EMINENT DOMAIN-Continued
for Government use, which was subsequently done by proper condemnation proceedings; and where the "Survey and Construction Permit" reserved to the owners the right to claim and receive full compensation for the value of any crops destroyed or damaged; it is held that plaintiffs are entitled to recover just compensation for the value of the growing crop of gray banana squash, which had been planted on a portion of the land, and which was partly damaged and partly destroyed. Daily, 723. Eminent Domain
XIX. Upon the evidence, the fair value of the crop on the land in question, on the date of the taking, was $20,059.60, from which is deducted $1,687.59, representing the amount of harvesting expense from which plaintiff was relieved, and also deducting $4,200, representing the market price of the squash actually harvested, leaving a net sum of $14,172.01 plus an additional amount as a part of just compen- sation measured by interest at four percent per annum, from date of taking to date of payment. Id. Eminent Domain
XX. The power of the Government to take under eminent domain applies to personal property as well as real property, and it has frequently been held that it is the character of the invasion, not the amount of resulting damage, so long as the damage is substan- tial, which determines whether there is a "taking" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. Id.
XXI. In a suit for just compensation for the requisition o
the yacht Mizpah by the War Shipping Administra- tion on March 16, 1942, where it is shown that the sister ship of the Mizpah sold in 1940 for about $110,000 and taking into consideration that in October 1940 the Navy Department was willing to pay $150,000 for the Mizpah and the plaintiff was then willing to accept $263,000, and upon the evidence as to the condition of the vessel, which had been kept most of the time in fresh water, and the superior equipment of the Mizpah, and other pertinent considerations; it is held that just com- pensation for the vessel on the date of requisition was $175,000. Plaintiff having been paid $87,000
on March 8, 1943, judgment is given for $88,000 plus, as a part of just compensation, interest on $175,000 at 4 percent per annum from March 16, 1942, to March 8, 1943, and interest at the same rate on $88,000 from March 8, 1943, to date of payment of judgment. McDonald, 734.
War and National Defense 14.
XXII. Cost has never been the measure of just compensation, although it may be one of the indicia to be taken into consideration in certain cases. See Vogelstein v. United States, 262 U. S. 337; Commodities Trading Corporation v. United States, 339 U. S. 121. Id.
War and National Defense 14.
XXIII. In the instant case, plaintiff's basis of reproduction cost, less depreciation, cannot be the measure of just compensation because at the time the Mizpah was requisitioned, when the use of private yachts was subject to severe government restrictions, costs of labor and material were high, no one would have thought of duplicating this yacht. Id.
See also Just Compensation VII, VIII, IX; Statute of Limitations I, II; Civil Aeronautics Act IV.
ERROR IN BID.
See Contracts XCVII.
ESTOPPEL.
See Contracts XLVI, XLVII, LXXXIII.
See Contracts XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII, XLII, XLIII, XLIV, XLV; Statute of Limitations I, II.
See Contracts XLVIII, XLIX, L, LI, LII, LIII, LIV. EXECUTIVE ORDER 9250.
See Contracts LXXXI, LXXXII, LXXXIII, LXXXIV, LXXXV, LXXXVI, LXXXVII, LXXXVIII.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 9301.
See Contracts LV, LVI, LVII, LVIII, LIX.
EXPERT WITNESSES.
See Eminent Domain VI.
FLYING PAY.
See Pay and Allowances I, II.
GOVERNMENT AGENTS, AUTHORITY OF.
I. A statement by the Chairman of the Board of Awards, when the bids were opened, that in his opinion the bid form provision for an increase or decrease if taxes
GOVERNMENT AGENTS, AUTHORITY OF-Continued
or charges were increased or decreased by Congress would apply to any adjustment of prices by the Office of Price Administration was not binding on the defendant, since the Chairman was not the con- tracting officer nor his authorized representative. Charles W. Kelly, 811.
United States
60.
II. Under the decisions, persons dealing with the Govern- ment must take notice of the extent of the authority conferred by the Government upon the agents with whom such persons are dealing. Id.
United States
40.
GRAND COULEE DAM.
See Contracts I.
GROWING CROP.
See Eminent Domain XVIII, XIX, XX. IMMIGRATION BOND.
I. In a suit to recover the proceeds of a Treasury note, deposited as security for a bond conditioned upon the requirements that an alien would depart from the United States by a certain time and that while in the United States he would not engage in any business or occupation or employment for hire, where it is shown by the evidence that both condi- tions of the bond were breached by the alien; it is held that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover. Kavounas, 406.
Aliens 53.
II. Where the alien, before his entry into the United States, had invested money in a partnership with his brother; and where after his admission as a tem- porary resident he assisted his brother in the business of the partnership, even after the expiration of the extended period for which he was admitted under the bond; it is held he was engaged in a business or occupation within the meaning of the provisions of the bond, and in violation thereof. A partnership is a well-recognized form of business association. Id. Aliens 53.
III. Where it is shown that pursuant to an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals, suspending the order of deportation issued by the Acting Commis- sioner of Immigration and Naturalization and per- mitting the alien to leave the country without
IMMIGRATION BOND-Continued
expense to the United States, the alien went to Canada where he obtained an immigration visa which permitted him to enter the United States for permanent residence, and he did so reenter this country about three months after the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals; it is held that the effect of the appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was to stay the entry of the order of depor- tation and the forfeiture of the bond, but the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the alien's subsequent lawful entry into the United States did not in any way affect the previously established breach of the obligations of the bond. Id.
Aliens
53.
I. Under the Jurisdictional Act of August 26, 1935, (49 Stat. 801) and in accordance with the prior decision in this case February 4, 1946 (105 C. Cls. 495), in which it was held that the Confederated Bands of Umpqua and Calapooia Indians of the Umpqua Valley were entitled to recover the value of the land reserved by them under the Treaty of November 29, 1854, and actually occupied by them at the time of their removal from the reservation in 1855, and that these Indians and certain others were entitled to recover the respective amounts set forth in that decision (105 C. Cls. 495), to the extent that they exceed any allowable offsets to which the defendant might show itself entitled under Rule 39 (a); it is held, after the taking of further evidence as to the valuations of the land taken and as to offsets, that the Umpqua and Cala- pooia Indians of the Umpqua Valley are entitled, after the deduction of offsets, to recover $342,450.74, together with interest on the principal sum as part of just compensation, under Article 1 of the 1854 Treaty, and that the Mo-Lal-Las or Molel Tribe of Indians are entitled, after offsets, to recover $34,996.85, without interest. Rogue River Tribe of Indians, 454.
United States 105.
II. As to the question of the size and location of the reservation occupied by the Confederated Bands of Umpqua and Calapooia Indians of the Umpqua Valley and reserved by them under the 1854 Treaty, the court finds that the description contained in the
first article of that treaty (10 Stat. 1125), the map prepared from that description by the Department of the Interior and the Department's estimate of the approximate area involved, indicate that the reser- vation contained approximately 67,820 acres of land in the Umpqua Valley in Douglas County, Oregon. Id.
Indians
12.
III. On the question of occupancy, the court finds that the Umpquas and Calapooias were, within the meaning of their treaty, in actual occupancy of all the land reserved to them in the first article of their treaty, including the tract reserved. The term "actual occupancy" indicated the usual mode of occupancy of Indians at that time. Id.
Indians
12.
IV. Almost immediately after the signing of the Treaty of December 21, 1855 (12 Stat. 981), ratified in 1859, by which the Molel Band was confederated with the Umpquas and the Calapooias, all the Indians assembled on the reservation, and the Umpquas and Calapooias were moved to the Grand Ronde Reservation. Thus, even if the Molels can be said to have been designated to share the reservation, they never actually occupied any portion of the land. Id.
Indians
12.
V. Taking into consideration the location of the tract and its physical characteristics, the development of the surrounding area at the time of taking, actual disposals of the tribal lands after the taking by the Government, private sale of similar lands bordering on the reservation, sales of land in the tribal area by the Oregon and California Railroad, agricultural and timber value of the reservation, and on the record as a whole, the court concludes that the lands taken had an average value of $1 per acre as of the date of taking on December 21, 1855. Id.
United States
108.
VI. The court follows the opinion in the case of the Alcea Band of Tillamooks et al. v. United States, 115 C. Cls. 463, in denying defendant's contention that any set-offs should be proportioned annually since 1855 before calculating and adding the additional amount
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