of 1972–73. It was recognized that these plants must receive full environmental appraisals consistent with the National Environmental Policy Act and the Calvert Cliffs decision. The results of this analysis show that if nuclear units now nearing completion are delayed tight power supply situations will prevail in some areas of the country.

This analysis has been prepared in two parts. First, the overall capacity situation in the Nation was analyzed. It was found that 16% of the reserve in the summer of 1972 is in nuclear units. This is broken down by regional reliability councils in Table A. A map showing the location of the councils is attached. It is apparent from inspection of this table that some regions are more affected by nuclear delays than others. The regions which seemed to be most severely affected were then analyzed in more detail and critical sub-regions were then identified. It became apparent that five areas in particular, namely New England, New York State, Florida, the Virginia-Carolinas area, and the northern Illinois-Wisconsin-upper Michigan area will have severe power shortage problems during the next 18 months. The detailed analysis of these areas is shown on Table B.

In preparing Table B assumptions were first made as to the reserve required for each area. In areas with adequate transmission lines to neighboring areas a 20 percent reserve was deemed adequate. In the case of Florida, due to inadequate transmission both within the state and to neighboring states, and the relatively large unit size as percent of load, it was judged that a greater reserve was necessary. The assumed scheduling of nuclear units was based on the staff's estimate after consultation with the regional reliability councils. In general, nuclear units were assumed to be delayed a year but in cases where active intervention is presently in progress or expected the anticipated delay was longer. Fossil units scheduled for service during the study period were assumed to be delayed six months. This is to account for the unexpected but usual problems of construction delay, difficulties during start-up of new units and predictable unreliability of immature units. The five crucial areas are discussed separately in the succeeding paragraphs.

The New England Power Pool faces a critical power supply situation in the winter of 1971-72. With the Vermont Yankee and Pilgrim No. 1 nuclear units unavailable, the installed New England reserve after taking account of scheduled power supply from systems outside of the New England Power Pool will be 13.3% at the time of peak winter load. Thus, with neither nuclear unit available, this reserve of 1704 MW is 860 MW below the 2564 MW considered necessary to maintain an adequate level of reliability. Stated another way the delayed nuclear units each represents a threat to the needed regional reserve level: Vermont Yankee, 20% loss of reserve; Pilgrim No. 1 25% loss of reserve. During the summer of 1972, the reserve situation is adequate with 21.4 percent reserve even with Vermont Yankee, Pilgrim and Maine Yankee delayed. However, an even more critical reserve situation develops in the winter of 1972-73 when with the three abovementioned nuclear plants delayed the reserve drops to 1,941 or 14.0%. If, in addition, Salem Harbor No. 4 fossil unit scheduled for October 1972 service should be delayed so as to be unavailable for the winter period, the reserve would be 1476 MW or 10.7%. These levels of re

serve would most probably result in power curtailments during the winter 1972-73 and possible curtailments during the coming winter.

Indian Pt. No. 2 (873 MW) represents about 20% of the necessary New York Power Pool reserve which was anticipated to be 4,207 MW during the summer of 1972. The reserve with Indian Pt. No. 2 in service would be 21% of the projected load but it should be remembered that in the past several summers the New York Power Pool, and Consolidated Edison in particular, have had difficulty supplying the load even with slightly more than 21% reserve. If Indian Point No. 2 is delayed beyond the summer of 1972, the expected reserve would be 16.6%. The problem is further compounded because the New York Power Pool has a total of 986 MW of fossil generation scheduled for June of 1972 and 348 MW of gas turbine capability scheduled for July which has been counted as part of the Pool reserve. If this generation is delayed or experiences difficulties during startup and is not available for the summer peak, the reserve falls to 2,000 MW or about 10%. The result of this reduction in reserves would probably result in power supply problems considerably more severe than New York City has experienced in the past several years.

Florida, due to its lack of adequate transmission within the state and from adjoining states and its unit size, requires more reserve than other areas. With both Turkey Point Nos. 3 and 4 in service, Florida would have 2,280 MW or 19.3% reserve in the summer of 1972 and loss of each unit would represent a reduction of 30% in the desired reserve level or a total of 60% taken together. The 2,280 MW regional level is 1,026 MW less than is desired. Without Turkey Point Nos. 3 and 4, Florida would have a reserve of 894 MW or 7.6%. This is 2,412 MW less than the desired reserve. This low reserve margin would create an even more severe situation than described for New York and chronic power curtailments might be expected during the summer of 1972.

The northern portion of Mid America Interconnected Network (MAIN) Regional Reliability Council which includes northern Illinois, Wisconsin and upper Michigan is another area which will be critically affected. With both Quad Cities Nos. 1 and 2 and Point Beach No. 2 in service, this area will have 3,315 MW reserve or 18.0% during the summer of 1972. This is 368 MW less than the necessary 20% reserve. However, if those three units are not in service, the reserve falls by 52% to 1,604 MW or 8.7% of the area load. In addition, there is a fossil-fuel plant scheduled for service in northern Illinois in April 1972. If this plant is delayed, the reserve margin is further reduced to 764 MW or 4.2%. It should be pointed out that the Palisades Plant, even though not in the MAIN region, is in close geographic proximity and therefore could transmit power to the Chicago area over interconnections in event of emergency. Any delay in that plant further compromises the reliability of electric supply in the Chicago Metropolitan area.

The Virginia-Carolinas area is the fifth area with anticipated critical power supply problems during the summer of 1972. With Surry No. 1 and Oconee No. 1 in service, the area has 2,775 MW or 13.4% reserve which is 1,376 MW below the desired 20% reserve level. With these two plants delayed, the reserve is reduced by 60% of the desired

reserve to 1,101 MW or 5% of the area load. The problem is further complicated in that there are two fossil-fuel units totaling 1,010 MW scheduled for service in June and July 1972. If both of these plants fail to meet their construction schedule or experience difficulties during start up the area reserve would be 90 MW or 0.4%. This situation would most probably result in recurring and widespread power curtailments throughout the summer.

As a result of this analysis, it is concluded that delays in the operation of nuclear units which are completed or nearing completion will cause serious power supply problems in the immediate future, particularly in the New England, New York, Southeast, and MidWest areas. Consequently, it is apparent that every effort must be made to bring new capacity on line as scheduled.