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juries on December 4, 1970. The rules require procedures which, expressly or by implication, assume the existence of electric power. Thus, the fire command stations required in each building shall be "adequately illuminated." Elevators, not impeded by the fire, shall be employed for evacuation. A "fire brigade" of building employees shall move to the floor below the fire and assist in evacuation and fire control in a variety of ways; presumably, the fire brigade is not expected. to run up 30 or so flights of stairs. Evacuation via corridors and stairwells assumes the existence of adequate illumination. No provision is made for persons trapped in elevators or for loss of water pressure on the upper floors of high-rise buildings.

On July 15, 1971, in the first such undertaking in recent memory, a high-rise building (Seagram Building, 32 floors) was substantially evacuated in a voluntary fire drill. Several factors are worthy of note. First, it took thirteen minutes to evacuate the building without use of elevators. Second, some 15% of the building's occupants did not participate, either because of the pressure of "business as usual" or because of a reluctance to walk down a large number of flights. Third, although elevators generally were not employed, a special elevator was required to evacuate 14 disabled persons who work in the building. One can only conjecture on such questions as: How many deaths or injuries would occur in a fire in the 13 minutes required to walk down and out of the building? How much more time would be required for similar evacuation of buildings larger than 32 stories? What would have been the fate of the 14 disabled persons in a fire in the absence of power for elevators? The fire problems within high-rise buildings would be aggravated, of course, by any traffic problems engendered as a result of loss of power to traffic signals. Moving emergency equipment through congested areas is difficult enough under the best of circumstances. Traffic jams created by loss of traffic signals (or disablement of electrically powered drawbridges) can only make matters appreciably worse.

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Thus far, electric power crises have not required extensive load shedding. For the most part, other load reduction measures have sufficed to bring power consumption into line with available supply. But it is questionable whether much reliance can be placed on this fact in light of the deteriorating power situation on Con Ed's service territory.

In the summer of 1969, according to Commissioner Ryan's report in Case 25293 (the Consolidated Edison service proceeding), Con Ed resorted to voltage reductions on four occasions, appeals to large customers on four occasions, and appeals to the general public on three occasions.

In the summer of 1970, Con Ed resorted to voltage reductions on 15 occasions, appeals to large customers on 12 occasions, and appeals to the general public on 11 occasions. In addition, Con Ed had the subways transfer to series operations on one day, creating a near-riot, and was forced to disconnect customers (aggregating 157 MW of demand) on another day.

In the winter of 1970-1971, with loads appreciably below summer peaks, Con Ed for the first time encountered capacity deficiencies in

14 Unintended outages of power, affecting limited areas, generally have occurred at times other than peak business hours. Even the November 1965 Northeast Blackout occurred after 5:00 p.m.

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winter months. Voltage reductions were employed on 8 occasions, appeals to large customers on 5 occasions, and appeals to the general public on 5 occasions. In addition, heat in the New York City subways was cut off on one cold winter day.

Thus far, the summer of 1971 has been relatively placid, with only a few voltage reductions and several days when power conservation was urged. However, the summer is not yet over (most of the problems last summer occurred subsequent to July 27), and, based on past experience, much will depend on the performance of the erratic Ravenswood No. 3 installation and on the forced outage on the remainder of Con Ed's system (which, despite recent improvements, is almost as erratic and unpredictable as Ravenswood No. 3).

Also of significance is the fact that Con Ed has not added any base load generating capacity to its system since Arthur Kill No. 3 in May of 1969. In recent years, the gap between supply and demand has been sought to be met by the addition of increasing numbers of gas turbines. How long this process can continue is questionable.

New base load generating capacity is being challenged at almost every point. Indian Point No. 2 is the subject of a controverted AEC proceeding. Bowline Point (a joint venture with Orange and Rockland) is being held up by environmental conditions in operating permits. And the projected Astoria plant is the subject of continuing controversy.

Con Ed also has been encountering difficulties in constructing the additional transmission facilities necessary to import purchased power. The merits of the controversies concerning new generating and transmission facilities need not be considered at this point. It is sufficient to note that delays incident to such controversies have become a fact of life.

Perhaps others can find in this record some basis for optimism. Maybe we will be lucky and Ravenswood No. 3 will function reliably, Con Ed's forced outage rate will be maintained at reasonable levels, and necessary new generating and transmission facilities will be constructed in timely fashion. It could happen almost anything is possible-but I am reluctant to base Commission policy upon a foundation of momentary improvement and wishful thinking.

In my opinion, the record to date warrants the adoption of precautionary steps beyond the measures adopted by the Commission. Yet it seems to be impossible to obtain support for such action. The reason, I believe, is endemic in our society's general approach to health and safety hazards. Before definitive action can be countenanced, there must be a catastrophe. A power crisis must hit with such intensity that scores of lives are lost and hundreds of bodies mutilated in a fire or other major disaster before a disruption of business activities will be considered. For reasons previously indicated, I believe that it is of the utmost importance that the economic life of New York City not be subjected to unnecessary interference. But I also believe that the protection of public health and safety is an overriding consideration. For my part, I prefer to act to avoid possible calamities and not wait for justification in the form of dead and mutilated bodies.

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Before the United States Atomic Energy Commission IN THE MATTER OF CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC. (INDIAN POINT STATION, UNIT No. 2)

(Docket No. 50-247)

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES F. LUCE

CHARLES F. LUCE, being duly sworn, deposes and says that: 1. I am the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. ("Con Edison"). 2. On August 17, 1971 I executed an affidavit in support of Con Edison's motion for an order establishing further procedural requirements to implement the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, which motion and affidavit were filed with the Atomic Energy Commission in these proceedings on that date. A copy of my affidavit was also attached to Con Edison's petition for rule making filed with the Commission on August 18, 1971. I hereby supplement my affidavit with the additional information hereinafter set forth.

3. Paragraph 13 of my affidavit refers to an estimated reserve for the summer of 1972 based in part upon the anticipated availability of 525 megawatts to be generated at Bowline Point Unit No. 1* which is presently under construction and is scheduled for service in July 1972 and approximately 350 megawatts to be generated by barge mounted gas turbines which are to be built and delivered for service in the summer of 1972.

In amplification of the statement made in paragraph 17 of my affidavit concerning the possibility of delays in the completion of this generating capacity, the facts are that a delay in the manufacturing of the turbine for the Bowline Point unit has occurred by reason of a strike at the supplier's plant and permit requirements pose a threat to the commencement of operations on schedule. The installation of the barge mounted gas turbines in time for the summer of 1972 depends upon close adherence to a construction schedule and is beset with the uncertainty attendant upon such a requirement. In addition, the Company's 1,000 megawatt generating unit, Ravenswood No. 3, which was returned to service on June 2, 1971, experienced an outage of five days in early July 1971 and was out of service for three weekends in August 1971 for turbine bearing repairs and inspection. Vibration of the turbine shaft continues at the location of this bearing even though the unit is being operated below its rated capacity.

4. With reference to the efforts made by Con Edison to explore every possible means of obtaining purchased power on a firm basis for the summer of 1972, referred to in paragraph 15 of my affidavit, the Company has solicited offers from sources in the northeastern states and Canada. In addition to the 395 megawatts referred to in paragraph 13 of my affidavit, we have obtained indications that there may be some power available for purchase. However, in all cases, except for ap

*Erroneously identified, through a typographical error, as Bowline Point Unit No. 2 in footnotes 4 and 5 on page 7 of my affidavit.

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proximately 200 megawatts, the timely availability of power is contingent upon the completion of construction of new facilities which are not even scheduled for service until the spring of 1972 at the earliest. A large part of the capacity available on this contingent basis depends on the timely completion and licensing of nuclear facilities. The remaining sales depend on the completion of non-nuclear facilities and known delays already jeopardize the construction schedules. The generally prevailing experience of slippages in utility construction projects casts serious doubt on the availability of the power involved in any of these offers. Certainly the vital needs of the people of New York City and Westchester County should not be permitted to rest on such conjectural support.

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PETITION FOR RULEMAKING

Before the United States Atomic Energy Commission

IN THE MATTER OF

Docket No. PRM

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC., Petitioner August 18, 1971.

PETITION FOR RULEMAKING

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., ("Petitioner") hereby petitions the Atomic Energy Commission, ("Commission") to issue the following regulation as an addendum to Appendix D to Part 50 of its regulations:

"Nothwithstanding the foregoing provisions of Appendix D to this part, the following procedures will apply to any proceeding on an application for a facility operating license for which a notice of hearing was issued on or before December 4, 1970 and for which a full power operating license has not been issued as of [the effective date of this addendum to Appendix D] :

1. A hearing will be held to consider the environmental impact of the facility in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Such hearing and actions preliminary thereto which are required to comply with that Act shall be undertaken and completed promptly in accordance with such orders as the Commission shall issue with respect to such proceeding.

2. The fact that a hearing on environmental issues is to be held shall not be cause for delaying the completion of any hearing now in progress on issues specified in a notice of hearing published prior to December 4, 1970. Upon the completion of such hearing the atomic safety and licensing board is authorized and directed to issue an initial decision with respect to such issues and, if its findings on such issues so warrant, to issue an order authorizing the Director of Regulation to issue a facility operating license. If at the time of issuance of such license the hearing on environmental issues has not been completed such license shall be issued with a condition that it is subject to continuance, suspension, modification or revocation based on the outcome of such environmental hearing. Any such license shall expire one year from the date of issuance if at that time the hearing and related procedures concerning environmental matters have not been completed and an initial decision with respect to these matters has not yet been

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