relations which lie outside the law. The present loose use of the term "international law" makes the delimitation of its actual scope all the more necessary. A searching discussion of these and related questions belongs more properly to a treatise on International Jurisprudence. The purpose of the present text is rather to set forth in as clear and concise terms as possible the existing state of things. The attempt has been made, therefore, to present international law as a positive system, and to distinguish as sharply as is feasible between such rules as have legal validity, in the sense that they are generally accepted, and such other rules as individual governments or writers, guided by altruistic or by selfish motives, have asserted are or should be the law. The present principles and practices of the nations form thus a starting point. By them may be judged the legal validity of the claims made by states seeking to enforce their national interests as against the interests of other members of the international community. On the other hand, looking to the future, the existing rules of international law may be tested by the general conceptions of justice prevailing within individual states, and conclusions may thus be drawn for the constructive amendment or enlargement of the law. This latter task is, in spite of its great importance, beyond the scope of the present volume. Its implications are, indeed, suggested here and there when glaring defects of the law are under consideration; but beyond this it has been neither feasible nor advisable to make constructive proposals. Reforms will be more readily forthcoming once the knowledge of present conditions has become more general. While maintaining, however, this positive attitude toward the rules of international law, the author has attempted to treat the subject in such a way as to throw light upon the true character of the law and to point out the limited scope of its operation. International law is still in a formative state, and there is need, in consequence, to interpret the law in the light of general jurisprudence and to point out its practical meaning in contrast with its abstract principles. Impatience is sometimes expressed with treatises which fail to present the law as a set of definite and categorical rules. But it can only be said that any treatise undertaking to do this would exclude from its scope the large body of usages and customs which lie on the outskirts of the law. The fundamental conceptions of international law are on the whole clear and precise. L When, however, governments come to apply general principles to concrete situations a wide field is opened up for differences of interpretation, and usage is not always sufficiently clear evidence of the correct inference in the case. In consequence there are many branches of the law in which it is difficult to make explicit and definite statements. The lawyer may seek the precision of a legal code; the scholar must be content with a balanced statement of general, and at times conflicting, practice. The following pages are offered as a text rather than as a general treatise. Fundamental principles are emphasized, and the leading features rather than the more minute details of international practice are set forth. Two considerations have been kept prominently in mind. The first is the need of showing the development of the general principles of the law, in order that their present validity may be better understood. With this object in view, frequent references have been made to the classic treatises of Grotius and Vattel, each of which is a landmark of progress at the period at which it was written. The second consideration is the importance of showing the application of general principles to concrete situations, and the divergences of international practice resulting from the absence of an international court of appeal. For this purpose references are made to the leading cases decided in national courts, principally British and American, which illustrate the interpretation placed by their respective governments upon the rule of law governing the particular facts in hand. For the convenience of the student, these cases have been selected from the available collections of cases, chiefly Scott's Cases on International Law (edition of 1922), and Evans' Leading Cases on International Law (edition of 1922). In addition to the references in foot-notes to authorities which may be consulted by the student, a briefer list of select references is included at the close of the volume. The difficult question as to the place to be assigned to the League of Nations in the general framework of international law has been met by taking the Covenant of the League as a legal document and discussing under separate headings the effect of its provisions upon the established rules of international law. Thus the organization and functions of the League are treated under a dozen or more chapter headings, while as a means of enabling the student to coördinate the different features of the League the text of the Covenant is printed in an appendix. The author regrets that a less conspicuous place could not have been assigned to the laws of war and of neutrality, or that treatment of them might not have been omitted altogether as unworthy of scientific study. But until the prospect of war becomes more remote it seems impossible to omit discussion of those paradoxical rules which mark the failure of the community of nations to develop a more adequate system of law. If in the coming years their importance should be diminished or quite nullified, they will still remain as instructive lessons in the history of the slow progress of mankind from lower to higher forms of law. Acknowledgment for help received is due in the first place to the standard treatises and texts, such as those of Hall, Oppenheim, Hershey, and others, which have put at the disposal of later writers a large body of material not otherwise available except at great cost of time. Moore's Digest is indispensable material for the American student, while Hyde's recent volumes have been of particular assistance in dealing with problems arising out of the World War. In addition the author is under special obligations to Professor Frederic A. Ogg, the general editor of the present series, who gave many helpful suggestions making for clearness and accuracy. Dr. James Brown Scott read the manuscript in full and contributed a small volume of criticisms and observations. which have added materially to the value of the work. Professor Manley O. Hudson read the proofs and entered numerous corrections. The author regrets that the character of the volume did not permit him to adopt the suggestions of Professor Hudson with respect to a more logical classification of international "rights" in accordance with the newer theories of analytical and sociological jurisprudence. Professor Edwin M. Borchard read the chapters on maritime war and checked up a number of points needing restatement. Professor Quincy Wright went through the list of select references in Appendix C and suggested additional titles. In spite of such valuable assistance, however, the author is conscious that in dealing with so many controversial questions and with so much doubtful evidence there is much room for error, for which he alone is responsible. Bryn Mawr College, Easter, 1924. C. G. F. |