...to choose to frustrate this attempt because they viewed it as a threat to their Assured Destruction capability, the extra cost to them would appear to be substantially less than the extra cost to us. This argument is not conclusive against our undertaking a major new Damage Limiting program. The resources...

...attempt because they viewed it as a threat to their Assured Deetruct: capability, the extra cost to then would appear to be substantially less than the extra cost to us. Second, since each of tie three, types of Soviet strategic offenilv* syitemi (land-based mlssilee, submarine-launched missiles...

...substantially less than the extra cost to us of any additional damage limiting measures we might take. Second, since each of the three types of Soviet strategic...missiles, submarinelaunched missiles, and manned bombers) can, by itself, inflict severe damage on the United States, even a "very good" defense against only...

...to choose to frustrate this attempt because they viewed it as a threat to their assured destruction developments. — The effort directed toward the expansion...subsystems. 3. Advanced development*. — The effort di has limited value. A "very good7' defense against bombers, for example, could be outflanked by targeting...

...were to choose to frustrate this attempt because they viewed as a threat to their assured destruction capability, the extra cost to them would appear to...very good defense against only one type of system has limited value. A very good defense against bombers, for example, could be outflanked by targeting...

...were to choose to frustrate this attempt because they viewed as a threat to their assured destruction capability, the extra cost to them would appear to...very good defense against only one type of system has limited value. A very good defense against bombers, for example, could be outflanked by targeting...

...to choose to frustrate this attempt ^because they viewed it as a threat to their assured destruction capability, the extra cost to them would appear to...each of the three types of Soviet strategic offensive svaems (land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and Binned bombers) could, by itself, inflict...

...Deatructloa capability, the extra oo*t to them vould appear to be substantially less than the extra coat to us. Second, since each of the three types of Soviet...(land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles and mnrmoil bombers ) could, by itself, inflict severe damage on tbe United State*, even a "very good"...

...to choose to frustrate this attempt because they viewed it as a threat to their Assured Deatructiom capability, the extra cost to them would appear to be substantially less than the extra co«t to us. Second, since each of the three types of Soviet strategic offensive Butane (land-baaed...

...substantially less than the extra cost to us of any additional damage limiting measures we might take. Second, since each of the three types of Soviet strategic...missiles, submarine-launched missiles and manned bombers) can, by itself, inflict severe damage on the United States, even a very good defense against only one...