Opinion, per DONAHUE, J. no such result was intended either by the constitutional convention or the electors of the state. For several years following the adoption of this amendment to the constitution, municipalities, the public utilities commission of Ohio, the public utilities of Ohio, and all others vitally interested, concurred in interpreting this provision to mean that the exercise of police power by municipalities must be subject to the general laws of the state. Municipalities, public utilities and private citizens invoked the jurisdiction of the public utilities commission, not only to fix rates but to ascertain the value of the property of public utilities used and useful for the service and convenience of the public. In fact, the city of Cleveland, the defendant in error in this case, by resolution of its council, adopted February 2, 1914, long after it had adopted a charter, requested the public utilities commission of Ohio to appraise the value of the property of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, under authority conferred upon that commission by Section 499-8, General Code, and the utilities commission proceeded to make such valuation. While that proceeding was pending, the council of the city of Cleveland fixed a rate to be charged by The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company for power and light furnished by it to the citizens of Cleveland, and that company appealed to the utilities commission. Both the questions of valuation and rate were pending before the commission at the same time, without objection on the part of the city. The commission fixed the valuation, but did not fix the rate. To this order of the commission fixing the valua Opinion, per DONAHUE, J. tion, the city of Cleveland prosecuted error in this court. City of Cleveland v. Public Utilities Commission, post, 462. The city of Cleveland not only conceded the jurisdiction of the utilities commission, but complained of its failure to hear and determine the question of rates at the same time it fixed the valuation. In the case of The Lima Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, ante, 110, the city of Lima invoked the jurisdiction of the public utilities commission, challenging the rates, charges and classification in the schedule filed by The Lima Telephone & Telegraph Co. The utilities commission made an appraisement of the value of the company's property and fixed rates that might be charged by that company. In that case neither the city nor the utility questioned the jurisdiction of the commission. This court, all members concurring in the judgment, approved the order of the commission, both as to value and rates. In the case of The Kent Water & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 97 Ohio St., 321, the utilities commission upon the request of the village of Kent appraised the property of the water and light company. After this valuation was settled, the water and light company appealed to the utilities commission from an ordinance of the village of Kent fixing the rates that the company might charge consumers. The commission fixed a different rate. The company prosecuted error in this court to this rate order. The village interposed, insisting that the order made by the commission Opinion, per DONAHUE, J. was reasonable and lawful. The cause was remanded to the utilities commission for a review of the appraisement. In the case of the City of Cincinnati v. Public Utilities Commission, 96 Ohio St., 544, the council of the city of Cincinnati by resolution requested the public utilities commission to ascertain the value of the property of The Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company and The Union Gas & Electric Company, used and useful for the service and convenience of the public. The city prosecuted error in this court to the order of the commission fixing this valuation, but it did not question the jurisdiction of the utilities commission. This court, all members concurring, modified the order and affirmed the same as modified. In the case of the City of Cincinnati v. Public Utilities Commission, Id., 270, it appeared from the record that on the 13th day of October, 1916, the council passed an ordinance fixing the rate to be charged for natural gas for five years; that the gas company accepted the ordinance, and agreed to abide and be bound thereby; that a referendum petition was filed October 30, 1916, which suspended the operation of the ordinance, so that no rate for natural gas was then in effect in that city; that the gas company filed a schedule with the public utilities commission; that the city of Cincinnati, through its solicitor, filed an application to strike this schedule from the files, and asked the public utilities commission to fix and put in force an emergency rate to be charged for natural gas in the city of Cincinnati, pending the referendum vote Opinion, per DONAHUE, J. on the ordinance, and that the utilities commission refused to fix such emergency rate. The city thereupon prosecuted error to this court, and this court held that there was no such emergency contemplated by the provisions of Section 614-32, General Code, that would authorize action by the public utilities commission, and affirmed its order. The question of the jurisdiction of the public utilities commission over public utilities operating within municipalities of this state was fully considered and determined in the case of City of Cincinnati v. Public Utilities Commission, 91 Ohio St., 331. That case did not involve the question of the authority of the utilities commission to fix rates, but it did involve the question of the authority of a municipality to exercise police power in the regulation of a local public utility, independent of the general laws of the state, and it did involve the jurisdiction of the public utilities commission of Ohio to regulate public utilities within the municipalities of the state. The city of Cincinnati passed an ordinance directing The Cincinnati Street Railway Company and The Cincinnati Traction Company to construct a double-track extension over a certain route within seventy days after the passage of the ordinance. The companies filed their complaint with the utilities commission, under the provisions of Sections 614-44 and 614-46, General Code, averring among other things that the requirements of the ordinance were unjust and unreasonable. The city of Cincinnati denied these averments. The utilities commission found that the additions and extensions required by the ordinance were not Opinion, per DONAHUE, J. practical, and entered an order relieving the street railway and the traction company from the obligations imposed thereby. The city of Cincinnati filed a petition in this court to review the order of the utilities commission. This court, all members concurring, held that the public utilities commission of Ohio is authorized to determine whether the requirements of such an ordinance are just and reasonable, and that the commission has authority to determine the practicability of additions and extensions of street railway lines required by city ordinance. Charter cities were not exempted from the operation of this decree. The principle involved in that case is identical with the principle involved in this. True, Cincinnati had not then adopted a charter, but a charter is merely a vehicle for the exercise of municipal power and cannot confer authority upon a municipality in excess of the power conferred by the constitution itself. It is expressly provided in Section 7, of Article XVIII, that the exercise of powers of local self-government, under a charter adopted in pursuance of that section, shall be subject to the provisions of Section 3. However, the case of Stange v. Cleveland, 94 Ohio St., 377, cannot be distinguished from the case at bar upon any theory of charter or no charter, nor upon any theory of different charter provision. It is the same city, the same charter and the same question as to the authority of the city to exercise police power, and involves a construction of Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution of Ohio. The city of Cleveland, on the 13th day of |