In fairness to the Atomic Energy Commission, it must be conceded that Solomon himself would have difficulty writing licensing regulations which comply with the broad directions of the National Environmental Policy Act. In the first place, the Act does not mention federal licenses and permits at all. The procedures it requires are not those normally associated with regulatory proceedings, but rather with the procedures used by federal agencies which are recommending legislation to Congress, or seeking appropriations to construct public works.

So far as I have been able to ascertain, the published legislative history of N.E.P.A. provides no specific guidelines to the AEC, or for that matter to any other regulatory agency, as to the application of N.E.P.A. to their respective licensing procedures. Thus without Congressional guidance the Atomic Energy Commission by regulation to having to decide such questions as are presented by the application of N.E.P.A. to nearly-completed nuclear plants. And the Corps of Engineers is having to decide the proper scope of its environmental inquiries prior to issuance of the dredging licenses and discharge permits which it must issue for the same nuclear plants as AEC must license.

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The National Environmental Policy Act rightly has been called, . (a) truly landmark legislation in history of man and his efforts to protect and improve his environment . . .". But it is not strange that an act of such breathtaking scope, drafted more in the language of ecology textbooks than in language traditional to the law, should require interpretation and refinement. The Congress, I suggest, should not expect the several federal regulatory agencies and the courts to do this job all by themselves. There is not time.

It is therefore my recommendation to the Congress that hearings be scheduled in the near future to consider the need for amendments to N.E.P.A. as it applies to federal licensing procedures, including not only nuclear power plant licenses, but other types of federal licenses and permits, such as those granted by the Corps of Engineers.

The purpose of such hearings should not be to repeal or reduce the effectiveness of the National Environmental Policy Act. N.E.P.A. is a landmark in America's struggle to protect its endowment of natural resources. Rather, the hearings should consider how to eliminate uncertainties, and define administrative and judicial procedures. As regards the licensing of nuclear power plants, I suggest that such hearings should consider, among other questions:

1. Should nuclear plants in advanced stages of construction under valid construction licenses issued by AEC be permitted to be completed without interruption, and be granted provisional operating licenses at the conclusion of expedited hearings on issue of radiological health and safety? (Meanwhile, the N.E.P.A. environmental review could be undertaken and, pursuant to the terms of the provisional operating license, operation of the plant could be suspended, if necessary, to accommodate any changes required as the result of the N.E.P.A. review.)

2. Should AEĆ be authorized in its judgment to rely on state certificates of reasonable assurance that water quality standards will be complied with?

3. Should AEC, having primary responsibility for the licensing of nuclear plants, have exclusive authority to conduct the N.E.P.A. environmental review respecting such plants, with other federal agencies that must issue licenses or permits for the same plants directed to accept the environmental findings of AEC?

4. What should be the extent of the alternatives to a proposed nuclear plant to be considered by AEC in a licensing proceeding? How many nuclear site and design alternatives? In what detail? (A detailed application may cost the applicant as much as $5,000,000. Must AEC consider non-nuclear plants as alternatives? Over what areas should it consider alternate site for nuclear and non-nuclear alternative possibilities? What transmission line alternatives over what routes? Underground or overhead? Should AEC be permitted to consider the alternatives of slowing economic growth or rationing electricity so that only "beneficial" uses of electricity are permitted?

5. To what extent shall AEC consider indirect environmental effects of nuclear plants, such as mining of uranium, transportation and disposal fo nuclear wastes, etc. If AEC considers fossil-fired alternatives, to what extent should it investigate their direct and indirect environmental effects, for example, air pollution, strip mining, ash disposal, etc.?

6. Should not off-site environmental issues such as raised by uranium mining, fuel enrichment, nuclear waste transportation and disposal, etc. be excluded from the issues in a license application for a particular plant, and dealt with in a separate environmental investigation of issues common to all nuclear power plants?

7. If AEC is to balance all of the engineering, economic, and environmental considerations involved in a proposed nuclear plant, and its possible alternatives, should it have authority to make a final determination in favor of an alternative?

8. Should AEC have authority to override any other state or federal agency by granting a permit to construct and operate a nuclear plant if, after balancing all considerations, it concludes this would be in the public interest?

9. What should be the scope of judicial review of issues raised by intervenors in licensing procedings based upon the National Environmental Policy Act? What measures can be taken to assure that administrative proceedings, as well as any judicial review, are conducted expeditiously?

Many of these uncertainties, and others, could be resolved in large part by the rule-making authority of the executive branch. But the experience of the past 22 months suggests that the executive branch has not yet taken the initiative in such a way as to remove as many as possible of the doubts and uncertainties that beset those who must build projects requiring federal approvals. I hope that this Committee, working with the executive branch, will find ways to remedy this very serious situation.

In closing, let me say again that we fully endorse the objectives of the National Environmental Policy Act. This Committee and its Chairman, Senator Jackson, are to be complimented for initiating a national environment policy that was urgently needed. What is required now, I believe, is specific guidance to those charged with its

implementation so we can meet the overall objectives of N.E.P.A. in a practical and timely fashion.

Hon. JAMES SCHLESINGER,

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,

EXECUTIVE CHAMBER, STATE CAPITOL,

Albany, N.Y., October 8, 1971.

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHAIRMAN SCHLESINGER: A serious danger of a power supply emergency in New York City during the summer of 1972 impels me to urge your Commission to invoke with all possible speed whatever extraordinary procedures may be available in handling the application of Consolidated Edison for an operating license for its Indian Point #2 plant.

It is my understanding Consolidated Edison's peak demand for the hottest days next summer has been estimated at 8550 megawatts and that sustained demands in the range of 7700-8100 megawatts will occur on many warm days. The Public Service Commission advises that Consolidated Edison's supply situation is such that the peak demand cannot be met next summer without Indian Point #2, and absent this plant the loads on many warm days can only be met if Consolidated Edison is able to import much greater amounts of power than it has ever been able to secure on a firm basis.

The overall power situation in the State and in the whole Northeast is very tight, and Consolidated Edison reports it has thus far been unable to contract for more than a fraction of the firm power imports available in the past summer. The life of the City of New York should not depend on the accidents of availability of massive amounts of power capacity not required by other utilities to meet their own loads on a particular day next summer, especially when the prospects seem so bleak.

These circumstances demonstrate, in my view, a compelling need for you and your agency to give the highest priority for completing the proceedings on Consolidated Edison's Indian Point #2 license application, consistent, of course, with your obligation to assure the public against hazards from radiation and unnecessary environmental damage.

To make progress on this matter, I urge you to use every possible means to resolve the procedural problems in such a way as to avoid, if possible, the catastrophe of power blackouts in New York City next

summer.

Sincerely,

Docket No. 50247.

Hon. JAMES SCHLESINGER,

NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER.

THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

OFFICE OF THE MAYOR,

New York, N.Y., August 31, 1971.

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHAIRMAN SCHLESSINGER: In the light of the current deliberations of the Atomic Energy Commission to formulate rules regulating the environmental impact of nuclear power plants, the Mayor's Interdepartmental Committee on Public Utilities strongly urges immediate

consideration be given to the City's vital need for electricity. Unless Consolidated Edison's Indian Point No. 2 Plant starts operation in sufficient time prior to the summer of 1972, the City faces a serious shortage of power.

The need for Indian Point No. 2 both for purposes of meeting electrical demand and for system reliability must not be underestimated. Briefly, the outlook for the coming year is as follows:

Peak demand for the summer of 1972 is forecast at 8,550 megawatts. Although there is possibility of 395 megawatts of purchased power and power from a plant being built jointly with a nearby utility, the anticipated need for power cannot be met without Indian Point No. 2 in operation. Because of forced or scheduled outrages of about 1,000 megawatts at all times, seldom has the Company been able to have 7,500 megawatts on line at one time.

Consolidated Edison has 38 generating units totaling 2,176 megawatts that are obsolete and unreliable machines. In fact, 30 units are more than forty years old-hardly suitable equipment to produce electricity or act as reserve for the City of New York. Furthermore, 1,984 megawatts of installed capacity is gas-turbine powered which makes them unsuitable for continuous base load operation.

Under these conditions, there exists a real hazard to the health, safety and welfare of the 7.9 million inhabitants and 3.7 million persons who work in the City of New York.

A major anticipated source of power for the coming year--525 megawatts-is the jointly-owned Bowline Point Unit No. 1 which is presently under construction. A recent strike has caused a delay in the manufacture of the plant's turbine, and there is now serious doubt as to whether the plant can be on the line as of its scheduled operation date of 1972.

Furthermore, we are advised by Consolidated Edison that its 1,000megawat unit, Ravenswood No. 3 ("Big Allis") has continued to experience vibration of the main shaft of the high-pressure machine. The unit has been shut down for maintenance every weekend in August, thus far. This unit will not be considered reliable until it undergoes a complete overhaul. Because the Company is so deficient in generating capacity, it cannot undertake such an extensive overhaul unless Indian Point No. 2 is available for service. We are also informed by the Company that its efforts to buy additional firm power for the coming year. has been thus far unsuccessful.

Thus, we believe that without the Indian Point No. 2 unit on the line, the City faces the real hazard of a power crisis in 1972. Whenever voltage reductions and load shedding episodes occur, the health, safety and welfare of the people of the City of New York are placed in jeopardy. Furthermore, an adequate supply of electricity is vital to the City's economie well-being.

Clearly, the Indian Point No. 2 Plant is needed to avert a power crisis in the City in 1972. Just as clearly, the Commission must comply with the mandate of the Court in the Calvert Cliffs' decision that the entire environmental impact of projects not yet granted an operating license be promptly and fully considered.

The Committee, therefore, earnestly requests the Atomic Energy Commission to consider these factors and to act promptly on its forthcoming rules and on the pending license for Indian Point No. 2 Plant. Sincerely,

MILTON MUSICUS,
Chairman.

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EXCERPT FROM STATEMENT BY DR. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, CHAIRMAN, U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, BEFORE THE PUBLIC WORKS SUBCOMMITTEE, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, NOVEMBER 15, 1971

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have this opportunity today to report to the Committee on three activities of the Atomic Energy Commission which recenly have attracted considerable Congressional and public interest.

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CALVERT CLIFFS

The second activity I want to mention is the Commission's implementation of the Appeals Court decision in the Calvert Cliffs case which expanded the environmental considerations which the AEC must take into account in the licensing of nuclear power plants.

As a result of that decision, we have revised our regulations to make the Commission directly responsible for evaluating the total environment impact, including thermal effects, of nuclear power plants and for assessing this impact in terms of the available alternatives and the need for electric power. I might mention in passing that I regard myself as a conservationist. More important, however, the AEC has indicated its determination to be responsive to the concerns. of conservation and environmental groups as well as others members of the public.

One of the first steps we have taken is to require applicants to show cause why permits for 48 nuclear power plants should not be suspended pending completion of the broadened NEPA review. We now have information from all of these utilities and our Director of Regulation is making determinations on whether suspensions should be ordered. On November 12 we announced that construction of the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant in Oregon should be continued pending completion of the expanded NEPA review. We will be making other announcements shortly.

In addition to these show cause reviews, we have begun preparation of new or supplemental environmental statements that will comply with the Court's mandate for all of the plants affected by the Calvert Cliffs decision. This involves, over the next year or so, the preparation and submittal to appropriate Federal, State and local agencies for comment a total of more than 70 environmental statements.

I am determined that we shall move forward expeditiously with these reviews but they will be substantive, careful, considered reviews.

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