to lay such duties, restrictions, or prohibitions on the goods of any particular nation as might oblige that nation to concur in just & equal arrangements of commerce. 2. To lay such uniform duties on the articles of commerce throughout all the states, as may avail them of that fund for assisting to bear the burthen of public expenses. Now this cannot be done by the states separately; because they will not separately pursue the same plan. New Hampshire cannot lay a given duty on a particular article, unless Massachusetts will do the same; because it will turn the importation of that article from her ports into those of Massachusetts, from whence they will be smuggled into New Hampshire by land. But tho Massachusetts were willing to concur with N Hampshire in laying the same duty, yet she cannot do it, for the same reason, unless Rhode island will also, nor can Rhode island without Connecticut, nor Connecticut without N York, nor N York without N Jersey, & so on quite to Georgia. It is visible therefore that the commerce of the states cannot be regulated to the best advantage but by a single body, and no body so proper as Congress. Many of the states have agreed to add an article to the Confederation for allowing to Congress the regulation of their commerce, only providing that the revenues to be raised on it, shall belong to the state in which they are levied. Yet it is believed that Rhode island will prevent this also. An everlasting recurrence to this same obstacle will occasion a question to be asked. How happens it that Rhode island is opposed to every useful proposition? Her geography accounts for it, with the aid of one or two observations. The cultivators of the earth are the most virtuous citizens, and possess most of the amor patriæ. Merchants are the least virtuous, and possess the least of the amor patriæ. The latter reside principally in the seaport towns, the former in the interior country. Now it happened that of the territory constituting Rhode island & Connecticut, the part containing the seaports was erected into a state by itself & called Rhode island, & that containing the interior country was erected into another state called Connecticut. For tho it has a little sea

coast, there are no good ports in it. Hence it happens that there is scarcely one merchant in the whole state of Connecticut, while there is not a single man in Rhode island who is not a merchant

of some sort. Their whole territory is but a thousand square miles, and what of that is in use is laid out in grass farms almost entirely. Hence they have scarcely any body employed in agriculture. All exercise some species of commerce. This circumstance has decided the characters of these two states. The remedies to this evil are hazardous. One would be to consolidate the two states into one. Another would be to banish Rhode island from the union. A third to compel her submission to the will of the other twelve. A fourth for the other twelve to govern themselves according to the new propositions and to let Rhode island go on by herself according to the antient articles. But the dangers & difficulties attending all these remedies are obvious.

These are the only alterations proposed to the confederation, and the last of them is the only additional power which Congress is thought to need.

12. Congress have not yet ultimately decided at what rates they will redeem the paper money in the hands of the holders, but a resolution of 1784, has established the principle, so that there can be little doubt but that the holders of paper money shall receive as much real money as the paper was actually worth at the time they received it, and an interest of 6 per cent from the time they received it. It's worth will be found in the depreciation table of the state wherein it was received; these depreciation tables having been formed according to the market prices of the paper money at different epochs.

13. Those who talk of the bankruptcy of the U. S. are of two descriptions. 1. Strangers who do not understand the nature & history of our paper money. 2. Holders of that paper-money

who do not wish that the world should understand it. Thus when, in March 1780. the paper money being so far depreciated that 40 dollars of it would purchase only 1. silver dollar, Congress endeavored to arrest the progress of that depreciation by declaring they would emit no more, and would redeem what was in circulation at the rate of one dollar of silver for 40 of paper; this was called by the brokers in paper money, a bankruptcy. Yet these very people had only given one dollar's worth of provisions, of manufactures, or perhaps of silver for their forty dollars, & were displeased that they could not in a moment multiply their

silver into 40. If it were decided that the U. S. should pay a silver dollar for every paper dollar they emitted, I am of opinion (conjecturing from loose data of my memory only as to the amount & true worth of the sums emitted by Congress and by the several states) that a debt, which in it's just amount is not more perhaps than 6 millions of dollars, would amount up to 400 millions; and instead of assessing every inhabitant with a debt of about 2 dollars, would fix on him thirty guineas which is considerably more than the national debt of England affixes on each of its inhabitants, and would make a bankruptcy where there is none. The real just debts of the U. S., which were stated under the 3d query, will be easily paid by the sale of their lands, which were ceded on the fundamental condition of being applied as a sinking fund for this purpose.

14. La canne à sucre est un erreur du traducteur de M. Filson. Le mot Anglois 'cane' vent dire ‘arundo' en latin, et ‘roseau' ou 'canne' en François le traducteur en a fait la 'canne du sucre,' probablement que le 'caffier' est une erreur semblable.

15. The whole army of the United States was disbanded at the close of the war. A few guards only were engaged for their magazines. Lately they have enlisted some two or three regiments to garrison the posts along the Northern boundary of the U. S.

16. 17. The U. S. do not own at present a single vessel of war; nor has Congress entered into any resolution on that subject.

18. I conjecture there are 650,000 negroes in the five Southernmost states, and not 50,000 in the rest. In most of these latter effectual measures have been taken for their future emancipation. In the former, nothing is done towards that. The disposition to emancipate them is strongest in Virginia. Those who desire it, form, as yet, the minority of the whole state, but it bears a respectable proportion to the whole in numbers & weight of character, & it is continually recruiting by the addition of nearly the whole of the young men as fast as they come into public life. I flatter myself it will take place there at some period of time not very distant. In Maryland & N. Carolina a very few are disposed to emancipate. In S. Carolina & Georgia not the smallest symp

VOL. IV.-10

toms of it, but, on the contrary these two states & N. Carolina continue importations of negroes. These have been long prohibited in all the other states.

19. In Virginia, where a great proportion of the legislature consider the constitution but as other acts of legislation, laws have been frequently passed which controulled it's effects. I have not heard that in the other states they have ever infringed their constitution; & I suppose they have not done it; as the judges would consider any law as void which was contrary to the constitution. Pennsylvania is divided into two parties, very nearly equal, the one desiring to change the constitution, the other opposing a change. In Virginia there is a part of the state which considers the act for organizing their government as a constitution, & are content to let it remain; there is another part which considers it only as an ordinary act of the legislature, who therefore wish to form a real constitution, amending some defects which have been observed in the acts now in force. Most of the young people as they come into office arrange themselves on this side, and I think they will prevail ere long. But there are no heats on this account. I do not know that any of the other states propose to change their constitution.

20. I have heard of no malversations in office which have been of any consequence; unless we consider as such some factious transactions in the Pennsylvania assembly; or some acts of the Virginia assembly which have been contrary to their constitution. The causes of these were explained in the preceding article.

21. Broils among the states may happen in the following ways: 1. A state may be embroiled with the other twelve by not complying with the lawful requisitions of Congress. 2. Two states may differ about their boundaries. But the method of settling these is fixed by the Confederation, and most of the states which have any differences of this kind are submitting them to this mode of determination; and there is no danger of opposition to the decree by any state. The individuals interested may complain, but this can produce no difficulty. 3. Other contestations may arise between two states, such as pecuniary demands, affrays among their citizens, & whatever else may arise between any two

nations. With respect to these, there are two opinions. One that they are to be decided according to the 9th article of the Confederation, which says that "Congress shall be the last resort in all differences between two or more states, concerning boundary jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever"; and prescribes the mode of decision, and the weight of reason is undoubtedly in favor of this opinion, yet there are some who question it.

It has been often said that the decisions of Congress are impotent because the Confederation provides no compulsory power. But when two or more nations enter into compact, it is not usual for them to say what shall be done to the party who infringes it. Decency forbids this, and it is unnecessary as indecent, because the right of compulsion naturally results to the party injured by the breach. When any one state in the American Union refuses obedience to the Confederation by which they have bound themselves, the rest have a natural right to compel them to obedience. Congress would probably exercise long patience before they would recur to force; but if the case ultimately required it, they would use that recurrence. Should this case ever arise, they will probably coerce by a naval force, as being more easy, less dangerous to liberty, & less likely to produce much bloodshed.

It has been said too that our governments both federal and particular want energy; that it is difficult to restrain both individuals & states from committing wrong. This is true, & it is an inconvenience. On the other hand that energy which absolute governments derive from an armed force, which is the effect of the bayonet constantly held at the breast of every citizen, and which resembles very much the stillness of the grave, must be admitted also to have it's inconveniences. We weigh the two together, and like best to submit to the former. Compare the number of wrongs committed with impunity by citizens among us, with those committed by the sovereign in other countries, and the last will be found most numerous, most oppressive on the mind, and most degrading of the dignity of man.

22. The states differed very much in their proceedings as to British property; and I am unable to give the details. In Virginia, the sums sequestered in the treasury remain precisely as they did at the conclusion of the peace. The British having refused