no use in repeating the list. The "conditionally contraband "

includes:

(a) Coal, when destined for a naval station, a port of call, or a ship or ships of the enemy.

(b) Materials for the construction of railways or telegraph.

(c) Money, when such material or money are destined for the enemy's forces.

(d) Provisions, when actually destined for the enemy's military or naval forces.

It is interesting to note that the inoffensive mule, which has proved so useful to us in South Africa, figures last of the long list of "absolutely contraband," and that the list is binding on American naval officers until otherwise announced." In another paragraph we are informed that "in case of war, the articles that are conditionally and unconditionally contraband, when not specifically mentioned in treaties previously made and in force, will be duly announced in a public manner.

A number of minor points are dealt with, such as use of false colors being forbidden and the rule that national colors must be displayed before firing a gun. Article 14 lays down that "all merchant vessels of the enemy, except coast-fishing vessels innocently employed, are subject to capture, unless exempt by previous stipulations." The merchant vessels may be destroyed if thought fit, the passengers being landed at a convenient port at the first opportunity. It is curious to note that, though constant reference is made to neutral vessels, the code gives no index as to how the United States is prepared to recognize transfers of shipping to neutral flags.

Section V deals with the exercise of the right of search, which is confined to properly commissioned and authorized vessels of war, convoys of neutrals being exempt on the commander of the convoys being able to give proper assurances. The right of search is universally recognized as necessary to a belligerent to enable it to ascertain the nationality of a vessel for the purpose of preventing breaches of blockade, and in other circumstances to seize vessels employed in any capacity for the enemy except that of carrying goods which are not contraband of war.

Further actions justifying seizure are:

1. Attempt to avoid search by escape; but this must be clearly evident.

2. Resisting search with violence.

3. Presenting fraudulent papers.

4. Vessels not being supplied with the necessary papers to establish the object of search.

5. If papers are destroyed, defaced, or concealed.

How far our own naval officers or the foreign office could justify the seizure of the German ships for which we had to pay compensation, under any of the above heads, is a matter of pure conjecture. It may, however, be confidently predicted that their task is not rendered easier by leaving so much to common sense which it is unwise to assume too confidently will be found in the right place at the right time. In the absence of any teaching on international law, except for a few lectures to some fortunate captains and commanders at the Royal Naval College, the least that might be done is to afford them such aid as the American Navy Department does to its own officers. This little code of laws deserves to be noted as another product of the United States Naval War College, to which we owe Captain Mahan's work on sea power; while in comparison Great Britain is content to spend £200 per annum on a naval strategy course, which includes a lecture on naval history, fee of £5 a lecture. Small wonder that in such circumstances the field produces so little,

and the official representative of the Admiralty informs the House that his sympathies are with the hostile critics of the naval educational system on this question of the higher training of the Navy.

A few days later there appeared from the distinguished British authority on international law, Professor Holland, the following letter:

(From London Times, Wednesday, April 10, 1901.)

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR CODE.

To the EDITOR OF THE TIMES:

SIR: The "Naval War Code " of the United States, upon which an interesting article appeared in the Times of Friday last, is so well deserving of attention in this country that I may perhaps be allowed to supplement the remarks of your correspondent from the results of a somewhat minute examination of the code made shortly after its publication.

One notes, in the first place, that the Government of the United States does not shirk responsibility. It puts the code into the hands of its officers" for the government of all persons attached to the naval service," and is doubtless prepared to stand by the rules contained in it, as being in accordance with international law. These rules deal boldly with even so disagreeable a topic as "Reprisals" (Art. 8), upon which the Brussels, and after it The Hague, Conference preferred to keep silence; and they take a definite line on many questions upon which there are wide differences of opinion. On most debatable points the rules are in accordance with the views of this country, e. g., as to the right of search (Art. 22), as to the twofold list of contraband (Art. 34-36), as the moment at which the liability of a blockade runner commences (Art. 44), and as to the capture of private property (Art. 14), although the prohibition of such capture has long been favored by the Executive of the United States, and was advocated by the American delegates at The Hague Conference. So also Articles 34-36, by apparently taking for granted the correctness of the rulings of the Supreme Court in the civil-war cases of the Springbok and the Peterhoff with reference to what may be described as 'continuous carriage," are in harmony with the views which Lord Salisbury recently had occasion to express as to the trade of the Bundesrath and other German vessels with Lourenço Marques. It must be observed, on the other hand, that Article 30 flatly contradicts the British rule as to convoy; while Article 3 sets out The Hague Declaration as to projectiles dropped from balloons, to which this country is not a party. Article 7 departs from received views by prohibiting altogether the use of false colors, and Article 14 (doubtless in pursuance of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the Paquete Habana) by affirming the absolute immunity of coast fishing vessels, as such, from capture.

66

It

On novel questions the code is equally ready with a solution. speaks with no uncertain voice on the treatment of mail steamers and mail bags (Art. 20). On cable-cutting it adopts in Article 5, as your correspondent points out, the views which I ventured to maintain in your columns when the question was raised during the war of 1898. I may also, by the way, claim the support of the code for the view taken by me, in a correspondence also carried on in your columns during the naval maneuvers of 1888, of the bombardment of open coast towns. Article 4 sets out substantially the rules upon this subject, for which I secured the imprimatur of the Institut de Droit International in 1896.

Secondly, the code is so well brought up to date as to incorporate (Articles 21 to 29) the substance of The Hague Convention, ratified

only in September last, for applying to maritime warfare the principles of the Convention of Geneva. Article 10 of The Hague Convention has been reproduced in the code in forgetfulness, perhaps, of the fact that that article has not been ratified.

Thirdly, the code contains very properly some general provisions applicable equally to warfare upon land (Arts. 1, 3, 8, 12, and 54). Fourthly, it is clearly expressed, and it is brief, consisting of only 54 articles, occupying 22 pages.

Fifthly, it deals with two very distinct topics, viz, the mode of conducting hostilities against the forces of the enemy, and the principles applicable to the making prize of merchant vessels, which as often as not may be the property of neutrals. These topics are by no means kept apart as they might be, articles on prize appearing unexpectedly in the section avowedly devoted to hostilities.

It is worth considering whether something resembling the United States Code would not be found useful in the British Navy. Our code might be better arranged than its predecessor, and would differ from it on certain questions, but should resemble it in clearness of expression, in brevity, and, above all things, in frank acceptance of responsibility. What naval men most want is definite guidance, in categorical language, upon those points of maritime international law upon which the government has made up its own mind.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

OXFORD, April 8.

T. E. HOLLAND.

NATURE OF THE DISCUSSIONS FOR 1903.

While it is true that the Naval War Code of the United States was issued only three years ago, yet the nature of the subject and the development of maritime international law and practice make it a topic worthy of the most careful consideration at the present time, when so much thought is given to naval affairs in their international relations. It has been considered advisable that the Naval War Code of 1900 be made the basis of the conferences in international law for the session of the United States Naval War College for the summer of 1903.

In the original preparation of the code, certain debatable points were submitted and opinions upon them asked. These were as follows:

1. Prohibition of bombardment of open or unfortified towns on seacoast.

2. Adoption of additional articles of Geneva Convention as formulated at The Hague, with the exception of Article 6 and the addition of a proviso to No. 3, that all neutral hospital ships shall, before and during action, attach themselves to one belligerent or the other and be subject to its regulations and fly its flag at the main, with red cross underneath.

3. Prohibition of use of false colors by men-of-war at any time. 4. The abolition of the jus angariae or seizure of neutral vessels or property for war purposes, except in the case of overpowering military necessity.

5. Exemption of fishing boats and fishermen; fish to be paid for if seized as a military necessity.

6. The exercise of the right of inquiry upon neutral men-of-war approaching a blockade or investment. If false colors were universally prohibited this would not be necessary.

7. Ransom of unfortified towns: If refused, the penalty. Should it be forbidden?

8. Should such a status as war rebel be further recognized? Vide Lieber's G. O. 100, Inst. to Armies, etc.

9. Is a collier attending a fleet of an enemy guilty of unneutral service or only of carriage of contraband of war? Should vessel and cargo be both seized?

10. Should a continuous-voyage liability be applied to vessels carrying goods that are contraband or presumably for the violation of blockade?

11. Should multiplied retaliation be severely prohibited, i. e., the shooting or hanging of more than one for one, etc.?

The code has not been tested by actual war; therefore, precedents which it might be desirable to maintain for the sake of strenghtening the code itself have not been established. The code can therefore be considered without prejudice which might be favorable to a rule that had already become strengthened through action in accordance with it, or found unsatisfactory or insufficient when tried in action.

The points for discussion which have been raised are based upon material furnished by officers of the Navy, by students of international law, by critics and writers who have given attention to the code in America and in Europe.

The English, French, and Italians have thus far paid most attention to the code. So far as possible their queries and criticisms are embodied in the discussions. The changes which may be desirable in consequence of development and changes naturally coming with the passage of time are also to be considered.

The points proposed for discussion seem in some instances trivial, but all are based on criticisms or questions that have come from persons or from other sources of sufficient weight to deserve consideration. It was also judged expedient to introduce so many as possible of these points upon which questions had been raised, in order that the code might be viewed as widely as the time limits of the discussions would permit.

HOOVER WAR LIBRARY

INTERNATIONAL LAW DISCUSSIONS,

1903.

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR CODE OF 1900.

EXPLANATION.

In the following pages the article or articles of the Naval War Code upon which questions are raised or upon which discussions are based will in each case precede the questions and discussions. The code as a whole will be found at the end of the discussions, on pages 101-114. On the pages following the code will be found the Instructions for the government of armies of the United States in the field, pages 115-139; Convention between the United States of America and certain powers with respect to the laws and customs of war on land (Hague Convention, proclaimed by the United States April 11, 1903), pages 141-158; Convention for the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864 (proclaimed by the United States November 1, 1901), pages 159-167.

DISCUSSIONS.

SECTION I.-HOSTILITIES.

Article 1.

The general object of war is to procure the complete submission of the enemy at the earliest possible period, with the least expenditure of life and property.

The special objects of maritime war are: The capture or destruction of the military and naval forces of the enemy; of his fortifications, arsenals, dry docks, and dockyards; of his various military and naval establishments, and of his maritime commerce; to prevent his

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