29 CORRESPONDENCE: FPC/AEC Hon. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., August 31, 1971. Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Federal Power Commission and its staff have reviewed in the brief time available the "Preliminary Staff Draft" covering proposed amendments to Appendix D of the AEC's procedures for implementing the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 which was issued under date of August 23, 1971. We have not sought to evaluate fully the merits of the proposed draft amendments in terms of their relationship to the issues raised by the court's decision on the Calvert Cliffs case. We do, however, wish to comment on aspects of the implementation procedures as we interpret their possible impact on the adequacy and reliability of electric power supply. Our concerns in keeping with the purposes of the Act related to protection of the human environment, refer to any possible effects of the amended regulations on the operations of any plants now in service or the readiness for service of plants now completed or well along toward completion. There are, to our knowledge, very few situations in the country where there is a prospect that new power capacity is now scheduled to come into commercial service so far ahead of genuine need that further operating delays would be inconsequential. In fact, the contrary is almost invariably true. Thus, additional delays of new power plants which would be physically ready for service will almost invariably have serious consequences adverse to the public interest, including detriment to the environment. Since all of the new nuclear units constitute well defined units of capacity needed to meet regional power supply plans, additional delays would mean consequences which in our judgment should, in each case, be carefully weighed against the indications of potential real environmental effects if the complete NEPA procedures could not be completed before operations commenced. Relative to this matter, our staff has examined in a preliminary way a list of the thirty-three nuclear power plants which we understand are being given "highest priority" attention by the Atomic Energy Commission as to implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act in relation to licensing actions. Within this list of thirty-three, we find eleven units, totaling almost 7.5 million kilowatts of capacity, which vary from 87% to 100% physical completion. Further significant delays in the availability of virtually all of these near-term new nuclear units would have severe impacts on the adequacy and reliability of electric service. We may cite some typical examples. The Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. has for the last several years been forced to reduce loads at times during the heavy load seasons of the summer months because of the lack of sufficient generating capability to meet peak requirements. The 872 MW Indian Point No. 2 nuclear unit (now 99% complete) represents almost 60 percent of the reserve capacity which the Company hopes to have for the summer of 1972. If this unit is unavailable the reserve capacity will be reduced from 17.2 percent to slightly less than 8 percent of projected peak load. These values may be compared with advance expected reserve margins of 23.2 and 17.2 percent for 1970 and 1971 respectively. Of course, these expectations did not materialize and it was necessary to curtail loads in both years. Another area of sorely needed additional generating capacity is the lower Florida Peninsula in the vicinity of Miami. Several extensive power failures have been experienced in recent years and in 1971 it has been necessary to curtail loads on occasion. If the Turkey Point Unit No. 3 (now 96% complete) is in service on Florida Power & Light Company's system but Unit No. 4 (now 84% complete) is not available for the summer of 1972, the reserve capacity will be only 564 megawatts or about 9 percent of expected peak load. If neither of the nuclear units is available, the Company would have a negative reserve for the summer season and frequent service interruptions to some loads would be anticipated. The Public Service Company of Colorado's Fort St. Vrain 522 megawatt nuclear unit is at 87% completion and is being relied upon for service by the summer of 1972. If it should be unavailable, the Company's reserve capacity for the summer would be reduced from 32.9 to 12.1 percent. A still worse condition would prevail during the following winter when loads will be larger and system reserve capacity would be only 3.1 percent if the new unit is not in service. These are examples of the needs in different parts of the country which characterize most of the new units concerned. Virtually every such unit is scheduled to come into service at about the latest time possible to maintain a reasonable margin of system reserve capacity for peak load conditions. Thus, it is normally true that any delays or schedule slippages inevitably create capacity deficiencies which are immediately reflected as deteriorations in adequacy and reliability of electric service in the area involved. Furthermore, there is virtually no area of the country which now has uncommitted surplus generating capacity at time of peak loads sufficient to supply significant amounts of firm power to shortage areas. These conditions emphasize the importance of finding any practical means of avoiding added delays without other serious environmental consequences. Thus deferment of operations of these plants (once key safety questions have been resolved) will, as against any other unresolved environmental questions, cause such probable penalties to the public's "human environment" as: potential reduction in adequacy and reliability of electric service; reduced capability for carrying loads for dependent-industrial, commercial, and residential use; probable increase in detrimental environmental effects by requiring continued operation of less efficient plants with less effective pollution controls; and substantial economic penalties from idle major investments in these units with a resultant increase in cost to the consumer. A reliable power-resource base, in cluding the planned nuclear facilities, is essential to meet our national. economic objectives. For the foregoing reasons, we urge that the Atomic Energy Commission seriously consider any procedural methods within the intent of the National Environmental Policy Act which might in the implementation of its regulations minimize the net adverse balance from consequences of the type we have outlined. In particular, consideration should be given to more adequate provision for the issuance of interim operating licenses so that constructed plants may be placed in service without undue delay. If the issuance of such interim operating licenses is not proscribed by the National Environmental Policy Act or other applicable laws, as interpreted by the courts, we urge that the AEC consider authorizing, with appropriate protective conditions, interim operation of a constructed plant in those cases where such interim operation: 1) will comply with applicable radiological health and safety standards; 2) will not result in a significant, irreversible, long-term adverse effect on the environment; and 3) is needed to provide an adequate and reliable supply of electric power or to avoid the adverse environmental impact of the interim use of alternate or inadequate energy sources. In such cases, expedited hearing procedures directed to the necessity for interim relief might be developed to insure the timely operation of nuclear power plants in conformity with the National Environmental Policy Act. The provisions of the draft proposal, read with the existing provisions of 10 C.F.R. § 50.57, do not seem adequate to meet the need for special consideration of interim operating licenses. Another area of special concern is the possibility that existing operations and construction may be suspended pursuant to Section E of the proposed regulations. We urge that the criteria for review set forth in paragraph E.2 be expanded to require consideration of the possible adverse environmental impact of a delay in construction or delay or interruption in operation. To this end, license applicants involved in these situations might be requested to provide analyses of the comparative environmental consequences of delays in operation of these plants versus continued operations without them. We have, of course, already provided comments on previous draft environmental statements indicating the relative importance of most of the units from the standpoint of their relation to their respective regional demand/supply situations. If this is not sufficient for aiding your consideration in particular cases, please let us know. Sincerely, Hon. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, JOHN N. NASSIKAS, Chairman. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., October 15, 1971. Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, * DEAR CHAIRMAN SCHLESINGER: Thank you for your letter of September 14, 1971, and the expressed recognition of the need to find suitable means of conducting prompt reviews of critical nuclear *The letter of September 14, 1971 is on p. 556, 68-699-72————20 power plants in keeping with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) and the need to insure an adequate and reliable national power supply. We are also responding to the related letter of September 29, 1971, from Harold L. Price, Director of Regulation. Mr. Price's letter deals with suggested procedures on which we will comment further. However, the material forwarded with his letter also conveys to us the understanding that the Atomic Energy Commission presently anticipates that the revised procedures are expected to cause minimum delays in the readiness for operation of a number of nuclear plants, of from six months to a year or more unless the AEC finds that emergency conditions prevail. We are greatly concerned about the severe effects on electric power supply in many areas of the Nation if such delays should occur with respect to a number of nuclear plants which are already completed or are nearing completion. In order to gauge the general effect of such delays, it is necessary to examine the relationship of individual nuclear plants to the available reserve capacity in each region of the country. For this purpose the FPC's Bureau of Power has prepared a Staff Report which is forwarded herewith, and indicates the assumptions on which it is based. Table A of the Staff Report shows the impact that scheduled delays in nuclear plants would have on the anticipated electric power generation reserves at critical periods from now through the winter of 1972-73. The table shows the planned capability, anticipated reserve, and the portion of the anticipated reserve that is due to scheduled nuclear plants in each of the nine Electric Power Reliability Council areas and for the Nation as a whole. From these data it appears that 16% of the Nation's reserve for the nummer of 1972 is from scheduled nuclear plants not yet on line and that the resulting potential loss of the anticipated reserves would exceed 40% in several instances. In addition, in many cases we are concerned that the reserve appears to be dangerously low, even with the scheduled nuclear plants. Furthermore, these reserve numbers are also affected by completion dates of new fossil-fueled plants which are not fully assured. It is our opinion that, in light of this Commission's responsibility for adequate and reliable power supply for the Nation and our joint concern for the discharge of the requirements of NEPA, there must be sufficient reserve of electric power capacity maintained in each major region as an essential feature of our national environmental enhancement policy. It is the intent of NEPA (Section 101(b)) to (2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings; (3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences; "In our highly developed society sufficient electric power reserves are essential to public health and safety as well as the other environmental objectives indicated above. In addition to the obvious usage of electricity for major public health facilities such as sewage treatment plants and hospitals, other widely dispersed uses such as highway lighting and residential food refrigeration depend on a continuous and thus reliable supply of electricity. Furthermore, an adequate supply of electric energy is an essential element of programs of national interest for maintaining a vigorous and stable economy. We believe that AEC should consider a pending operating license to represent an emergency situation if the absence of the projected nuclear power unit significantly reduces the available electric power supply below a prudent level of reserve on the pertinent system or region and there is no comparable demonstration of significant adverse effects on the natural environment from operation of the plant. It is our judgment that national concern for the consequences of particular power shortages requires that any such serious threat to a prudent reserve level needs to be considered as an "emergency" situation rather than judging that only the occurrence of an actual power shortage or blackout constitutes a condition of "emergency." The Staff Report provides the basis for our serious concern about the potential effect of AEC procedures and their implementation. As you will see, it analyzes what may be the potential power situation in five significant power regions where the specific capacity reserve conditions at particular times are critical to the overall public interest. The reported specific impacts of the nuclear plants on these local load areas are shown in Table B. We anticipate that each of these situations and others may be referred at an early date by the AEC to this Commission for further review and comment. The situations described make clear the need to consider seriously any procedural techniques applicable within the principles of NEPĂ and the Calvert Cliffs decision which can expedite consideration of total environmental factors, including the consequences of non-availability of needed power. We believe that the Atomic Energy Commission could well conclude that emergency situations exist where it is readily foreseeable that adequate and reliable supplies of electric power are seriously threatened and that expedited procedures for considering potential questions of environmental effect are therefore justified under the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act and the Calvert Cliffs decision. As for the suggested procedures transmitted with Mr. Price's letter, we are entirely agreeable to accommodating them and fitting our procedures to those outlined by the AEC. The designated responsible senior officer for the FPC in these matters will be Mr. Frederick H. Warren, Advisor on Environmental Quality. Please be assured that we stand ready to assist you in any way in which we may be effective in assuring the prompt disposition of these matters. Sincerely, JOHN N. NASSIKAS, Chairman. Attachment: Staff Report, Federal Power Commission, Bureau of Power, Electric Generating Capacity Situation, Winter 1971-72 Summer 1972, Winter 1972-73, with attached Tables A and B. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, BUREAU OF POWER ELECTRIC GENERATING CAPACITY SITUATION, WINTER 1971-72SUMMER 1972-WINTER 1972-73 The staff of the Bureau of Power has analyzed the possible impact of the Calvert Cliffs decision on the electric generating capacity situation during the winter of 1971-72, the summer of 1972 and the winter |