payment of debt. Held, not payable in greenbacks. Dutton v. Pailant, 52 Penn. St. Rep. (2 P. F. Smith) 109. "When treasury notes were made a legal tender in payment of 97, 98. debts, they were made the equivalent of coin as a means of payment, in all but the cases excepted by law." Brown v. Welch, 26 Ind. 117. The outstanding debt of the United States for borrowed money usually called the loan, see note 78. 99. 78. [3.] To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and What is the among the several States, and with the Indian tribes. power as to commerce? 85. "TO REGULATE." “TO That is, to prescribe the rule by which How to regcommerce is to be governed. (Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 196.) ulate com merce? 101. Story's Const. § 1061. But a State may pass tants against paupers. city of New York v. § 1072 a. police laws for the protection of its inhabi- It is denied that the power "to REGULATE is exclusively in Congress. (The License Cases, 5 How. 504.) Id. § 1072. And license laws, the primary object of which is to secure the health of the community. The License Cases, 5 How. 504; Story's Const. § 1072. 89. 86. "COMMERCE" is traffic, but it is something more; it is inter- What is Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 191, 209.) United States v. commerce? Holliday, 3 Wallace, 417; Story's Const. § 1061, note 2. course. 3 Buying, selling, and exchanging is the essence of commerce. Wall, 417. It also includes navigation, as well as traffic, in its ordinary signification; and embraces ships and vessels as the instruments of intercourse and trade, as well as the officers and seamen who navigate and control them. The power of Congress extends to all these subjects. People v. Brooks, 4 Denio, 469. For the necessity of this power see the Federalist, Nos. 4, 7, 11, 22, 37; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 225; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 445, 446; Story's Const. §§ 1057, 1060. 209. 196. To regulate the external commerce of the nation and the respective states. People v. Huntington, 4 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 187. The whole subject fully discussed. Id. But not to declare the status Can Conwhich any person shall sustain while in any State of the Union. gress declare The power can be exercised over persons as passengers, only while on the ocean, and until they come under State jurisdiction. the States? It ceases when the voyage ends, and then the State laws control. 18, 196. Lemmon v. People, 26 Barb. 270; affirmed, 20 N. Y. 562. the status of persons in 87. "COMMERCE WITH FOREIGN NATIONS" means commerce be- With foreign tween citizens of the United States and citizens or subjects of for- nations. eign governments, as individuals. United States v. Holliday, 3 Wallace, 417; Flannagan v. Philadelphia, 22 Penn. 219. tion of wharves is subservient to commerce. Stevens v. Walker, 15 La. Ann. 577. The erec 231. With foreign among the several States? The giving of a license by a municipal corporation is not a regulation of commerce. Childers v. People, 11 Mich. 43. The violation of a local law requiring such licenses, by the use of an unlicensed boat, though it be duly licensed for the coasting and foreign trade under the laws of the United States, is a punishable offense. Id. A tax, the effect of which is to diminish personal intercourse, is a tax upon commerce. Linsing v. Washburn, 30 Cal. 534. The California tax-law upon Chinese is a violation of this section and unconstitutional. Id. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, nations and may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wh. 196. Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, can mean nothing more than intercourse with those nations, and among those States, for the purposes of trade, be the object of trade what it may; and this intercourse must include all the means by which it can be carried on, whether by the free navigation of the waters of the several States, or by a passage over land through the States, where such passage becomes necessary to the commercial intercourse between the States. Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 388; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. 18 How. 421; Columbus Ins. Co. v. Peoria Bridge Co. 6 McLean, 70; Columbus Insurance Co. v. Curtenius, Id. 209; Jolly v. Terre Haute Drawbridge Co. Id. 237; United States v. Railroad Bridge Co. Id. 518. This clause confers the power to impose embargoes. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wh. 191; United States v. The William, 2 Hall's L. J. 255, 272. And to punish crimes upon stranded vessels. United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72. It does not, however, interfere with the right of the several States to enact inspection, quarantine, and health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating their internal commerce. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wh. 203; New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102; Conway v. Taylor, 1 Black. 633. Nor with their power to regulate pilots. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299. Or to protect their fisheries. Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71; Dunham v. Lamphere, 3 Conn. 268. 88. A State law which requires the masters of vessels engaged in foreign commerce to pay a certain sum to a State officer, on account of every passenger brought from a foreign country into the State, or before landing any alien passenger in the State, conflicts with the Constitution and laws of the United States. Smith v. Turner. 7 How. 263. (This decision was by a divided court, and is not conclusive authority. Smith v. Marston, 5 Tex. 432.) So does a state law, authorizing the seizure and imprisonment of free negroes brought into any port of the state, on board of any vessel, from any state or foreign port. Elkison v. Deliesseline, 2 Wh. Cr. Cas. 56; 1 Opin. 659. (But see 2 Opin. 426, contra.) And so does a state law which requires an importer to take a license, and pay fifty dollars before he should be permitted to sell a package of imported goods. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wh. 419. Purvear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 478. But a State law which imposes a tax on brokers dealing in foreign exchange, is not repugnant to this clause of the Constitution. Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 73. Nor is one imposing a tax on legacies payable to aliens. Mager v. Grima, Id. 490. Nor are the license laws of certain States, forbidding the sale of spirituous liquors under less than certain large quantities. Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 5 How. 504; The State v. Allmond, 4 Am. D. R. 533; California v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 467. 89. "AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES. This section quoted with What is clause 18, and Art. VI., Sec. 2, and Art. X. of Amendments. commerce Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wallace, 724. among the several 86, 87. Commerce includes navigation; and comprehends the control for States? that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all navigable waters 138, 114, 274, of the United States which are accessible from a State other than 203. those within which they lie. For this purpose they are the public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation of Congress. (Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 191; Corfield v. Coryel, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 378.) Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wallace, 724, 725. The right includes the power to remove all obstructions, and What does to provide for the punishment of offenders. The whole powers the right include? which existed in the States before the adoption of the Federal Constitution, and which have always existed in the Parliament in England. Id. It is for Congress to determine when its full powers shall be brought into activity, and as to the regulations and sanctions which shall be provided. (United States v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Woodbury & Minot, 420, 421; United States v. Coombs, 12 Peters. 72; New York v. Milne, 11 Peters, 102, 155.) Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wallace, 725. 203. Wherever commerce among the States " goes, the power of What is the the nation, as represented in this Court, goes with it to protect and power of the Supreme enforce its rights. (Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 191; Steamboat V. Court to enLivingston, 3 Cowen. 713.) Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wallace, force the 725. right? the United The National Government possesses no powers but such as have What are the been delegated to it by the States, which retain all but such as they powers of have surrendered. The power to authorize the building of a States? bridge is not to be found in the Federal Constitution. It has not 71, 188, 269. been taken from the States. Id. When the Revolution took place the people of each State became themselves sovereign, and in that 2, 6. character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soil under them for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the general government (Martin v. Waddell, 16 Peters, 410.) Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wallace, 726. Ante Preface, pp. viii, ix. The right of eminent Eminent dodomain over the shores and the soil under the navigable waters, for main? all municipal purposes, belongs exclusively to the States within their territorial jurisdiction, and they only have the power to exercise it. Id. But this right can never be used to affect the exercise of any Can the national right of eminent domain or jurisdiction with which the States use a United States have been invested by the Constitution. (Pollard's lessee v. Hogan, 3 Howard, 230.) Gilman v, Philadelphia, 3 Wallace, 726. national right? What sub der State control? Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every descripjects are un- tion, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, and those which respect turn-pike roads, ferries, &c., are component parts of the powers of a State. (Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 192) Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wallace, 726. And also bridges. (People v. S. & R. R. R. Co., 15 Wend. 113.) Id. Pilot laws? When is a gress paramount? Pilot laws enacted in good faith are within the powers of the States. (Cooly v. The Board of Wardens, 12 Howard, 319.) Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wallace, 727. Master v. Ward, 14 La. A. 289; Master v. Morgan, 14 Ib. 595. But where Congress has acted the law is paramount. (Pennsyl law of Con-vania v. Virginia, 18 Howard, 430.) Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wallace, 727, 729. Until Congress has exercised the power, the State may authorize obstructions which do not violate the Constitution. (Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. 2 Peters, 250.) Id. 727-729. When may the States current pow• The States may exercise concurrent or independent power in all cases but three: 1. Where the power is lodged exclusively in the exercise con- Federal Constitution. 2. Where it is given to the United States and prohibited to the States. 3. Where from the nature and subjects of the power, it must be necessarily exercised by the National Government exclusively. (Houston v. Moore, 12 Wheat. 419; Federalist No. 32.) Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wallace, 730. ers? What laws void ? A State law requiring an importer to take out a license before he of a State are shall sell a bale of goods is void. (Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419.) Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wallace, 730. Purvear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 478. So the passenger laws from foreign countries. (Passenger's Cases, 7 Howard, 273.) Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 730. Not so of the State liquor-license laws. (License cases, 5 Howard, 504.) Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wallace 730. Purvear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 498. Congress may regulate all bridges over navigable waters, remove offending bridges, and punish those who shall thereafter erect them. Id. 731. Bridges? Where does power of Congress not stop? What were as to slaves? The power to regulate commerce does not stop at the jurisdiction or limits of the several States. (Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 190.) United States v. Holliday, 3 Wallace, 417. 510. 90. As to the power of Congress over the subject of commerce the powers among the several States, see the Opinion of McLean, J., in Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet. 504; Taney, Ch. J., Id. 508; Baldwin, J., Id. In Shelton v. Marshall, 16 Tex. 352, Wheeler, J., said:-As respects the power of the States over the subject of the Constitutional inhibitions in question (the introduction of slaves as merchandise), what we deem the sound and correct doctrine was stated by ChiefJustice Taney, in Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet. 508, viz.: แ In my judgment, the power over this subject is exclusively with the several States: and each of them has a right to decide for itself, whether it will or will not allow persons of this description to be brought within its limits, from another State, either for sale or for any other purpose; and also to prescribe the manner and mode in which they may be introduced, and to determine their condition and treatment within their respective territories; and the action of the several States upon this subject cannot be controlled by Con gress, either by virtue of its power to regulate commerce, or by virtue of any other power conferred by the Constitution of the United States." 203. Congress may have power to prevent the obstruction of any Navigable navigable stream which is a means of commerce between any two streams? or more States. Works v. Junction Railroad, 5 McLean, 526; Jolly v. Terre Haute Drawbridge Co. 6 Id. 237; Devoe v. Penrose Ferry Bridge Co. 3 Am. L. J. 79. But a State law granting the exclusive privilege of navigating a part of an unnavigable stream, which is wholly within the State, on condition of rendering such part navigable, is not repugnant to the Constitution. Veazie v. Moore, 14 How. 568. And see Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. 2 Pet. 251. 91. If commerce or traffic or intercourse be carried on with an With the InIndian tribe, or with a member of such tribe, it is subject to be dian tribes? regulated by Congress, although within the limits of a State. The Does the locality of the power is absolute, without reference to the locality of the tribe or tribe cause a the member of the tribe. United States v. Holliday, 3 Wallace, difference? 418. This power is not claimed as to any other commerce originated and ended within the limits of a single State. Id. So long as the tribal relations exist, the Indians who are con nected with their tribes and under the jurisdiction of an agent, are under the protection of the laws to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians. Id. The States cannot control the subject. Id. Under the power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, Congress has power to prohibit all intercourse with them, except under a license. United States v. Cisna, 1 McLean, 254. So Congress has power to punish all crimes committed within the Indian country, which was a part of the Louisiana territory, dedicated to the Indians. The United States v. Rogers, 4 How. 567. The United States has adopted the principle originally estab- What is the lished by European nations, namely, that the aboriginal tribes of rule as to ownership Indians in North America are not regarded as the owners of the of soil? territories which they respectively occupied. Their country was divided and parceled out, as if it had been vacant and unoccupied land. Id. If the propriety of exercising this power were now an open question, it would be one for the law-making and political department of the government, and not the judicial Id. The Indian tribes residing within the territorial limits of the United States, are subject to their authority; and where the country occupied by them is not within the limits of any one of the States, Congress may by law, punish any offence committed there, no matter whether the offender be a white man or an Indian. Id.; The United States v. Rogers, 4 How. 567. 196. The 25th section of the act of 30th June, 1834, extends the laws Intercourse of the United States over the Indian country, with a proviso that law ? they shall not include punishment for "crimes committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian." Id. This exception does not embrace the case of a white man who, at mature age, is adopted into an Indian tribe. He is not an "Indian" within the meaning of the law. Id. 4 St. 729; 1 Brightly's Dig, 430, § 75; 4 Op. 72, United States v. Rogers, 4 How. 567. |