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safeguard action by another party, a re-examination of the relatively new Antidumping Agreement is not warranted.

With regard to the Subsidies Agreement, Libbey observes that the serious prejudice provisions in Art. 6.1 has thus far not proven useful. Libbey would support either elimination of Articles 6.1, 8 and 9 pursuant to Article 31 of the Agreement, or extension with review by the end of 2001. In the safeguards area, Libbey suggests that the United States undertake a review of the hundreds of gray area measures in place during the Uruguay Round negotiations, which were to have been phased out by January 1, 1999. Such a review would ensure that such measures have been eliminated in fact.

COMPETITION POLICY

It is Libbey's understanding that there are a number of countries that seek to have competition policy included on the Seattle Ministerial agenda. For example, Japan's submission indicates that it plans to raise the issue of measures affecting competition at the ministerial. The European Union has over time also expressed a keen interest in the issue, as have Hong Kong and other members.

Libbey's position on this issue is that the WTO is not the appropriate forum in which to raise this issue or that, at a minimum, it is premature to have the issue considered as part of the Seattle process. As the process within the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) has demonstrated, it is extremely difficult to get even active antitrust administrators within developed countries to agree on what should be viewed as hard core competition problems. The exchange of information process within the WTO over the last two years suggest that at most, a process of continuing to exchange information should be pursued.

Moreover, it is disturbing that a number of countries believe that the consideration of adding competition issues to the WTO agenda would permit a reopening of the rules area, in particular antidumping. None of the WTO articles has been evaluated on a "competition" basis (particularly since there is no agreement on what "competition policy" should be across borders). While Libbey would not object to considering whether there is a consensus on competition principles, since the objective of many countries appears not to be expanded disciplines on anticompetitive behavior but rather a weakening of the existing rules regime, the United States should simply oppose inclusion of competition policy on the agenda.

Should competition policy be included, the United States must insist on not reopening other areas. Finally, if areas are reopened, all should be reopened and examined including S&D, whether Most Favored Nation and national treatment are always consistent with competition policy, etc.

STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES

While in most parts of the world, products of interest to Libbey are not produced or sold through state trading enterprises, Libbey agrees with the position of the United States and others that state trading enterprises should be reexamined, including ways to in fact ensure that such entities, if they continue, act in a manner consistent with WTO obligations. State trading enterprises are provided with significant rights and privileges under Article XVII and, through their operation, they can erect significant barriers to trade.

MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT

The United States and other countries tried hard during the Uruguay Round to obtain a substantial agreement on investment. The Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (“TRIMs”), which does little more than restate preexisting obligations, was the only result. Efforts within the OECD to fashion an investment agreement were not successful there. It is hard to imagine how reconsidering investment within the WTO will advance meaningful rules on investment liberalization in the near future. Nonetheless, investment restrictions abroad (including trade-balancing and local content requirements) are important to industrial producers like Libbey. Thus, Libbey agrees with countries such as Japan that have urged that investment is an important area for WTO consideration. However, no agreement should be accepted which does not significantly liberalize investment around the world.

LABOR AND ENVIRONMENT

Libbey views the work of the WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment as valuable, at least in the area of transparency, and also in terms of efforts to define

how multilateral environmental agreements relate to the WTO. Libbey is among the many U.S. industries that face artificial competitive disadvantages because the labor and environmental standards of the United States are not internationally agreed to or applied. Although there is an existing forum for discussion of substantive labor rights, the International Labor Organization, the issue of whether violations of core labor rights should result in trade action could, in Libbey's view, be explored by the WTO in a fruitful manner.

Libbey thanks the Subcommittee for the opportunity to provide these comments.

Statement of Micron Technology, Inc., Boise, Idaho

Micron Technology, Inc. ("Micron") appreciates the opportunity to provide trade policy recommendations for the upcoming WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle this November.

Micron is a manufacturer of dynamic random access memory (DRAM) semiconductors, static random access memory (SRAM) semiconductors and flash memory. Micron also, through its subsidiary, Micron Electronic Industries, manufacturers personal computers, laptop computers and servers. Micron's U.S. facilities are located in Boise, Idaho and Lehi, Utah. Micron also has facilities in Italy, Japan, and Singapore. Micron employs approximately 8,000 people in the United States.

Micron is vitally interested in several issues that are likely to be raised in the context of a new trade round. Specifically, Micron is concerned that there will be a concerted effort by U.S. trading partners to introduce weakening changes to the WTO Antidumping Code, either in the context of antidumping discussions or through discussions held in the context of trade and competition policy. Micron is also concerned about the ongoing efforts in the WTO to harmonize rules of origin. To the extent that these efforts will continue in the context of the new round, Micron stresses the importance of ensuring that the provisions of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws continue to be enforceable once harmonization has occurred. Micron also favors elimination of remaining duties on semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment. Finally, Micron believes that in the context of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM”), that the purpose of the "greenlight" subsidy provision has been served and that it should be allowed to expire at the end of this year as contemplated in the SCM. The serious prejudice provisions, however, should be extended.

NO CHANGES SHOULD BE MADE TO THE WTO ANTIDUMPING AGREEMENT Micron believes that in order to preserve the consensus for an open international trade regime, national authorities must have the tools to deal effectively with instances of injurious unfair trade practices. Under the auspices of the Uruguay Round, very significant changes were made to the Antidumping Code, which went into effect only at the beginning of 1995. Many of these changes served generally to weaken disciplines against dumping, and thus weaken the U.S. antidumping law. Despite the fact that these changes were made fairly recently, several countries have announced their intention to seek a reopening of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI if the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Antidumping Agreement) with the aim of further limiting the efficacy of the dumping provisions. Japan, for example, in a communication to the WTO General Council regarding preparations for the Ministerial dated July 6, 1999, recommends clarifying relevant articles, with the aim of limiting "the abuse of antidumping measures." Their very clear intention is to introduce additional provisions that will weaken antidumping remedies. The government of South Korea has voiced similar recommendations.

Strong antidumping laws are critical to the semiconductor industry. Our industry has long been plagued by significant dumping that very nearly eliminated the entire DRAM industry in the mid-1980's when Japanese producers lost millions of dollars in order to drive U.S. producers out of business. Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor producers have engaged in similar tactics.

As this committee is well aware, the United States has the most open trading regime in the world, and its companies operate on the basis of market principles. Other countries, by contrast, still maintain significant barriers to trade, and often their domestic producers do not operate within a market-based framework, but benefit from significant government protection and support. The U.S. antidumping laws are really this country's last bulwark against the unfair and injurious trade practices of many countries. Micron believes that the Antidumping Agreement should

not be reopened in this negotiation, and that antidumping disciplines should not be weakened or sacrificed in order to achieve agreement in other negotiating areas.

In addition, there are several countries that would like to use discussions in the WTO about trade and competition policy as a back door to making changes in the antidumping area. This must not be allowed to happen. Trade and competition discussions have thus far not proceeded beyond very general discussions about national laws curbing anticompetitive practices. Micron therefore believes that the issue of international rules governing competition is not ripe for this round of trade negotiations. Moreover, any discussion in this area should not be used to alter in any way existing WTO antidumping disciplines.

NATIONAL TRADE LAWS MUST BE PRESERVED WHEN ORIGIN RULES ARE HARMONIZED Micron believes that the work program undertaken in Uruguay Round with respect to harmonizing national rules of origin must not in any way undermine the use or effectiveness of antidumping or countervailing duty laws. The current Agreement on Rules of Origin specifies that a single origin rule should apply to all trade matters from collection of Customs statistics to antidumping enforcement. While a single rule may be fine for certain industries, it would be very detrimental to U.S. semiconductor manufacturers concerned about dumping, if origin is established on the basis of the country in which final assembly occurs.

Current U.S. law bases origin for semiconductors for Customs purposes on country of final assembly. In antidumping cases, however, origin is determined on a case-by-case basis. In the semiconductor area, antidumping orders are administered on the basis of where a semiconductor is fabricated. If a final assembly rule were adopted for all purposes, the antidumping law would no longer be of any benefit for U.S. semiconductor producers, since foreign fabricators could very easily move final assembly to another country, thus avoiding the order.

For certain products it clearly would make most sense to have different rules for antidumping purposes and for general trade purposes. If this is not possible, however, Micron urges our negotiators to adopt harmonized origin ruled based on the country in which a semiconductor is fabricated.

DUTIES ON SEMICONDUCTORS AND MANUFACTURING EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE

ELIMINATED

Micron firmly supports continued elimination of industrial tariffs in any new round of WTO negotiations. Micron believes that more countries should be encouraged to eliminate their duties in accordance with the 1997 Information Technology Agreement. In addition, negotiating authority should be sought to negotiate elimination of all remaining duties on semiconductor manufacturing equipment and materials.

THE SUBSIDIES CODE GREEN LIGHT PROVISION SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO EXPIRE Under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures that was negotiated during the Uruguay Round, WTO countries agreed to permit non-application ("greenlighting") of countervailing duty measures to certain types of subsidies, including subsidies for environmental compliance, regional subsidies and certain research and development subsidies. WTO countries agreed that, unless specifically extended by WTO member countries, green lighted subsidies would once again become actionable subsidies after December 31, 1999.

Micron believes that the benefits of the Green Light provision have run their course, particularly with respect to R&D subsidies. R&D subsidies, to the extent that they are specific to an enterprise or industry or group thereof, should be subject to countervailing duty disciplines and WTO challenges when they result in material injury, serious prejudice, or nullification and impairment. In today's competitive global climate there is simply no reason to exempt an entire category of subsidies from internationally-agreed to disciplines, particularly in area of R&D, where government subsidies can result in significant unfair advantages for national firms.

Micron also believes that the serious prejudice provisions, which are also due to expire, should be permanently extended. These provisions have helped to increase disciplines against dark amber subsidies, several of which have been subject to WTO dispute settlement challenges.

CONCLUSION

Micron supports the efforts of the United States to build a more open international trading environment. We appreciate this opportunity to express out views.

65-092 D-00--11

Statement of North Dakota Durum Wheat Farmers

These comments are submitted by durum wheat farmers located in North Dakota (whose names and addresses appear at the end of these comments) in response to the Subcommittee on Trade's Advisory of July 8, 1999 regarding the Subcommittee's hearing on U.S. negotiating objectives for the WTO Seattle Ministerial Meeting. We appreciate this opportunity to raise the concerns of wheat farmers such as ourselves so they may be addressed in the upcoming negotiations.

Farmers, and wheat farmers in particular, have long been supporters of trade liberalization. We have supported trade liberalization because we believed that opening foreign markets by reducing tariffs and other barriers to U.S. exports would benefit U.S. farmers, who can compete with any farmers in the world absent programs or policies that distort trade. Lately, however, large segments of the farming sector, including wheat farmers, have come to question whether we have received all of the benefits of "free trade" to which we were entitled. The answer to that question is, sadly, "no."

The upcoming WTO negotiations present an opportunity for policymakers to restore the faith of farmers in the effectiveness of trade agreements. Much is at stake, including the lives and livelihood of tens of thousands of farmers across the country. It is with these thoughts in mind that we identify what we believe should be our country's negotiating objectives. First, agriculture must be the top priority for the upcoming negotiations. As the Subcommittee's Members are no doubt aware, U.S. agriculture is in crisis. Oversupply and historically low commodity prices threaten to push large numbers of small farmers out of business. While emergency relief measures such as those being considered by Congress and the Administration can help in the short-term, the upcoming trade negotiations provide the opportunity to reach long-term solutions.

The negotiations must focus on the elimination of foreign export subsidies and other programs that distort trade. Our negotiators should also focus on practices that allow countries to avoid export subsidy commitments, such as pooling arrangements and dual pricing systems. These types of practices undercut U.S. products in the world market by creating artificially low export prices for many foreign prod

ucts.

The negotiations must ensure that U.S. farmers have full and unimpeded access to foreign markets. Too many countries currently do not allow reciprocal marketing of U.S. agricultural products, even though the United States has granted such access to them. This cannot be permitted to continue.

Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) issues are important to ensuring market access. Sound science must be the touchstone for SPS standards. At the same time, effective enforcement against pest and disease prevention, including karnal bunt, must be given appropriate priority as well.

Resolution of disputes must be made speedier. The recent dispute with the European Union over beef hormones exposes the important shortcomings in the current system, and is a prime example of how the promises of the benefits of the new and improved trading system under the WTO have not come to fruition for America's

farmers.

Elimination of state trading enterprises (STEs)also should be a priority. Our experience with the Canadian Wheat Board, for example, has shown how STES provide support to domestic producers through different means, and also has enhanced the ability of foreign countries to restrict trade from the United States. Efforts to ensure compliance with Article XVII principles have been unavailing. Elimination of STES appears the only likely solution.

As important as opening foreign markets and removing various impediments to U.S. exports is, we think it is no less important that farmers in the United States have available to them effective remedies when injurious imports enter our market, particularly when such imports are either being sold at dumped prices or are being subsidized. The United States should resist efforts to re-open international agreements on antidumping and countervailing duties which would likely result in weakening of those remedies. Accordingly, we oppose proposals to reopen these agree

ments.

Finally, a review of barriers that exist with respect to access to purchase registered chemicals and pesticides should be undertaken without delay, whether in the Seattle context or separately as a NAFTA issue. Today, U.S. farmers face obstacles in trying to purchase certain pesticides in Canada, where they are available at much lower prices than in the United States because of differences in patent protec

tion. These result in significant artificial cost disadvantages for U.S. farmers visà-vis our Canadian competitors. We respectfully urge our negotiators to bring this important problem expeditiously to the negotiating table, whether under the TRIPS Agreement, bilaterally, or on a NAFTA-wide basis, to obtain harmonized patent protection for registered chemicals and pesticides so that U.S. farmers are not needlessly disadvantaged.

Once again, we appreciate this opportunity to provide input into the negotiating agenda.

Respectfully submitted,

JEROME ANDERSON
Ross, ND 58776-9096
MARSHALL CRAFT
Stanley, ND 58784
LOUIS KUSTER
Stanley, ND 58784
CURT TRULSON
Ross, ND 58776

Statement of Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America

(PhRMA)

SUMMARY

The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”) urge the United States to pursue every opportunity for improving the ability of the innovative pharmaceutical industry to compete in foreign markets. The United States has a substantial interest in ensuring that our trading partners do not erect barriers to our ability to compete in their markets, through non-market-based price controls, inadequate intellectual property protection standards, unfair or coercive government procurement practices, high tariffs or other measures. We urge the U.S. Government to approach the Seattle Ministerial Conference and the new round of negotiations in the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) with a view toward removing these impediments to trade. We stand ready to work with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR"), other key actors in the United States Government, and the Congress, to pursue an effective course of action in the new round and through other opportunities.

To summarize our more detailed comments that follow, PhRMA has identified the following five priority areas. Among these negotiating objectives for the new round, our member companies place highest priority on the issues of intellectual property protection and non-market-based price controls.

• Intellectual property. Preclude any attempt to reduce, dilute or delay implementation of existing TRIPS obligations, ensure the possibility of initiating work to enhance the Agreement at a suitable time during the next round, and seek to enhance existing standards through other bilateral and multilateral fora.

• Price controls. Ensure that WTO Members identify, eliminate, or substantially reduce trade-distorting price controls and non-market-based government interventions in the pharmaceuticals market, as these measures undermine the goals of free trade.

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Government procurement. Pursue expansion of the plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement to ensure the coverage of governmental and quasi-governmental entities responsible for direct and indirect procurement of and/or payment for pharmaceutical products.

Sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Emphasize the importance of transparent and non-discriminatory rules, and oppose any attempts to undermine the risk assessment and sound science standards of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement.

Customs and tariff issues. Expand the pharmaceutical tariff agreement to cover both additional products and countries, complete the World Customs Organization's harmonization work program under the Agreement on Rules of Origin, and implement the Customs Valuation Agreement by developing countries.

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