Page images
PDF
EPUB

to make satisfaction for the slaves they carried away, contrary to the treaty of peace, and to deliver up the ports within our limits, the execution of that treaty is in some degree suspended. Individuals however are paying off their debts to British subjects, and the laws even permit the latter to recover them judicially. But as the amount of these debts are 20 or 30 times the amount of all the money in circulation in that state, the same laws permit the debtor to pay his debts in seven equal & annual payments.

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS OF M. DE MEUSNIER, AND

ANSWERS.

J. MSS.

1. What has led Congress to determine that the concurrence of seven votes is requisite in questions which by the Confederation are submitted to the decision of a Majority of the U. S. in Congress assembled ?

The IXth article of Confederation § 6. evidently establishes three orders of questions in Congress. 1. The greater ones, which relate to making peace or war, alliances, coinage, requisitions for money, raising military force, or appointing it's commander-inchief. 2. The lesser ones, which comprehend all other matters submitted by the Confederation to the federal head. 3. The single question of adjourning from day to day. This gradation of questions is distinctly characterized by the article.

In proportion to the magnitude of these questions, a greater concurrence of the voices composing the Union was thought necessary. Three degrees of concurrence, well distinguished by substantial circumstances, offered themselves to notice. 1. A concurrence of a majority of the people of the Union. It was thought that this would be ensured by requiring the voices of nine states; because according to the loose estimates which had been made of the inhabitants, & the proportion of them which were free, it was believed that even the nine smallest would include a majority of the free citizens of the Union. The voices therefore of nine states were required in the greater questions. 2. A concurrence of the majority of the states. Seven constitute that majority. This

number therefore was required in the lesser questions. 3. A concurrence of the majority of Congress, that is to say, of the states actually present in it. As there is no Congress when there are not seven states present, this concurrence could never be of less than four states. But these might happen to be the four smallest, which would not include one ninth part of the free citizens of the Union. This kind of majority therefore was entrusted with nothing but the power of adjourning themselves from day to day.

Here then are three kind of majorities. 1. Of the people. 2. Of the states. 3. Of the Congress: each of which is entrusted to a certain length.

Tho the paragraph in question be clumsily expressed, yet it strictly ennounces it's own intentions. It defines with precision the greater questions for which nine votes shall be requisite. To the lesser questions it then requires a majority of the U. S. in Congress assembled: a term indeed which will apply either to the number seven, as being a majority of the states; or to the number four, as being a majority of Congress. Which of the two kinds of majority was meant? Clearly that which would leave a still smaller kind for the decision of the question of adjournment. The contrary would be absurd.

This paragraph therefore should be understood as if it had been expressed in the following terms: "The United States in Congress assembled shall never engage in war &c. but with the consent of nine states: nor determine any other question but with the consent of a majority of the whole states; except the question of adjournment from day to day, which may be determined by a majority of the states actually present in Congress."

2. How far is it permitted to bring on the reconsideration of a question which Congress has once determined?

The first Congress which met being composed mostly of persons who had been members of the legislatures of their respective states, it was natural for them to adopt those rules in their proceedings to which they had been accustomed in their legislative

houses; and the more so as these happened to be nearly the same, as having been copied from the same original, the British parliament. One of those rules of proceeding was, that "a question once determined cannot be proposed a second time in the same session." Congress, during their first session, in the autumn of 1774, observed this rule strictly. But before their meeting in the spring of the following year, the war had broke out. They found themselves at the head of that war in an Executive as well as Legislative capacity. They found that a rule, wise and necessary for a Legislative body, did not suit an Executive one, which, being governed by events, must change their purposes, as those change. Besides their session was likely then to become of equal duration with the war; and a rule which should render their legislation immutable during all that period could not be submitted to. They therefore renounced it in practice, and have ever since continued to reconsider their questions freely. The only restraint as yet provided against the abuse of this permission to reconsider, is that when a question has been decided, it cannot be proposed for reconsideration but by some one who voted in favor of the former decision, & declares that he has since changed his opinion. I do not recollect accurately enough whether it be necessary that his vote should have decided that of his state, and the vote of his state have decided that of Congress.

Perhaps it might have been better when they were forming the federal constitution, to have assimilated it as much as possible to the particular constitutions of the states. All of these have distributed the Legislative, executive & judiciary powers into different departments. In the federal constitution the judiciary powers are separated from the others: but the legislative and executive are both exercised by Congress. A means of amending this defect has been thought of. Congress having a power to establish what committees of their own body they please, and to arrange among them the distribution of their business, they might on the first day of their annual meeting appoint an executive committee, consisting of a member from each state, and refer to them all executive business which should occur during their session; confining themselves to what is of a legislative nature, that is to say to the heads described in the 9th article as of the

competence of 9 states only, and to such other questions as should lead to the establishment of general rules. The journal of this committee of the preceding day might be read the next morning in Congress, & considered as approved, unless a vote was demanded on a particular article, & that article changed. The sessions of Congress would then be short, & when they separated, the Confederation authorizes the appointment of a committee of the states, which would naturally succeed to the business of the Executive committee. The legislative business would be better done, because the attention of the members would not be interrupted by the details of execution; and the executive business would be better done, because business of this nature is better adapted to small than great bodies. A monarchical head should confide the execution of it's will to departments consisting each of a plurality of hands, who would warp that will as much as possible towards wisdom & moderation, the two qualities it generally wants. But a republican head founding it's decrees originally in these two qualities should commit them to a single hand for execution, giving them thereby a promptitude which republican proceedings generally want. Congress could not indeed confide their executive business to a smaller number than a committee consisting of a member from each state. This is necessary to ensure the confidence of the Union. But it would be gaining a great deal to reduce the executive head to thirteen, and to debarrass themselves of those details. This however has as yet been the subject of private conversations only.

3. Calculating the federal debts by the interest they pay, their principal would be much more than is stated under the 3d. of the former queries. The reason for this is that there is a part of the money put into the loan office which was borrowed under a special contract that whatever depreciation might take place on the principal, the interest should be paid in hard money on the nominal amount, Congress only reserving to itself the right, whenever they should pay off the principal, to pay it according to it's true value, without regard to it's nominal one. The amount of this part of the debt is 3,459.200 dollars. From the best documents in my possession I estimate the capital of the federal debt as follows.

[blocks in formation]

Domestic debt as stated in Apr. 1783, since which there is no

[blocks in formation]

The result as to the foreign debt is considerably more thar in the estimate I made before. That was taken on the state of the Dutch loans as known to Congress in 1784. The new estimate of 1785 however (lately come to hand) shews those loans to be completed up to 7 millions of florins, which is much more than their amount in the preceding statements. The domestic debt too is made somewhat higher than in the preceding answer to the 3d. query. I had in that taken the statement of 1783 for my basis, and had endeavored to correct that by the subsequent liquidation of 1784. & 1785. On considering more maturely those means of correction, I apprehend they will be more likely to lead to error; and that, upon the whole, the statement of 1783, is the surest we can have recourse to. I have therefore adopted t literally.

« PreviousContinue »