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We need single equipment design review for a number of important

reasons:

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First, in radiological safety reviews, the need above all else is for explicit, consistently adhered to, criteria and standards for equipment design. Most of the states will not have the technical capability to develop these standards-indeed hardly any states will have it. The complexity of nuclear systems and the overwhelming importance of quality and reliability means that any review calls for a mix of technical disciplines-core physics, metallurgy, mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, chemistry, etc., etc. It can't be handled by one or two people functioning as experts in all branches of technology. Second, because of the close relationship of one element of nuclear design and all others, it is plausible that there will be situations where state requirements could actually be counterproductive in terms of over-all safety.

Third, preemption is an ingredient of the one-stop philosophy. Two reviews of nuclear equipment design with different and perhaps conflicting requirements open up new potentials for dual vetoes and delay.

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VI

The subject of delay leads, of course, to the question of procedural reform. The number of issues now available for contest under NEPA and the Atomic Energy Act is nearly endless, between them, the Atomic Energy Act and the Administrative Procedure Act contemplate that many of these issues will be litigated in a trial-type proceeding with a whole apparatus of devices which can be manipulated to produce years-long delay prolonged discovery, prehearing conferences, numerous pre-trial motions, appeals from decisions on motions, appeals from decisions on motions, objections to evidence, rulings on evidence, extended cross-examination, briefs, intermediate decisions, exceptions to intermediate decisions, briefs on appeal, etc., etc. This is not all; some issues can now be litigated before one tribunal and relitigated before another, and the same issue can be tested over and over again plant-by-plant-by-plant.

All during this period the fact that government authorization is required before a project can proceed means that an intervenor has the benefit of an automatic temporary injunction. This injunction applies regardless of the importance of the contentions raised, or the merits of the intervenor's case, or the ability to accommodate objections later without holding up the project, or the great expense associated with delay, or the total balance of the public interest.

After all, the legal profession has some obligations too, and we ought to be able to recommend to Congress a better system than this. Industry has to accept the proposition that the environmental effects of power plant proposals should be intensively reviewed. It also has to accept the proposition that there should be effective citizen participation in the review process. Effective participation to my mind means that relevant underlying documents should be publicly available, subject only to carefully defined claims of privilege, that there should be oral hearings with opportunity to submit rebuttal testimony, that the basis of a decision should be fully articulated, and that there should be an opportunity for judicial review.

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On the other hand, it is not unreasonable for industry to contend that these objectives should be accommodated with a minimum of delay and expense, that contested issues should be resolved in an orderly and expeditious manner. These objectives can't be attained in the context of a classical trial-type review of each issue associated with each new facility, and so Congress should prescribe some new procedural approaches.

First, generic issues should be disposed of on a generic basis. Examples here come readily to mind-Commission policy and arrangements for high-level waste disposal, radiation emission standards, emergency core cooling systems.

My own understanding is that light water reactors have reached a stage of evaluation where it would be rational to grant a model or type approval for the nuclear steam supply system. The so-called balance of plant design still varies enough so that the type-approval approach would take longer to implement, but the availability of such a type approval would sharply accelerate standardization by engineer

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constructors.

Second, it seems to me that the ground rules for oral hearings should be redefined and that these ground rules should fall somewhere between conventional trial-type adjudication and the bare opportunity to submit written comment characteristic of conventional rule-making. Nuclear power plant proceedings are generally addressed either to complex technological issues or to broad social policy choices. Traditional trial-type hearing mechanics and traditional evidentiary rules are not well studied to sensible consideration and resolution of either kind of question. We do need public availability established by agency rule— of revelant documents, oral public hearings and some elements of adversary process.

I should emphasize that here I am talking about a hearing on a generic issue leading to a general rule or standard or a type approval, which would be binding in a subsequent proceeding addressed to a particular plant proposal, and I am also talking about a hearing on the proposal itself. I would use essentially the same oral hearing procedure, whether the context was similar either to old-fashioned rulemaking, or to old-fashioned adjudication.

This is obviously an idea which needs more definition in detail on points such as opportunity for cross-examination. I hope that bodies like the Administrative Conference can be helpful to the Congress in developing a redesigned oral hearing procedure. I would suggest that one method of approach would be to take each of the distinctive elements of a trial-type proceeding and ask whether that particular element is useful and if useful at all, whether it is worth the price.

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VII

This leads to a question as to whether it is sound national policy to hold up a project indefinitely while intervenors are litigating a position which may in the end be found erroneous, or insubstantial, or one which can be accommodated by minor changes after construction or operation is under way-and all of this regardless of the public need for the project, or the costs of delay. As I have observed earlier, inter venors currently have the benefit of an automatic temporary injunc

tion, and resourceful counsel can prolong the life of this injunction indefinitely.

Now if a program does not require prior government authorization, an opponent of the program must satisfy certain well-known requirements before he can obtain a temporary injunction. I would suggest that the public interest in adequate electrical supply at reasonable cost, is so great that we should have an analogous procedure in cases where a government permit or license is required-that is, the agency should have the power to grant temporary authorization to proceed, pending the outcome of the case, unless the intervenor made a showing comparable to that which would be required for a temporary injunction. Exercise of this temporary authorization power by an agency should be subject to substantive standards and to procedural safeguards, but it seems to me an indispensable element of any reasonable regulatory system. To some extent, this authority may now be available under existing law but for many reasons we need legislative clarification of this.

Let me go back to my opening metaphor--if one regards the situation pre-NEPA as the thesis, and the current post-Calvert Cliffs confusion as antithesis, then I hope that the synthesis will be new federal legislation calling for state and regional land-use planning, new federal legislation on regulation of the environmental effects of electric power generation and transmission, major reforms of the Atomic Energy Act, and a new national energy policy. These are not trivial issues and they call for full and candid debate, addressed to the Congress and to the Administration.

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45

AEC MAKES ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES TO STRENGTHEN ITS

REGULATORY PROGRAM

NOVEMBER 11, 1971

Chairman James R. Schlesinger of the Atomic Energy Commission today announced organizational changes within the AEC to strengthen the Regulatory Staff which handles reviews of applications to construct and operate nuclear reactors and to use radioactive materials.

Effective immediately, Edward J. Bloch has been appointed Deputy Director of Regulation for Reactor Licensing, and Dr. Clifford K. Beck has been named Deputy Director of Regulation for Compliance, Safeguards and Materials.

John A. Erlewine has been appointed Deputy General Manager of the AEC to succeed Mr. Bloch. Mr. Erlewine has been Assistant General Manager for Operations.

In directing the compliance, safeguards, federal-state relations and view of the expanding workload in the reactor licensing area, power plan under the National Environmental Policy Act, a second Deputy Director of Regulation position has been created. Mr. Bloch, who has been Deputy General Manager of the Commission's operating programs under the General Manager, will serve in this new position. He will supervise Regulatory Staff review of reactor licensing matters. Dr. Beck has been the sole Deputy Director of Regulation up to this time.

Chairman Schlesinger said in a statement:

"The addition of Mr. Bloch as Deputy Director of Regulation for Reactor Licensing will provide the Regulatory Staff with a person who has had more than 25 years' experience in all facets of the atomic energy program. He will direct special attention to expediting the reactor licensing functions, especially in the area of expanded environmental reviews which have resulted from the Calvert Cliffs decision and the Commission's subsequent adoption of revised regulations which take into account our broadened environmental responsibilities.

"Dr. Beck, who has served as Deputy Director of Regulation since that position was created in 1961, will concentrate his attention on directing the compliance, safeguards, federal-state relations and materials licensing functions of the AEC Regulatory Staff. These areas also have experienced a sharply increased workload as a result of the growth of nuclear power and will require continued careful attention by the AEC. Both Mr. Bloch and Dr. Beck will serve directly under our new Director of Regulation, L. Manning Muntzing.

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"We are fortunate that we have a man of Mr. Erlewine's talent and experience to step into Mr. Bloch's position as Deputy General Manager under our General Manager, Robert E. Hollingsworth. As Assistant General Manager for Operations, he has supervised the activities of nine AEC field offices and he has been involved in such key areas of the Commission's program as operational safety, waste management, international affairs and Congressional relations."

In a related action to strengthen the Regulatory Staff, the AEC's General Manager will detail to the Regulatory Staff 30 professional staff members on a temporary basis to assist in the environmental review and in expediting the licensing process.

Biographical information on Dr. Beck, Mr. Bloch and Mr. Erlewine is attached.

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DR. CLIFFORD K. BECK

Dr. Clifford K. Beck came into the atomic energy program in 1943 when he served as a research scientist at Columbia University on the Manhattan Project. He was technical assistant to the Manager of the Gaseous Diffusion Project at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, in 1945-46 and Director of Research at the Gaseous Diffusion Project from 1946 to 1949. Dr. Beck headed the Physics Department and was Director of Nuclear Research Projects at North Carolina State College, Raleigh, from 1949 until 1956. While at North Carolina State College he initiated and directed projects leading to the first university research reactor, and developed the training programs from which the first doctoral degrees in nuclear engineering were awarded.

He was a consultant to the Commission's Division of Civilian Application from November of 1955 until June of 1956 when he joined the Commission full time as scientific advisor to the Director of the Division of Civilian Application (later the Division of Licensing and Regulation) and Chief of the Hazards Evaluation Branch of those divisions. In December of 1960 he was appointed Assistant Director of Nuclear Facilities Safety in the Division of Licensing and Regulation, a position which was later designated as Assistant Director for Facilities Licensing. In 1961, Dr. Beck was appointed to the position of Deputy Director of Regulation.

Dr. Beck holds a bachelor of science degree from Catawaba College, Salisbury, North Carolina; a master's degree in physics from Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee; and a doctor of philosophy degree in physics from the University of North Carolina. He was awarded an honorary doctorate by Catawaba College in 1952.

While at Oak Ridge, Dr. Beck served as the first chairman of the Board of Directors of the Oak Ridge Hospital when it came under civilian control. From 1960 to 1969 he served one appointed and two elected terms as a member of the Board of Education of Montgomery County, Maryland, including a term as president of the board. In 1968 he was appointed by the Governor to the Maryland State Board for Community Colleges and has been President since the establishment of the Board.

Dr. Beck is married to the former Mary Beth Lassetter and they have four children. The Beck family lives on a farm near Clarksburg, Maryland.

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