as a basis for new highway bridges, it should, at least for the sake of economy, reconsider the wisdom of constructing a rapid transit line to Virginia.

2. A so-called "1985" traffic forecast, prepared by the D.C. Highway Department in 1964 as a basis for an expansion of the proposed system of interstate freeways in Washington. Subsequent studies are in agreement that this "1985" forecast is worthless, and the D.C. Highway Department itself has recently abandoned it.

3. A desire, at least on the part of many Planning Commission members, to appease the Highway Lobby in the hopes that this would reduce their irresponsible clamor and pressures for much more controversial projects, particularly a proposed Three Sisters Bridge.

We find none of these reasons to be sound affirmative grounds for the proposed legislation. To the contrary, whether the Congress desires to face up to the issue or not, it should recognize that the construction of new bridges to funnel more traffic into the central city may seriously jeopardize the economic feasibility of the recently-authorized rapid transit system and may destroy, for the foreseeable future, Washington's chance to secure a "balanced transportation system."

THE PAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

Twenty-five years ago, a former D.C. Highway Director (Captain Whitehurst) advised the House District Committee that in his judgment it would be a mistake to build any more bridges from Washington to Virginia. His reason: the central city was already overloaded with motor vehicles.

Since that time, Congress has authorized and the Commissioners have constructed three new bridges. Of the four bridges in existence in 1941, one (Highway) has been retired and the capacity has been increased on the other three by widening (Key), unbalanced lanes (Chain and Memorial) and improved access roads (Key, Chain and Memorial).

When ground was broken on the most recent of these bridge improvements (Roosevelt Bridge) in 1960, Engineer Commissioner Welling declared that this was the last bridge to be built between Washington and Virginia. With its completion, the number of peak-hour inbound highway lanes from Virginia to Washington has been increased 100% since 1950 from 8 lanes to 16, which is more than from New Jersey to Manhattan, which has over twice as many peakhour commuters as Washington.

In the same 15-year period, from 1950 to 1965, the total number of peak-hour commuters from Virignia to Washington increased by only 37.5%, from 29,900 in 1950 to 41,170 as of 1965. Transit commuting not only failed to increase, but declined; all of the increase was reflected in increased auto traffic. With the opening of each new bridge, the number of bus commuters dipped. Where once over 50% of all peak-hour travel from Virginia to Washington was by bus, this ratio dropped to 28% by 1965.

New bridge construction has so outstripped increased travel requirements that Washington today has more unused bridge capacity than ever before in its history. Traffic on Memorial Bridge is at its lowest point in over a decade; Key Bridge and Chain Bridge traffic are both substantially lower than in recent years; Roosevelt Bridge is being used at only one-third of its capacity.

THE CLOUDED CRYSTAL BALL

Sophisticated transportation planners are today only beginning to realize how grossly inaccurate and misleading have been their previous forecasts of "need" on which existing bridges have been built.

Thus, the Mass Transportation Survey of 1959, relying upon a 1958 forecast by Wilbur Smith & Associates, New Haven, Connecticut, recommended a bridge system on the basis of the following projected increases from 1955 to 1965:

As of today, all of the bridges have been built which the MTS deemed necessary for a peak-hour inbound flow of about 60,000 commuters, without rapid transit, but 1965 has come and gone with total travel, and traffic in all categories far below the levels previously assumed.

It is also recognized that the MTS made a "1980" forecast, which was the basis for its recommendation for bridges at Three Sisters Islands and Arizona Avenue. But, we are so far away from even the "1965" forecast that it seems pointless to be concerned with "1980" as well. Needless to say, however, even the still higher "1980" forecast found no need for a third bridge at 14th Street.

CURRENT ESTIMATES OF NEED

A singular fact which we would hope would have some weight with your committee is that all published studies of future transportation requirements since the MTS except one are in full agreement that with a balanced transportation system (including rapid transit) there is no present indication of any additional bridge requirements in the next 20 years. And the one exception (by the Highway Department) has been abandoned by its sponsor.

That one exception is a pamphlet, issued by the D.C. Highway Department, November 4, 1964, entitled "Supplementary Report on Interstate Route 266: 1985 Traffic Forecast For Central Potomac River Crossings." For an early refutation of this report, see Committee of 100 on the Federal City, "Rush-Hour Commuting From Virginia to Washington," November, 1964. Subsequent analyses by the Clarkeson Engineering Company, Alan M. Voorhees & Associates, Wilbur Smith & Associates and Arthur D. Little, Inc., also confirm the worthlessness of the conclusions of that report, and the D.C. Highway Department has quietly buried its "1985" forecast, although the resulting freeway proposals remain on its drawing boards.

The first study was that conducted by the NCTA in 1962 in carrying out its Congressional mandate to review and revise the 1959 Mass Transportation Survey. It found no need for any new Virginia-Washington bridges, at 14th street or at any other location.

Initially, the D.C. Highway Department ridiculed the NCTA's forecast as "too low", pointing out that it was related to the year "1977" whereas it felt it should be planning for 1985. It has now been confirmed, however, by two con sultants retained by the Highway Department that the NCTA forecast, far from being low, is in fact optimistic. The joint report formally submitted by Wilbur S. Smith & Associates and Alan Voorhees & Associates, Inc., to the D.Č. Highway Department, April 15, 1966, concludes that the NCTA forecast was too high for 1977 and may, indeed, be optimistic for the year 1985!

Finally, of course, there is the recent evaluation of the D.C. Highway program by Arthur D. Little, Inc., prepared under the direction of President Johnson. This report, "Transportation Planning in the District of Columbia, 1955 to 1965: A Review and Critique", March 22, 1966, included the following conclusions and recommendations:

"Present plans for freeway extensions in the District are based on insufficient data, and on questionable assumptions and forecasting techniques.

"Transportation planning has been carried out with inadequate regard for long-range economic and social impact.

"The competitive aspects of freeways vs. rapid-transit have been given only cursory treatment in the reports.

And, with specific reference to D.C. Highway Department proposals for new radial freeways and bridges, Arthur D. Little, Inc., recommended that the Policy Advisory Committee urge:

"The District Government and the Bureau of Public Roads to delay action on all proposals for extending the District's freeway network until the highway plan has been re-examined."

The Policy Advisory Committee, which included in its membership both the District Engineer Commissioner and the Federal Highway Administrator, unanimously concurred in the substance of this recommendation, stating:

"Planning for extensions of the freeway system to provide east-west and northsouth connections through the District should remain flexible. This will permit the utilization of more current statistical data, future modifications in freeway design criteria, and the National Capital Planning Commission's latest land-use plan for the District."

Detailed studies by the Committee of 100 on the Federal City have reached essentially the same conclusions, finding a total absence of any need for more bridge capacity than the present 29 lanes between Washington and Virginia.

Three of the most recent of these studies, which include documentation for factual statements in this letter, are attached. They are:

1. "Transportation Recommendations for the 1965-85 Plan," as approved at the annual meeting of the Committee of 100 on the Federal City, November 30, 1965;

2. "The 1965 'Gravity Model' Traffic Forecast of the Mass Transportation Survey: Forecast Vs. Actual Traffic Growth," a report dated Sept. 9, 1965, as revised Feb. 15, 1966;

3. "Forecasting 1985 Transportation Requirements," a report dated Feb. 26, 1966, that includes as an appendix, "Assumptions Employed By Highway Planners To Inflate 1985 Traffic Forecast," which is pertinent to the "1985" forecast recently abandoned by the D.C. Highway Department.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

This letter focuses primarily on the economic and transportation balance considerations posed by the proposal to build a third 14th Street Bridge that, by current planning data, is excessive to future needs.

We would be remiss, however, if we did not point to other practical problems that are raised by the proposal. We note that no scale model, diagrams or maps were presented at the hearing to show how two new two-lane roadways from the 14th Street bridges would be integrated into the already complex highway network fronting the Jefferson Memorial in West Potomac Park. Under the proposal, this area would have to accommodate the junction of at least 36 lanes of highways-12 lanes from the 14th Street bridge added to 8 lanes of the Southwest Freeway, 6 lanes on 14th Street, 6 lanes on the proposed South Leg Freeway, 4 lanes on Maine Avenue, plus other lanes on park roads.

One cannot help wonder how this "gateway to our Nation's Capital" would look with such a maze of highways. We would think that Congress, most of all, would want to insist on a visual plan, including a scale model, before giving serious consideration to the present proposal.

We should also point out that the contemplated widening of Shirley Highway, without the addition of new bridge capacity, could actually promote achievement of a better balance in Washington's transportation system. The presentlyauthorized southern terminus of the rapid transit system is located at approximately the northern terminus of the Virginia highway widening proposal, offering an ideal place on the south side of the Potomac River for a fringe parking facility for motorists or bus riders to connect to rapid transit for swift movement to their Washington destinations.

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

We find ourselves in full concurrence with the opinions, as expressed in several opinions by the Comptroller General and in statements by the members of your committee, that the Board of District Commissioners are without legislative authority to construct bridges within the District of Columbia across the Potomac River.

Ever since the District of Columbia became the seat of the Federal government, Congress alone has had jurisdiction formerly exercised by Maryland and Virginia over the Potomac River within the District "to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in all cases whatsoever." Constitution, Article I, Section 8.

There has not been a single bridge built across the Potomac River in the 165 years since this cession that has not been built pursuant to special Congressional enactment, whether such bridge has been for vehicles, canal boats, railroads or (most recently) the proposed rapid transit line.

As long ago as 1838, when a certain lawyer named Francis Scott Key unsuccessfully sought to enjoin construction of the original Aqueduct Bridge, the Supreme Court recognized that specific authority was required from Congress for bridges crossing any part of the Potomac River within the District of Columbia. City of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Pet. 91.

Of the highway bridges presently standing across the Potomac River within the District of Columbia, the old Highway Bridge was authorized by the Act of Feb. 12, 1901, 31 Stat. 767, as amended by joint resolution of Feb. 19, 1906, 34 Stat. 821; Francis Scott Key Bridge was authorized by the Act of May 18, 1916, 39 Stat. 163; Memorial Bridge, by the Act of Feb. 24, 1925, 43 Stat. 974; the new super-structure on Chain Bridge, by the Act of June 23, 1936, 49 Stat. 1863; the two new bridges at 14th Street by the Act of July 16, 1946, 60 Stat. 566, as amended by the Act of July 3, 1958, 72 Stat. 320; Woodrow Wilson Bridge, by

the Act of August 30, 1954, 68 Stat. 963, as amended by the Act of May 22, 1956, 70 Stat. 184; and Theodore Roosevelt Bridge, by the Act of August 30, 1954, 68 Stat. 961, as amended by the Act of June 4, 1958, 72 Stat. 180.

Contrary to the contention of the Commissions' Corporation Counsel, the six legislative enactments since 1946 were not to resolve disputes among warring agencies. Although in two instances with regard to the 1946 legislation and the 1954 legislation on Roosevelt Bridge-there initially had been such differences, on both occasions they were resolved before the bills ever left committee, the first by mediation by President Truman from the top of the Washington Monument, the second by mediation by the late Senator Case at a breakfast conference. And in none of these instances was it ever suggested that Congress had unwittingly "delegated" its legislative authority to the District Commissioners, any other agency, or any combination of agencies to act for it.

Corporation Counsel's legal shell game ignores the distinctive Constitutional roles of Congress legislating as the Federal government and as the "state government" of the District of Columbia. While the District of Columbia may, and frequently is, included in Federal programs legislated by Congress (such as qualifying for Federal highway aid as a state), this does not waive the necessity for affirmative "state" action or waive "state" jurisdiction.

This distinction is evident in the history of Potomac River bridges. The first such bridge, known as the "Little Falls Bridge", was erected in the 1790's at the present site of Chain Bridge by the Georgetown Bridge Company under authority of a charter granted by the Maryland legislature. With the establishment of the District of Columbia, Maryland's former jurisdiction over the Potomac River became vested in Congress. When this bridge was washed out by floods, the bridge company found that its original Maryland authorization, continued by Act of Congress, was insufficient to rebuild the bridge. Upon petition from the company, Congress authorized the stockholders of the company to rebuild the bridge. 2 Stat. 648 (1811). No "Federal" issue was involved, the bridge being well above the navigable limits of the Potomac River. No "appropriation" issue was involved, since the capital was to come completely from private sources.

Corporation Counsel's legal shell game also confuses the distinction between an "authorization" by Congress for an agent to exercise a sovereign power in the District of Columbia, vested in Congress by the Constitution, and an "appropriation" by Congress enabling a person to spend public money. Where, as in the case of private bridge companies, turnpike companies, or transit companies, no public money is involved, only an "authorization" is necessary. Where, as in the case of the District Commissioners' statutory duty to keep District highways in repair, there exists a standing "authorization," only an "appropriation" is necessary. For most major public transportation projects, both are required. A mere appropriation, standing alone, is insufficient to constitute an authorization, Maiatico v. United States, 302 F. 2d 880 (1962). Thus, although Congress had appropriated funds for the construction of an expressway in Glover-Archbold Park, an injunction suit was sustained against a motion to dismiss where an issue existed as to the District Government's legislative authority to take the park lands involved. Archbold v. McLaughlin, D.D.C. 1960. Similarly, an authorization standing alone, without supporting appropriations, is insufficient to permit attempted implementation of the authority. Miller v. United States, 61 App. D.C. 58 (1932). Thus, despite the fact that Congress in 1897 authorized the District Commissioners to construct Connecticut Avenue between Florida Avenue and the west side of Rock Creek valley, it was many years before the Commissioners secured the necessary appropriations to complete the project. See Extending Connecticut Avenue, 3 Comp. Dec. 435 (1897); Appropriations for Bridges Across Rock Creek, 10 Comp. Dec. 281 (1903).

While it is possible, if Congress so desires, to combine an "authorization" and "appropriation" in the same legislative act-such as was done in sanctioning the present superstructure of Chain Bridge in 1938 recent District appropriations acts have not purported to do so, and they would have been subject to a point of order if they had.

Corporation Counsel variously asserts that the alleged discretion of the District Commissioners to build such bridges as they want, without specific Congressional authorization, originated in 1938, 1946, and 1954. The complete answer to this argument is to be found in the history of the 1954 legislation it relies upon and subsequent legislative developments:

The draft bill that became the Public Works Act included the ambiguous phrase that "A program of construction projects to meet immediate capital needs for highways in the District is hereby authorized." Some of the projects described

in this program (e.g., East Capitol Street Bridge) had previously been authorized by Congress; others (e.g., Theodore Roosevelt Bridge) had not been. The question naturally arose as to whether the "progam" being authorized was a program for raising money, in that case by borrowing, or also constituted a blind authorization of specific projects that had not been authorized by Congress.

At the House District Committee hearings, Representative Smith asked the D.C. Highway Department:

"If I may interrupt you right there, I have been wondering whether, if we passed this bill, it would authorize the controversial E Street bridge."

"No, sir," was the emphatic reply of Mr. Brinkley of the D.C. Highway Department. Engineer Commissioner Prentiss added: "this authorization is for a method of financing the program, and we are not asking for the approval of the specific project." (Hearings, p. 124).

The Public Works Act became law on May 18, 1954, 68 Stat. 218. Thereafter, on July 28, 1954, at a famous breakfast at the Cosmos Club, the previously-divided Federai and District agencies presented to Senator Francis Case their agreement on a site for what is now known as Theodore Roosevelt Bridge. See Washington Post, July 29, 1954. Under Corporation Counsel's present theory, this should have ended any necessity for Congressional action. But, instead of relying upon this breakfast compact as a basis for ignoring the Commissioners' prior legislative request, Engineer Commissioner Prentiss relied upon the agreement as a basis for Congress giving favorable action on bills then stuck in committee. Thereafter, Congress granted the requested authorization for the bridge, which became law on August 30, 1954, 68 Stat. 961.

Thereafter, however, the District Commissioners and other interested agencies changed their minds and decided that they desired to build a different bridgeslightly north of the previously authorized location. Money having been appropriated by Congress and earmarked for the bridge, the question arose as to whether the Commissioners could spend such appropriations on a bridge different from the one specifically authorized. The Comptroller General emphatically ruled no. Noting that existing legislation included nothing "which may be considered as authorizing or directing construction of the bridge across the Potomac River in the vicinity of Constitution Avenue at a location other than the location prescribed" in the 1954 bridge act, the Comptroller General ruled that such 1954 legislation would have to be amended before the project could be commenced. Opinion B-125404, August 31, 1956.

In the following year, District Engineer Commissioner Lane made an abortive proposal that Congress consider "granting to the Commissioners an authority similar to that enjoyed by all State highway commissions to build bridges as may be required" in their own discretion. (See "Lane Contends District Should Pick Bridge Sites," Washington Star, April 12, 1957). This trial balloon gained no general support and never ripened into a specific legislative proposal. Instead, the Commissioners sought, and ultimately obtained, amendment of the previous 1954 legislation so as to authorize construction of the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge at its present location, 72 Stat. 183 (1958).

In conclusion, we would like to express our appreciation to your committee for focusing attention on the fact that projects added to the D.C. Highway Department's program in recent years have no legislative authorization.

Although, for the reasons stated, we cannot support the bill now before your subcommittee, we would like to urge that immediate attention be given to consideraion of legislation necessary to implement highway plans supported by the Committee of 100, found justified by the Arthur D. Little study and recommended specifically by the Policy Advisory Committee. In particular, we would hope that the National Capital Planning Commission or the President would be invited to submit draft legislation at an early date to authorize replacement of the Whitehurst Freeway with a tunneled freeway and to authorize a South Leg freeway tunnel beneath the Lincoln Memorial and the Tidal Basin. Respectfully submitted.

PETER S. CRAIG, Chairman, Roads Subcommittee.