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CHAP.
XXV

e. Pacific blockade

in 1807 Congress established a general embargo on all shipping, foreign and domestic, in the ports of the United States, making exception in favor of the departure of foreign ships in ballast.1 A Non-Intercourse Act followed in 1809 prohibiting commerce with France, England, and their colonies.2

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During the second quarter of the nineteenth century the larger states developed the practice of instituting a pacific blockade as a means of putting coercion upon weaker states. Pacific blockade differs from hostile blockade only in respect to the absence of a formal state of war and in respect to the relations of third states to the blockade. When resorted to upon political grounds-that is to say, when the blockading state has no direct legal ground of offense against the blockaded state, but is acting in pursuance of national interests above the law-pacific blockade is commonly classed as "intervention." But in object and in form it is, none the less, tantamount to reprisals. In 1827 Great Britain, France, and Russia, without declaring war upon Turkey, brought pressure to bear upon that state in the interest of the independence of Greece by blockading those parts of the Greek coast in occupation of the Turks. Even the subsequent battle of Navarino was fought without the acknowledgment of a state of formal war. In 1832 Great Britain and France blockaded the coast of Holland with the object of coercing that state to recognize the independence of Belgium. In 1886 he Great Powers blockaded the Greek coast to prevent that country from going to war with Turkey, and again in 1897 the Great Powers blockaded the coast of Crete to prevent the island from annexing itself to Greece. During the First Balkan War of 1913 the Great Powers blockaded the port of Antivari to prevent Montenegro from annexing a portion of Turkish territory which the blockading powers believed should be attached to Albania. A last instance of such intervention is to be seen in the blockade by the Allied Powers of certain ports of Greece in 1916

1 Act of December 22, 1807. 2 Stat. at Large, 451.

2 Act of March 1, 1909. 2 Stat. at Large, 528. For the effect of the several acts, see Moore, Digest, VII, § 1099. These acts must be distinguished from such measures as the act of March 14, 1912, by which Congress authorized an embargo upon the shipment to Mexico of arms and ammunition manufactured in the United States, the object of which was not to make reprisals upon Mexico, but to maintain better the neutrality of the United States during the civil conflict in Mexico. See below, p. 567.

See above, pp. 150 ff.

For details, see Hogan, Pacific Blockade, 73 ff.

For details, see ibid., 80 ff.

Ibid., 126 ff., 142 ff. Moore, Digest, VII, 138, 139.

with the object of preventing that state from joining forces with CHAP. the Central Powers.

Cases of reprisals in the strict sense are to be seen in the blockade of the Greek ports by Great Britain in 1850 as a means of securing redress for an attack upon the house of an English subject, Don Pacifico.1 This blockade has been generally condemned by authors on the ground that it was resorted to before recourse had been had by Don Pacifico to the Greek courts.2 In 1902 Great Britain, Germany, and Italy blockaded the coast of Venezuela as a means of coercing that state to settle outstanding claims of their respective citizens; but in this case it is not clear whether the blockading powers were not actually at war with the blockaded state.

il

XXV

upon the of third

states

Though condemned by some publicists as a form of international Its effect procedure, practice has now given to pacific blockade a definite commerce legal standing. There are, however, no rules of law governing the conditions under which recourse may be had to it. As to the effect of a pacific blockade upon the commercial intercourse of third states with the blockaded state, it would appear that the earlier blockades at times included the ships of third states in the restrictions imposed, whereas later blockades, such as that of Greece in 1886, were as a rule applied only to ships of the blockaded state.* In 1902 the United States announced, in anticipation of the blockade of Venezuela, that it refused to acquiesce "in any extension of the doctrine of pacific blockade which may adversely affect the rights of states not parties to the controversy, or discriminate against the commerce of neutral nations."' 5 It was in view, however, of the fact that a blockade could be of little value if it did not interfere with the commerce of third states that Hall argued that blockade was "essentially an incident of war," and that it could not be defended on the basis of general principle. As matters now stand, the discussion of the rights of third states still 1 See Oppenheim, International Law, II, § 35.

2 See ibid.

For details see Moore, Digest, VII, 140; U. S. Foreign Relations, 1903, 420 ff.; Stowell and Munro, Cases, II, 7.

4

The blockade of Crete in 1897 was exceptional in the restrictions placed upon the commerce of neutral ships. For the protest of the United States, see Moore, Digest, VII, 139.

Ibid., 140. See also VI, 586-592. For the collateral question as to the preferential treatment accorded to the claims of the blockading_powers, see Award of Tribunal of Arbitration, February 22, 1904. Scott, Hague Court Reports, 56; Wilson, Hague Arbitration Cases, 34,

•International Law, ed. 1883, § 121. This view was modified in later

editions.

CHAP.
XXV

f. Other forcible measures of redress

rests upon general principle, the argument being made, on the one side, that third states should not be made to suffer without fault by measures of self-help put into effect in time of peace, and, on the other side, that peaceful blockade is useful as an alternative to war, and that if the blockading power could not restrict the intercourse of third states there might be a tendency on its part to declare formal war.1 It would appear that it was the protest of third states against the pacific blockade of Formosa in 1885 that led France to declare war upon China, and that Great Britain, Germany, and Italy declared their blockade of Venezuela in 1902 to be a war blockade with the object of enforcing it against the vessels of third states.

In addition to pacific blockade, states have at times had recourse to other forcible measures of redress which differed only from acts of war by the absence of formal hostilities. In 1854 an American warship twice bombarded Greytown, Nicaragua, and finally destroyed the town by fire as reprisals for the failure of the authorities to grant the redress demanded. In justification of such exceptional action, President Polk offered the fact that the community was no more than a "piratical resort of outlaws." In 1858 the United States despatched a naval fleet to the River Plate with the object of making a demonstration which would facilitate the settlement of claims against Paraguay. In 1895 British forces occupied the custom house and other public buildings in the port of Corinto as a means of coercing Nicaragua to pay the indemnity demanded. A conspicuous instance of reprisals was the occupation by United States naval forces of the city of Vera Cruz in 1913 as a means of compelling the Mexican Government to grant specified redress for the arrest of an American officer and seaman in the port of Tampico. 5 The resolution of Congress of April 22, 1914, authorizing the President to use the armed forces of the United States "to enforce his demand for unequivocal amends for certain affronts and indignities committed against the United

1

The issues are discussed at length by Westlake, Collected Papers, 572 ff. See also Oppenheim, International Law, II, §§ 44-49. Hyde is of the opinion that the assertion that the right to coerce a delinquent State by means of a pacific blockade embraces incidentally the right to interfere with vessels of third States'' is at variance with sound principle. International Law, II, § 592. For the constructive proposals formulated by the Institute of International Law in 1887, see Resolutions, 69.

* Moore, Digest, VII, § 1168.

'Ibid., § 1092. For other examples of the display of force, see ibid., § 1091. Ibid., 1096.

For further details, see Hyde, International Law, II, § 591.

XXV

States" exhibits the paradoxical nature of reprisals in announcing CHAP. "that the United States disclaims any hostility to the Mexican people or any purpose to make war upon Mexico."

More recently, the Italian Government, not satisfied with the reply of Greece to its ultimatum of August 29, 1923, bombarded and seized the island of Corfu on the following day. The occupation of the island was explained as indicating not an intention to go to war but merely a desire to obtain a security which would make it clear to the Greek Government that no trifling would be permitted. The killing of a number of refugees in the fortress was described as unintentional. The island and others adjacent to it were evacuated on September 27.1

It should be observed that before resorting to the more extreme forms of reprisals states frequently break off diplomatic relations with the offending state by recalling their public ministers resident at the foreign capital. This measure is in itself not a form of reprisal, since it is not intended to inflict injury upon the offending state, but rather to serve as a warning that the issue between the two states has reached a point where the injured party regards diplomatic negotiations as no longer profitable and is prepared to take active measures of self-help.

For the conditions of the evacuation, see above, p. 392.

g. Rupture of diplo

matie

relations

a. Character

of war as a legal remedy:

the right to make

war

War as a procedure and war as a legal relation

CHAPTER XXVI

FORCIBLE PROCEDURE BY WAR

The right to make war as an ultimate means of self-help when other measures of redress have failed or offer no prospect of success has already been discussed with respect to the general principle of its legality. It has been shown that international law has concerned itself only in the most abstract way with the question of the causes for which war may be legally undertaken; and that while certain offenses are not regarded as sufficiently grave to warrant a recourse to war, yet under the present restricted scope of international law the circumstances attending a particular dispute may be so complex as to render ineffective any attempt on the part of public opinion to pass upon the merits of the decision taken. In general, therefore, it may be said that states are legally entitled to resort to war as a means of redress when the necessity of doing so seems to them warranted by the importance of the interests involved and justified by the principles of international law as interpreted by themselves individually. That this indi

vidual interpretation, however, may not be wholly arbitrary, international law interposes the sanction of general public opinion, supported by the possible armed intervention of states which fear for themselves should the lawbreaker succeed in his arbitrary measures.1

As a method of procedure, war consists in the employment of force to reduce the offending party to submission. It is this aspect of war which writers have in mind when they employ the definition of Gentilis to the effect that war is a "contention" or "contest" carried on between two states by means of their armed forces.

That the rule is sufficiently elastic to reduce the distinction between legal and illegal wars to the vanishing point has not kept it from being repeated by statesmen and writers. See above, pp. 383-385.

2

Oppenheim, for instance, says that "it is universally recognized that war is a contention, which means, a violent struggle through the application of armed force. For a war to be in existence, two or more States must actually have their armed forces fighting against each other, although the commencement of a war may date back to its declaration or some other unilateral initiative act." International Law, II, § 55. See also Lawrence, Principles of International Law, § 135. The definition of Gentilis may be found in De Jure Belli, Lib. I, Cap. 2. See Walker, History of the Law of Nations, I, 252.

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