings and motion control components and assemblies. The largest U.S.owned full-line producer of antifriction bearings, Torrington is a subsidiary of Ingersoll-Rand Company. Torrington is a key supplier to the motor vehicle industry, the machine tool industry and the aerospace industry. The company has an extensive network of 25 manufacturing plants in North and South America, Europe and Asia and more than 11,000 employees. More than 50 offices are located in strategic cities around the globe, with corporate headquarters situated in Torrington, Connecticut. The Torrington Company, in 1998, was a recipient of the first annual Quest for Excellence award presented by Automotive Industries (AI), a leading industry publication. In addition, subscribers of Machine Design and American Machinist magazines voted Torrington one of America's leading manufacturing technology companies in the 1998 Excellence in Manufacturing Technology Achievement Awards. Torrington's comments focus on a number of issues previously identified by the United States Representative as relevant to the upcoming Ministerial meeting.

I. IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND WORK PROGRAMS

A. Full Implementation and Notification

Torrington agrees with the position of the United States and other WTO members that full and effective implementation of the Agreements concluded in the Uruguay Round should be a top priority for the WTO and the agenda that Ministers will consider in November 1999. WT/GC/W/107, 26 October 1998, Communication from the United States. For a discussion of Torrington's concerns with particular agreements, see section III, infra.

II. MANDATED NEGOTIATIONS

Torrington supports efforts to obtain liberalization in the service industry, including repair and maintenance services, financial services, telecommunication services, transport services generally, express integrated transportation services, distribution services and transport services generally. In general, liberalization in these sectors will decrease the costs of doing business abroad and thus is expected to help Torrington and other U.S. exporters to achieve better access to export markets. In addition, repair and maintenance of bearings is an integral part of the bearing business, hence, liberalization efforts in this sector would likely benefit Torrington directly.

In addition, Torrington has urged USTR to continue efforts to improve market access for U.S. producers in important export markets, particularly Japan. See also, infra, Section VI.A (industrial market access).

III. REVIEWS OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND WORK PROGRAMS

A. Antidumping

Torrington has urged USTR to oppose the proposals by several countries seeking a general reopening of negotiations on either the subsidies or the antidumping agreement. The agreements, achieved after difficult negotiations, have been in place for less then five years. Hence, such reopening is premature. In any event, any controversies should first be handled through the already established dispute settlement procedures. USTR should focus the attention of the members and the organization on remaining implementation and notification failures. Moreover, member nations have not accomplished agreement on addressing circumvention problems as called for by the Marrakesh decisions. US focus in antidumping should be limited

to the above and should oppose any reopening of the agreement. See, WT/GC/W/145, 18 February 1999, Communication of the Government of Japan.

B. Subsidies

Torrington agrees with suggestions of the United States and some other Members of the WTO that implementation of the Subsidies agreement could be improved by modifying the notification/review process such that updating notifications are eliminated and full notifications are made every other year, permitting a regular cycle in which subsidies are notified in the first year and reviewed in the second, etc.. WT/GC/W/107, 3 November 1998, Communication from the United States.

Article 31 of the Subsidies agreement calls for the WTO to review the operation of Article 6.1 (serious prejudice), and Articles 8 and 9 (non-actionable subsidies), and determine whether these articles should be eliminated. Torrington supports the continuation of these articles.

Torrington further agrees that tighter rules should be developed to preclude the circumvention of export subsidy commitments so that there is a fully shared understanding of what is permitted and precluded by commitments on export subsidies. C. Customs Valuation

Torrington agrees with USTR's efforts to improve technical assistance, by focusing on active assessment of specific needs of particular Members. Such efforts are particularly relevant in the context of efforts to bring about full integration of all Members in the world trading system, including developing countries. However, Torrington is concerned that many nations have not brought themselves into compliance only four months ahead of the required timeline. The US should encourage full compliance by January 1, 2000.

D. Dispute Settlement

Torrington generally supports efforts to increase transparency in the dispute settlement process. In this context, Torrington suggested to USTR that all submissions in a dispute settlement proceeding, including submissions by NGOs, be made available to the public. Finally, Torrington understands that review of the DSU process is focused on two principal issues: the appropriateness of remands for further factual information; and the clarification of Article 21 and 22 in light of recent panel experience. In this context, to the extent any modifications to the dispute settlement process are considered, Torrington is concerned that such modification would not affect the existing timelines, thus delaying relief.

E. Rules of Origin

Torrington understands that the work of the Technical Committee has not been able to resolve a number of disagreements among the Members. In this context, Torrington has urged USTR to take the position that these issues should not become a matter of negotiation in the new Round, but should be discussed separately.

F. Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

Torrington supported and continues to support USTR's efforts to promote effective technical assistance, such as the joint initiative announced by WTO and WIPO. WT/ GC/W/107, 3 November 1998, Communication from the United States. As stated before, such efforts are particularly relevant in the context of efforts to bring about the full integration of developing country members in the WTO system. Similar to Customs Valuation and TRIMS, many developing countries are required to bring themselves into compliance by January 1, 2000. The U.S. has much to lose if such compliance is not full.

IV. INTEGRATION OF LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Torrington supports efforts to integrate all developing countries in the multilateral trading system. In this context, Torrington refers to its comments above regarding the need for effective and specific technical assistance to developing countries that require it.

In addition, Torrington believes that benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences should be limited to the least developed countries. The current system grants preferential treatment to countries that do not need such preferences to compete in export markets. As result the benefits of GSP for the least developed countries are diluted and MFN treatment is unfairly withheld from third country suppliers.

V. ELECTRONIC COMMERCE

Electronic commerce has great potential for the reduction of transaction costs and the opening of additional markets. In addition, the application of electronic technology to the notification process holds the potential of increased transparency and improved implementation. See also, infra, Tariff Bindings; WT/GC/W/107, 3 November 1998, Communication from the United States (PC Integrated Data Base). These developments, apart from increasing international trade generally, should also facilitate the integration of developing countries in the world trading system.

Any review of electronic commerce issues, however, should be undertaken in the spirit of minimizing government interference, relying instead on self-governance by users and transparency. Government intervention will likely result in unneeded restraints, distort the development and application of new technology, and add costs. Thus, such intervention will compromise benefits attainable from the new technologies.

VI. OTHER TRADE MATTERS OF INTEREST

A. Industrial Market Access

Torrington generally supports the inclusion of industrial tariffs, where done on a request/offer basis.

Further, Torrington supports the elimination of tariffs on information technology products under the Information Technology Agreement, with the understanding, however, that such elimination in fact is limited to information technology products. Thus, bearings should remain excluded from such an agreement.

As the U.S. and Australia communications recognized, in some instances tariffs are applied at levels below bound rates, including through tariff regimes that_appear to be complex, non-transparent and discriminatory. See, WT/GC/W/132, 21 January 1999, Communication from Australia. Thus, Torrington agrees that an important objective in the upcoming negotiations should be to improve and expand market access opportunities by lowering bound tariff rates to eliminate the disparity between applied and bound rates and by ensuring that the market access results provide greater certainty and transparency in the operation of tariff regimes.

In this context, Torrington applauds USTR's efforts to support the preparation of updated electronic versions of the Members' various tariff bindings. WT/GC/W/107, 3 November 1998, Communication from the United States (PC Integrated Data Base)

B. Consultations With Non-Governmental Stakeholders

Torrington supports USTR's efforts in this regard, and refers in particular to its comments under section III, D, above, regarding the public availability of all relevant documents.

C. Trade and Investment; Trade and Competition Policy

Torrington does not believe that the US should support negotiations within the WTO on either trade and investment or trade and competition. Torrington strongly supports expanded investment liberalization. However, considering the problems at multilateral agreements encountered within the OECD, Torrington does not believe that the multilateral approach through the WTO is appropriate. Similarly, Torrington concurs with the position of the US that it is not the right time to pursue multilateral negotiations on competition policy.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT T. BOYD ESQ.

Vice President, Secretary and General Counsel

Statement of U.S. Integrated Carbon Steel Producers

This statement sets out the views of the five major integrated U.S. producers of carbon steel_products-Bethlehem Steel Corp., U.S. Steel Group, a unit of USX Corp., LTV Steel Co., Ispat Inland Inc., and National Steel Corp. -on the importance of not allowing bilateral or multilateral negotiations to be used as a forum for attacking U.S. trade laws, primarily antidumping and countervailing duty laws. Maintaining strong trade laws are essential to facilitating an open market policy both in the U.S. and abroad. Internationally agreed upon antidumping rules must not be open for renegotiation in any forum-not even with an original intent of

strengthening these laws. This must be a primary negotiating objective for the Administration at this year's WTO Ministerial in Seattle.

During the debate of whether to extend fast-track authority in the 105th Congress, both the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee sent clear messages that U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws must not be compromised as a result of trade agreements entered into by the United States. The most recent, and continuing, steel import crisis has demonstrated that without strong and effective enforcement of our trade remedy laws, U.S. manufacturers and workers would be left fully defenseless against sudden massive surges of unfairly traded imports. This import crisis has been devastating, forcing several vibrant American steel companies into bankruptcy and resulting in the loss of thousands of good American jobs. As families and entire communities have struggled to survive the crushing effects of unfairly traded imports, their belief in U.S. open market policies has been tested. As such, the United States must have strong trade laws that are able to respond vigorously and effectively against unfair trade if open market policies are to succeed. The integrity of these laws must be maintained in our international trade negotiations.

TRADE REMEDY LAWS MOST EFFECTIVE METHOD FOR COMBATING CAUSES OF IMPORT CRISIS

Unfairly traded imports, and the trade distortions which enable foreign producers to engage in such practices, can best be stopped by eliminating the benefits of dumping into the U.S. market. U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws are the most effective tools available to achieve this end.

The roots of the steel import crisis can be found in the global overcapacity of steel. This overcapacity was created, and is maintained, by misguided economic policies of foreign governments and unfair trade practices by foreign steel producers. As demand for steel dropped due to the economic crises in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America, the pressure on foreign producers to export their excess steel production into the U.S. market was exacerbated by the rapid decline in demand in these other world markets.

There are three basic causes of global steel production overcapacity. First, there is massive foreign government subsidization of foreign steel (over $100 billion in such subsidies during the past 20 years). Second, many foreign steel companies enjoy protected home markets through government intervention (e.g. quotas, import licensing). Third, anticompetitive business practices, including domestic and international cartel arrangements involving foreign steel companies, effectively create protected markets. As a result, foreign steel manufacturers can produce at levels not supported by the economic realities of the market place. In many countries, it also has enabled manufacturers to set artificially high home-market steel prices to support dumped low-price steel in the U.S. market.

Not surprisingly, countries which have engaged in unfair trade practices have been the most vocal opponents of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws. They have been well organized in seeking renegotiation of these rules during the upcoming WTO and FTAA talks. The Ways and Means Committee, as it has done before, and Congress, must demand that U.S. negotiators block any attempts at renegotiating these rules.

AMERICAN STEEL COMPANIES AND WORKERS ARE PAYING THE PRICE OF UNFAIR

TRADE

American steel companies and workers have paid a heavy price over the last decade to reorganize their businesses into a world class, globally competitive, and environmentally sound industry. American steel companies invested over $50 billion dollars to modernize their plants and equipment, and have reduced their labor force by over 60 percent during that same period. Foreign producers, who have dumped their excess products into the U.S. market, and who have enjoyed the benefits of subsidies and protected home markets, have not made such sacrifices. Instead, as confirmed by the International Trade Commission's affirmative findings of injury in the recently filed hot-rolled, cold-rolled, and cut-to-length plate cases, and the high dumping margins and countervailing duty rates found by the Commerce Department, those producers have sold dumped and subsidized steel into the U.S. market. After having made the necessary investments to modernize the industry, American steel companies and workers are now paying again-this time for the refusal by foreign manufacturers to restructure their industry. Since the beginning of the current import crisis, over 10,000 good U.S. steel jobs have been lost. Several American steel companies were forced into bankruptcy during a period of high demand. This crisis is far from over. Steel imports remain high compared to historical norms;

steel prices remain severely depressed; and the fundamental causes of this crisis remain in place. Even if trade imports and prices return to normal levels, a crisis of greater proportions could restart at any moment since the United States remains the most open and available market for the world's excess steel capacity.

ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS MUST BE PRESERVED TO ACHIEVE AN OPEN MARKET TRADE POLICY OBJECTIVE

Strong antidumping and countervailing duty laws are essential if global and regional market opening policy objectives are to be achieved. Maintaining free trade depends on maintaining fair trade. Antidumping rules are designed to ensure that exporters based in countries with closed markets do not abuse other countries' open market policies. Weakening these rules would inevitably lead to abuse of the world's open markets-including that of the United States, the world's most open marketand would ultimately undermine confidence in the WTO itself.

Although international rules in this area were recently and comprehensively renegotiated in the Uruguay Round, our trading partners have already launched a multi-front attack on the U.S. trade laws and the WTO agreements which these laws implement. In the WTO, as well as in FTAA and APEC discussions, foreign countries continue to seek further erosion of our trade remedies. It is neither necessary nor appropriate to revisit at this time the antidumping and countervailing duty laws in international negotiations.

Statutory trade policy negotiating goals provide broad instructions to executive branch negotiators-identifying priorities and implicitly suggesting where there may be latitude to accommodate other countries' interests. The intent of the provisions in various versions of fast track legislation has been to direct U.S. negotiators to pursue stronger trade remedies as a priority objective and to alert foreign governments that agreements weakening U.S. trade laws would not be approved at the implementing stage by Congress. These provisions were adopted in recognition of the critical role these trade laws play in opening world markets and in providing for a more fair market structure in the United States. However, despite any intentions of U.S. negotiators to strengthen the antidumping laws, other countries at the negotiating table would strongly pursue weakening the trade laws, and U.S. negotiators should, accordingly, avoid opening negotiations on these laws at all costs.

Following her testimony at the Ways and Means Committee's August 5 hearing, Ambassador Esserman made an encouraging statement with regard to the possibility of reopening negotiations on the antidumping laws: "The U.S. position is firm-it is not appropriate to have antidumping as a subject for negotiations in this next round." This Committee should reaffirm its commitment to the trade remedy laws and demand that the Administration stand by this statement later this year in Seattle. Under no circumstances should foreign governments be allowed to reopen negotiations on the antidumping rules.

Statement of the Government of the United States Virgin Islands

INTRODUCTION

The Government of the United States Virgin Islands (USVI)) hereby provides this written submission in opposition to any reduction in the present duties on rum in conjunction with the upcoming World Trade Organization ("WTO") Seattle ministerial meeting or any other future tariff negotiations under the auspices of the WTO. The USVI strongly urges that rum be excluded from any WTO or FTAA negotiations on possible further reductions or eliminations of duties. As explained below, U.S. duties on low-value bulk and bottled rum have only recently been_affirmed after delicate and complex discussions among the United States, the European Union ("EU"), Caribbean governments and non-governmental stakeholders. The result of these 1997 negotiations reflects longstanding United States policy to preserve tariffs on imported rum. This consistent U.S. policy is based on the fundamental fact that the rum industry and existing U.S. tariff preferences play a critical role in the economies of the USVI and other Caribbean jurisdictions. Moreover, under a Congressionally mandated program to foster the development of the USVI, federal excise taxes on Virgin Islands rum shipped to the United States are returned to the USVI treasury. This revenue-which accounts for approximately 10 percent of the USVI's total budget-secures hundreds of millions of dollars of government borrowings in support of essential public services and programs.