Mr. MOLLEUR. Mr. Chairman, in view of that question, I would just like to point out what I think is pertinent here, because it was asked twice this morning. Last fall I had an extensive meeting with Judge Morris Miller of the Juvenile Court. And at that time we discussed the necessity and the need for extending the project's activities into the Juvenile Court. And the Judge told me thatoutlined these special procedures which the Juvenile Court had for recognizance release of juvenile offenders, and some of the adult persons that come before that court. And therefore he indicated to me that he did not feel that there was any special need for the project to operate in that court. Mr. WHITENER. Thank you, Mr. Molleur. Now, Mr. David Bress, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. We have kept you quite longer than we should have. STATEMENT OF DAVID BRESS, ESQ., U.S. ATTORNEY FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Mr. BRESS. In view of what has been said, I have very little to add. I think the bail agency is desirable, even without the Bail Reform. Act. With the Bail Reform Act I think the bail agency bill is indispensable. With respect to Sections 10 and 11, it is my opinion that it would be undesirable to add Section 10, leave 10 in this bill, in view of the differences between Section 10 and its parallel provision in the Bail Reform Act. I think that there is an inconsistency between the two. Under Section 10 a sentencing judge is required to give credit for pretrial detention. And if he does that, under the Bail Reform Act it may well be that the Attorney General will also be called upon to give credit. I think that one or the other ought to do it. Since we now have the Bail Reform Act passed, I think we ought to leave that subject alone and let it be handled administratively by the Attorney General. It seems to me in principle that it will be fairer if it is handled administratively, and the judge would then be imposing the sentence without regard to pre-trial detention. I am satisfied that there is nothing additional that I need say in support of this bill. Mr. FuQUA. Mr. Bress, is it your opinion that both Sections 10 and 11 in toto should be deleted in this bill we are considering now, 15065? Mr. BRESS. Yes, sir, I think so, in view of its inclusion in the Bail Report Act. Mr. FUQUA. And that is because this is covered in the Bail Reform Act? Mr. BRESS. Yes, sir. Mr. WHITENER. Mr. Bress, of course you know that in the House Judiciary Committee that the problems of the incarceration credit provision and it is much broader in Section 10 of this bill, because it not only applies to criminal offenses, but it applies to criminal acts, which, as we understand it, mean that in the case of a criminal intent, or I suppose quasicriminal actions, that this credit shall prevail as well. I think maybe this is desirable in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, that it has to be done. But we will take into account your recommendations and those of Mr. Freed. 65-212 0-66- -5 And I assume, Professor, you and Mr. McCarthy and Mr. Molleur have no adverse comment to make about that recommendation, do you? Mr. GREENKALGH. Well, since Dean McCarthy outranks me I would have to yield to him. I am sure that we can work it out. Mr. MCCARTHY. We commented in our statement about the possible effects of this other Bail Reform Act. I think it is fair to say that when this was drafted by Judge Danaher of course the Bail Reform Act had not yet, as you know, finally come out of the House Judiciary Committee. And I think that he was attempting to reflect a proposal which has often been made in connection with bail releases. But I do think, as Mr. Freed and Mr. Bress have indicated, that in view of the passage yesterday, and the obvious imminent enactment into law of the Bail Reform Act of 1966, section 10 with its various provisions is possibly inconsistent with the Bail Reform Act. Insofar as 11 is concerned, I believe it is virtually the same language as is in the Bail Reform Act. And if it serves any purpose by being in this Act it would merely be to emphasize that this Act did not intend to conflict with the Bail Reform Act. But it would serve no other function. Mr. WHITENER. At the time this bill, H.R. 15065 was being prepared, the Judiciary Committee was dealing with S. 1357, which at that time had in addition to this time credit some sort of payment formula based on the Minimum Wage Act. I want to make the record clear that Judge Danaher agreed with me and a majority of the House Judiciary Committee that that was a cumbersome and unworkable proposition. So not knowing how the committee would amend that section-but I suppose operating under the suggestion from me as a member of the Judiciary Committee-I thought that we would take out a part of it, a part of that section. He and his judicial colleagues, in drafting this bill, were almost faced with the necessity of having a sensible provision about time credit or credit for the time incarcerated prior to trial. And I believe if you gentlemen will talk to Judge Danaher in the light of what has happened to S. 1357 since he and I were having our preliminary discussions about the content of this bill, you may find that you are not in disagreement. We will include in the record at this point the letter of Mr. Bress to Chairman McMillan, dated June 2, 1966. (The letter referred to follows:) Hon. JOHN L. MCMILLAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Chairman, Committee on the District of Columbia, DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Reference your communication of May 20, 1966, pertaining to H.R. 15065, a bill to "establish a fact-reporting bail agency in courts of the District of Columbia, and for other purposes", and your invitation to address my recommendations and report to the Committee, this is to advise that I am in full accord with the basic principle embodied in the bill. In fact, on Wednesday, May 25, 1966 I again voted affirmatively in the Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit in favor of establishing a fact-reporting bail agency to continue the work of the District of Columbia Bail Project. With respect to the specific details, the bill is presently being studied by my office and the Department of Justice. I regret to inform you that neither the Department nor I have arrived at a final position respecting all aspects of the bill. However, as a preliminary comment, I note that Section 11 (2) and (3) of the bill has the effect of rendering misdemeanor violations of Section 4 prosecutable within the sole jurisdiction of the United States Attorney, notwithstanding some of the violations will pertain to substantive crimes within the prosecuting jurisdiction of the Corporation Counsel, as provided for in Sections 3 (b) and 11 (c) of the bill. It would perhaps be more consistent with the administration of justice already established by Congress if Section 11 (2) and (3) would be so worded as to cause the Corporation Counsel to retain jurisdiction of those matters resulting from prosecutions instituted by him, as delineated in 22 D.C.C. § 101, in which "... the maximum punishment is a fine only, or imprisonment not exceeding one year. See also District of Columbia v. Moody, et al., 113 U.S. App. D.C. 67, 304 F. 2d 943 (1962); United States v. Strothers, 97 U.S. App. D.C. 63, 228 F. 2d 34 (1955). I shall continue our study of the bill and coordination with the Department of Justice so that the Committee might have benefit of our views at the earliest possible date. Thank you for bringing this important matter to my attention. Sincerely yours, DAVID G. BRESS, U.S. Attorney. Mr. WHITENER. Mr. Reporter, we have a letter here from Chief Judge Matthew McGuire, of the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia, this letter being dated May 23, 1966. Also, we have a letter dated May 27, 1966, from Chief Judge John Lewis Smith, Jr., of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions. We will make these letters a part of the record. These letters support the enactment of H. R. 15065. (The letters referred to follow:) U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Hon. JOHN L. MCMILLAN, Chairman, Committee on the District of Columbia, MY DEAR CONGRESSMAN: This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of May 20, 1966 enclosing therewith a copy of H. R. 15065 "To establish a factreporting bail agency in courts of the District of Columbia, and for other purposes" which has been referred to your Committee. In reply, you are advised that I have examined the Bill, having become familiar with its genesis, and although it is a much different Bill from that originally proposed some time ago, the object is the same and I think it worthwhile, and I have no hesitancy in saying so. Sincerely yours, MATTHEW F. MCGUIRE, Chief Judge. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS, Hon. JOHN L. MCMILLAN, Chairman, Committee on the District of Columbia, DEAR MR. MCMILLAN: Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of May 20th requesting recommendations concerning H.R. 15065, "To establish a fact-reporting bail agency in courts of the District of Columbia, and for other purposes". I am in favor of the passage of the proposed bill, but believe that it should also apply to the traffic and D.C. branches of the court. With kind personal regards and best wishes, I am, Sincerely, JOHN LEWIS SMITH, JR. Mr. WHITENER. Now we will hear from Mr. Kneipp. We have a statement or report from the Commissioners, which will be made a part of the record at this point, (The letter referred to follows:) GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, EXECUTIVE OFFICE, Washington, June 7, 1966. Hon. JOHN L. MCMILLAN, Chairman, Committee on the District of Columbia, DEAR MR. MCMILLAN: The Commissioners of the District of Columbia have for report H.R. 15065, 89th Congress, a bill "To establish a fact-reporting bail agency in courts of the District of Columbia, and for other purposes." The bill creates an independent bail agency to secure data and provide for any court or judicial officer in the District of Columbia reports containing verified information concerning any individual with respect to whom a bail determination is to be made. According to section 3 of the bill, the terms "judicial officer" and "bail determination" have the following respective meanings: "The term 'judicial officer' means, unless otherwise indicated, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, or any judge of any of said courts, a United States Commissioner and, when applicable, the Supreme Court of the United States or a Justice thereof." "The term 'bail determination' means any order by any judicial officer respecting the amount of bail, or terms and conditions of release of any person arrested in the District of Columbia for any offense except a charge of intoxication or traffic violation, and shall include a like order respecting any person deemed to be a material witness in any criminal proceeding in the District of Columbia." The agency established by the bill is required, "except when impracticable", to interview persons detained pursuant to law or charged with offenses in the District of Columbia, who are to appear before a U.S. Commissioner or whose cases arose in or are before any court of the District of Columbia. The agency is to independently verify information obtained from such interview, secure the person's prior criminal record from the Metropolitan Police Department, and prepare a written report of such information for submission to the appropriate judicial officer. The agency is authorized to present such report to the appropriate judicial officer with or without a recommendation for release on personal recognizance, personal bond, or other non-financial condition, but without any other recommendation. It must also provide copies of such report to the United States Attorney, to the Corporation Counsel if pertinent, and to counsel for the person who is the subject of the report. The report must at least include information concerning the person accused, his family, his community ties, residence, employment, and prior criminal record, if any. The information contained in the agency's files, presented in its report, or divulged during the course of any hearing, is to be used only for the purpose of a bail determination and is to be otherwise confidential. It cannot be made subject to court process for use in any other proceeding. The agency is to function under the authority and be responsible to a five-member executive com mittee consisting of the respective chief judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, and a fifth member to be selected by the four chief judges. The bill provides for the appointment of a Director of the agency, selected by the executive committee, whose compensation may not exceed that of a GS-15. The bill also provides, in section 7, for the employment of agency personnel. In this regard, the language of section 7 appears to be somewhat involved, and the Commissioners believe it desirable, from the standpoint of flexibility and clarity of expression, to amend section 7 to read as follows: "SEC. 7. Subject to such policies as the executive committee may establish, the Director shall employ and compensate such personnel as may be required to carry out the functions of the Agency. Such compensation shall be at rates provided for similar work under the Classification Act of 1949, as amended." Section 8 of the bill requires the submission to the Congress and to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts of a report on the agency's activities. Section 9 authorizes appropriation of such sums as may be required for the operation of the agency, to be disbursed by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Section 10 provides that persons convicted of offenses in the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions or in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall be given credit toward the service of such sentence as may be imposed for any days spent in custody while awaiting trial, or prior to the imposition of sentence, if it should appear that such person was so incarcerated solely because of his financial inability to provide bail. The Commissioners believe it only equitable that a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment after having been held in custody in connection with an offense should receive credit toward the service of such sentence for the days spent in custody while awaiting trial or prior to the imposition of the sentence. Section 11 provides penalties for persons who willfully fail to appear before a judicial officer as required by the terms of a bail determination. Section 12 provides for the effective dates of the various provisions of the bill. One feature of the bill is of considerable concern to the Commissioners. They note that the definition of "bail determination" has the effect of excluding from the coverage of the bill persons charged with the offense of intoxication or with a traffic violation. The Commissioners believe that anyone who is held in custody on a charge of intoxication or for a traffic violation, by reason of his being unable to post bail, should be subject to the provisions of the bill in like manner as persons charged with other, and perhaps more serious, offenses. Accordingly, the Commissioners recommend the deletion of the phrase "except a charge of intoxication or traffic violation" where such phrase occurs in lines 21 and 22 on page 2 of the bill. The Commissioners generally favor the principle of the bill in the belief that, when determining whether an accused person or material witness should be enlarged on bail, the court or judicial officer should have available full information respecting such a person. Accordingly, the Commissioners favor the enactment of the bill, preferably with the amendments they have suggested, and particularly the amendment recommended in the preceding paragraph. The Commissioners have been advised by the Bureau of the Budget that, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the submission of this report to the Congress. Sincerely yours, WALTER N. TOBRINER, President, Board of Commissioners, District of Columbia. STATEMENT OF ROBERT F. KNEIPP, ESQ., ASSISTANT Mr. KNEIPP. Mr. Chairman, as the Commissioners have indicated in this report to the Committee of June 7, 1966 they favor the enactment of the bill. They did, however, propose two amendments. One of them to Section 7 to make the personnel features more flexible. And this was backed by the Bureau of the Budget. The Bureau of the Budget feels that Section 7 of the bill was a little too inflexible in its language, and they would prefer the amendment set forth in the Commissioners' Report. Mr. WHITENER. What page is that? Mr. KNEIPP. It is on page three of the Commissioners' Report, which offers an amendment of Section 7 of the bill appearing on page six. Mr. WHITENER. All right, sir. Mr. KNEIPP. The other amendment the Commissioners have proposed is that in part offered by Judge Danaher, striking in lines 21 and 22 on page 2 of the bill the phrase, "except in charges of intoxication and traffic violations.". The Commissioners saw no reason why persons held in custody for failure to make bail should not be subject to this bail determination in like manner as persons charged with other offenses. |